

**The Centrality of the Heart
in Herman Bavinck's
Anthropology**

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Edited by John Bolt



Anthony A. Hoekema (1913 – 1988)

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Preface

[v] The problem which shall be our main concern in this thesis is: What is primary or determinative in human nature? The author became interested in this problem through frequently hearing people use the expression, "the primacy of the intellect." The more he thought about this expression, however, the more he became convinced that the interpretation of human nature implied in that expression is neither Scripturally sound nor psychologically tenable. If, however, the intellect is not primary, to what should primacy be ascribed? What is actually primary in human nature? What is the ruling center in man, which ultimately determines all that he thinks, says, and does? This question will form the subject of the investigation which follows.

As will be evident from the sub-title, the psychology of Herman Bavinck forms the central focus of this thesis. It was thought advisable to organize this investigation around the position of some one man, in order to give unity, coherence, and definiteness to this study. It was decided to make Bavinck the central figure in this study because, in the author's opinion, he has made a real contribution to this problem. Bavinck had a remarkable background for a problem [vi] of this sort, being thoroughly at home both in the fields of systematic theology and psychology, and having written a number of important publications in both fields. It is the author's conviction that, to the question of what is primary in human nature, Bavinck gave an essentially correct answer. However, the author feels that Bavinck also illustrates some of the more common misconceptions and inadequacies which still plague many Christian thinkers when they come to express themselves on psychological questions. Hence it was considered profitable to make Bavinck's contribution to this problem basic in this thesis.

The first chapter will therefore deal at some length with the psychology of Herman Bavinck, with special references to the question of what he considered primary in human nature. Subsequent theologians will be compared to Bavinck in such a way that both the latter's merits and inadequacies will be pointed out. Bavinck's psychology will thus form the main theme of this investigation.

Chapter 2, dealing with the position of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, two contemporary Dutch scholars, has been added to show how Bavinck's position on the "primacy of the heart" has been utilized in the formulation of a distinctive philosophical approach.

Next follows an historical survey. Four outstanding Christian theologians are investigated, with a view to [vii] determining whether they corroborate or refute Bavinck's position on what is primary in human nature. No attempt is made in these historical studies to be exhaustive; the aim is simply to find some historical confirmation, either negatively or positively, for the rightness of Bavinck's view on the problem which here concerns us. Accordingly, chapters 3 to 6 deal, successively, with Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. The reasons why these men have been singled out will be found in the chapters in which they are discussed.

Chapter 7 is titled, "The Scriptural Conception of the Heart." The reason why this chapter is included is obvious. To us who are Christians, the Bible is the final court of appeal in all matters of faith and life. Accordingly, in chapter 7 we go with our problem to the Scriptures, to see what the Bible holds to be primary or determinative in man, and to see whether the Scriptural answer to this question agrees with Bavinck's position.

In chapter 8 Bavinck's psychology is subjected to a rather thoroughgoing evaluation, in light of the previous historical and Biblical study. His positive contributions to our subject are noted, but his inadequacies are also pointed out.

Although Bavinck's psychology forms, as has been said, the main theme of this investigation, still the ultimate goal of this study is a clearer understanding of human nature, particularly with regard to the question of what is primary or [viii] determinative in man. Accordingly, in chapter 9, the author gives his own formulation of an answer to this question, and attempts to draw his own conclusions on the basis of the foregoing investigation. Also in this chapter, the problem which forms the subject of this thesis is related to recent trends in psychological research. These recent psychological trends are seen to confirm the primacy of the heart, and to refute the primacy of the intellect, or of any other single function of the soul. Hence the conclusion is reached that what is primary or determinative in man is not the intellect, the will, or the feelings, but the heart.

In order to facilitate the discussion, a few terms should be briefly defined. When the terms primary or primacy are used in this thesis in connection with the intellect, the will, the heart, or any other aspect of mental life, they mean primacy in the sense of sovereignty, and are intended to indicate the ruling center in man. By the term heart is meant the inner core of human personality; the organ of thinking, feeling, and willing, as well as the seat of sin, of faith, and of spiritual renewal. By the soul is meant the immaterial aspect of man; the terms soul and heart shall often be used interchangeably. Where a distinction is intended, the heart will be considered to be the center or core of the soul. The terms self and ego, although not precisely synonymous, shall nevertheless be used as practically synonymous with soul, and even, at times, with heart. [ix]

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dr. John E. Kuizenga, under whom this investigation has begun, and to other members of the Princeton Seminary faculty, for many helpful suggestions as to the manner in which this investigation was to be conducted; to the library staffs of Princeton Seminary and Calvin College for their constant helpfulness; to the Twelfth Street Christian Reformed Church of Grand Rapids for their exceptional co-operation, which included a four-month leave of absence; and to Mrs. Adrian Poulisse of this city for her invaluable assistance in typing the manuscript.

A. Hoekema
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Chapter 1

The Psychology of Herman Bavinck

[1] We begin our study with an exposition of the psychology of Herman Bavinck, who lived from 1854 – 1921, and at the time of his death was professor of systematic theology at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands.¹ Although Bavinck's major contributions were in the field of systematic theology, still throughout his life he interested himself in psychological questions, writing a number of works on psychology, including one on Biblical psychology. Since he approached psychology with a tremendous background in theology, what he has to say will have a great value for a Christian anthropology.

We shall approach Bavinck with the question which forms the main subject of this thesis: namely, what is fundamental or determinative in human nature? In order to find Bavinck's answer to this question, we shall examine his psychology under a number of more or less interrelated topics. We shall first note what he says about the unity of the soul, the substantiality of the soul, and the wholeness of human personality. Next, we shall take notice of the "primacy" which he assigned to the heart. Then we shall observe Bavinck's doctrine of the faculties, noting their relation to the heart. In connection with this, we shall take up the question of whether Bavinck taught that there is a "primacy of the intellect" in human nature. In closing, we shall point out the relation [2] between the heart and sin in Bavinck's teaching, and also the relation between the heart and spiritual renewal.

The Unity of the Soul

First of all, then, we shall examine Bavinck's teachings on the unity of the soul. Bavinck insists quite emphatically on the unity of the soul. To begin with, he vigorously opposes those thinkers and systems which deny this unity. Among the ancients it was especially the Greek philosophers who denied the unity of

¹Ed. note: Free University of Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).

the soul and who, therefore, incurred Bavinck's decided disapproval. In *De overwinning der ziel*, for example, he states that both Plato and Aristotle ascribed three souls to man, but that we fail to find in either of these thinkers any inner unity among these souls.² In his *Beginselen der psychologie*, he criticizes the scholastic psychology of the Middle Ages in similar vein. After showing that this psychology, especially as developed in Thomas, followed Aristotle in ascribing vegetative, sensitive, and rational activities to the soul, Bavinck comments: "The division of the soul into *anima vegetativa*, *sensitiva*, and *intellectiva* does not do justice to the unity of the life of the soul, nor to the mutual interrelatedness of these three functions of the soul."³

[3] In Bavinck's day, however, there was another school of thought which denied the unity of the soul and which he, therefore, opposed with even greater vigor. I refer to what Bavinck calls "the newer psychology," by which he means the associationistic, atomistic psychology represented by such men as Herbart and Wundt. In his *Beginselen* he describes the position of this school in considerable detail, characterizing it as a "*Psychologie ohne Seele*."⁴ According to Kant, so Bavinck explains, the soul is a series of conscious states; whether there is a substance behind these mental states which "has" these states we do not know; all we need to do in psychology is to study the relationships which obtain between the various conscious states. Psychology is thus wholly sundered from metaphysics.

Bavinck combats this view in no uncertain terms. He draws an argument from personal experience:

² Herman Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1916), 21.

³ Herman Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie* (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1897), 20. A second edition of this work was published in 1923. Except where specifically designated, however, all quotations from this book are from the first edition. ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, in *Bavinck Review* 9 (2018): 25. Ed. note: Some of the passages and specific phrasing that Hoekema cites from the first edition were not picked up or significantly enlarged and altered by Valentijn Hepp who prepared the second edition. In what follows, we will only cite the ET reference when it is explicitly found in the second edition. In some instances, this may be only a part of the original.

⁴ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 22. Ed. note: This particular German quote is not found in the second edition. The closest similar point of view is Bavinck's critique: "The soul, the self, is denied as an active, creative force." See Bavinck, *Foundations of Psychology*, 33.

Every man is conscious of being a self, distinct from others. Mine and thine are always sharply distinguished. The thoughts which I think, the emotions which I feel, the decisions which I make, are mine and not the experiences of others. Sin, virtue, responsibility, imputation, repentance, sorrow, pain, reward, punishment, etc., all presuppose the distinctness and independence of the individual.⁵

Further on in this same discussion, Bavinck draws a parallel between the atoms which the physicist must assume to [4] explain the phenomena of physics, and the soul which the psychologist must assume to explain the phenomena of consciousness. If the physicist has the right to assume the existence of atoms as carriers of physical phenomena, the psychologist has equal right to assume the existence of a soul which is behind the conscious phenomena.

In fact, all psychical phenomena are of such a unique sort that they demand a spiritual soul as a bearer. Sensation, consciousness, thought, self-consciousness, will, personal identity amidst all bodily changes, language, religion, morality, art, science, history, etc., all point back to the soul of man as a spiritual principle.⁶

Bavinck also criticizes this same associationist psychology in his Stone Lectures of 1908, the Dutch edition of which bears the title, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, especially in the lecture on “Revelation and Religious Experience.” There he states that this kind of empirical psychology shall never fully be able to understand or explain the life of the soul, since it cannot penetrate to the real self, the substantial soul behind all the phenomena which it investigates. To this he adds a second criticism, namely, that this kind of psychology cannot do justice to reality because it treats man too much as an abstraction. It abstracts man from his social environment, the mental processes from their connection with the full life of man, and even abstracts from the wholeness of mental life certain specific phenomena, such as sensations of time, space, and color. The result is that this atomistic type of psychology is wholly inadequate to account for or to explain the rich totality of man’s mental life. Bavinck [5] continues:

⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 30; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 41. Note [by Hoekema]: Since Dutch is not as well known as most modern languages, all direct quotations from the Dutch occurring in this thesis have been translated. The translations are in every instance mine.

⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 32; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 44.

In reality, the phenomena of consciousness do not occur in isolation, but are closely related to each other, and together arise out of the depth of the personality. The whole is not to be understood atomistically as an aggregation of parts, but, conversely, the parts are to be understood organically as an unfolding of the totality.⁷

Bavinck thus anticipated the criticisms of this associationist psychology which were to be made by the Gestalt school, several years later. All of his criticisms serve to confirm his commitment to the unity of the soul.

Once again, in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, published in 1920 and therefore revealing his mature position, Bavinck opposes this atomistic psychology. In connection with his discussion of trichotomy, he points to the danger of losing the unity of personality if the trichotomic view be adopted, and calls attention to three non-Christian systems of thought which deny this unity. The last of these is the associationist psychology of Bavinck's day, which denied the personal soul, and for which the soul was just a name for the sum of all thoughts and feelings. Bavinck goes on to remark that the Christian view of man, grounded in Holy Scripture, stands diametrically opposed to all such dissolution of the unified personality, since Scripture affirms throughout that man is one.⁸

[6] Turning now to Bavinck's positive teachings on this point, we may note, first of all, his stress on man as an organic unity of body and soul. We find his discussion of this point elaborated most completely in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*. Soul and body are not antithetical to each other, but were both created by God, so that man, in body and soul, forms an organic unity.⁹ Further in this same chapter, Bavinck repudiates the dualism of Plato and Descartes, and also of the psychophysical parallelism of his day, saying: "Spirit and matter, soul and body, are certainly distinguished in Scripture, but they never stand dualistically

⁷ Herman Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1908), 182–83. The English edition of these Stone Lectures bears the title, *The Philosophy of Revelation* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1909); new ET: *The Philosophy of Revelation: A New Annotated Edition*, ed. Cory Brock and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2018); cited passage is on p. 173.

⁸ Herman Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1920), 57. Another critical discussion of this associationist psychology will be found in Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 25 f.

⁹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 18.

opposed to each other. They are at all times closely united, influence each other, and work together with each other.”¹⁰ He goes on to show that the possibility of this co-operation and interaction of two diverse substances is rooted in the theistic belief that God, who is spirit, has created the material universe. The fact of creation is basic to the unity amidst diversity which we find everywhere in the universe, and specifically in the constitution of man.¹¹

Again, in the chapter on “Soul and Body,” Bavinck states that Scripture does not dissect man into parts, but considers man in his unity.¹² In connection with the [7] distinction between soul and spirit, to which we shall return later, Bavinck denies that these two Biblical concepts stand for two different substances in man. “Spirit and soul refer to the same inner man, looked at from different sides.”¹³ And in the concluding chapter of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, Bavinck summarizes the Scriptural view in these words:

Man is a unity, an organic whole, a unity amidst diversity. This truth is of the greatest importance, especially at the present time. There are psychologists and pedagogues who disregard soul or body; intellect, heart, or will; the unity or the diversity of the life of the soul. But the Scriptures do justice to the whole man, in all his aspects. Soul and body are not dualistically opposed to each other, like two clocks, but they are most intimately united in man’s personality, and are such essential constituents of man’s being that the separation between the two wrought by death shall again be done away by the resurrection.¹⁴

Enough has been quoted to show that Bavinck believed in the organic unity of body and soul in man.

We may, however, also look at the unity of the soul from another, somewhat more philosophical, point of view: that of the self as the subject of all mental activity. This approach to the question is most characteristic of Bavinck’s earlier psychological work, the *Beginnselen der psychologie*, which has over twenty-five references to this point. Already on page 2 of this work Bavinck asserts that

¹⁰ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 21.

¹¹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 22.

¹² Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 24.

¹³ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 58.

¹⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 79.

behind all mental states and functions the soul or ego is hidden. On page 13 he remarks that the soul of man is the subject of all of man's mental and physical functions. In discussing the nature of the soul, he criticizes the materialists who say [8] that mental phenomena are a secretion of the brain and that the brain is the subject of human thinking.

As little as the foot is the subject and cause of walking, so little is the brain the subject and cause of thinking. In both cases it is the hidden essence of man (the spirit, the ego) which is subject and cause. It is the inner, invisible man who thinks with his brain and walks with his feet, who sees with his eye and hears with his ear.¹⁵

After rejecting both the materialistic and the pantheistic conceptions of the soul, Bavinck presents the theistic view as that to which he is committed: "Theism, recognizing this diversity amidst unity, posits that the soul is a unique spiritual substance, different from the body, having a distinct origin, essence, and duration."¹⁶

Further, on page 39 and following, Bavinck criticizes Herbart's psychology, in which various types of ideas and images combine with each other in a mechanical, haphazard way, the soul having no direct control over these combinations. In criticism Bavinck avers that these ideas and images, though not always the products of conscious activity, are nevertheless products of the soul, and must therefore be attributed to the working of the soul. Similarly, at another place he states that though circumstances may be the occasion (*causa formalis*) of the emotions, their real cause (*causa efficiens*) is the soul itself.¹⁷

[9] In fact, this holds true for all the actions of man: "It is always the same sensory-spiritual subject which is the cause of all physical and mental changes."¹⁸

¹⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 28.

¹⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 31; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 43. Cf. also the quotation from Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 32, given in footnote 6 above; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 44.

¹⁷ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 62. Cf. pp. 152, 154, 161; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 110; cf. 160 ff.

¹⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 163. Cf. p. 171; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 215; cf. 222.

In connection with self-consciousness, Bavinck criticizes the associationist view which would make self-consciousness just a combination of conscious phenomena. Self-consciousness, he replies, is an activity in which the soul distinguishes itself from the world, and in which it is conscious of being a distinct essence, identical with itself through all the time of its existence. The phenomenon of self-consciousness, therefore, is another proof for the reality of the substantial soul behind all mental activity.¹⁹

In discussing the question of the freedom of the will, Bavinck observes that some have ascribed this freedom to the intellect and some to the will. His answer is that both intellect and will have a part in this freedom; and that the best way to express this fact is to ascribe freedom to man himself, rather than to any of his faculties: "Freedom is therefore an attribute of man, who judges with his intellect, and rules with his will. . . . He himself is the subject of this freedom."²⁰ This again establishes Bavinck's thesis that the unified, substantial soul of man is the real subject of all mental activity.

In Bavinck's *Overwinning der ziel*, a lecture delivered [10] in 1916, another illuminating statement about the substantial soul is found. After reviewing the arguments of Locke, Hume, and the associationist psychologists, who deny that there is a real ego behind the phenomena of consciousness, Bavinck replies:

But all these arguments cannot overthrow the incontrovertible testimony of our own consciousness, that the "I" in us remains the same, notwithstanding all the changes, both internal and external, which the passing of the years has wrought in us. In the stream of phenomena which we call our soul-life, the "I-ness," the unity and identity of personality, remains standing, immovable as a rock in the midst of the waves.²¹

A little further on, he adds the significant observation that this self, which is the subject and bearer of all mental phenomena, is in a certain sense above time:

¹⁹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 118–19; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 168–70. See also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 50–53, for an excellent discussion of the psychological significance of self-consciousness; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 33–36.

²⁰ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 180. Cf. p. 188; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 233; cf. 241.

²¹ Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 25.

From the present moment, we project that “self” far into the past. We remember that we had certain experiences years and years ago, and that we were then nevertheless the same person as now. In the midst of the stream of becoming, we discern in our own personality a being which exalts itself above time and extends itself through time. This being is the soul which, as personality, conquers sensuality and becomes a partaker of spirituality and eternity.²²

Enough has been quoted to show that Bavinck believed in the substantial self as the subject of all mental activity.²³ But we may note still another way in which he teaches the unity of the soul: namely, by his frequent emphasis on the whole man. According to Bavinck, man’s religious life, which is his [11] true life, consists in serving God with his entire being. So, for instance, in his *Christelijke wereldbeschouwing*, published in 1904, and therefore one of his earlier works, he says:

Religion is not mere doctrine. . . . Neither is religion mere doing. . . . Still less is religion a mere romantic sentiment or aesthetic emotion. . . . But religion is more, is something other and higher than all of those put together; it consists in serving God with all our mind and with all our soul and with all our powers.²⁴

In similar vein he remarks elsewhere:

Religion is not limited to one of man’s faculties, but includes the whole man. Our relation to God is total and central. We must love God with all of our mind, with all our soul, and with all our powers. Just because God is God, he demands our whole self, body and soul, with all our faculties and in all our relationships.²⁵

²² Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 26. On this point, see also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 118; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 114.

²³ For further references to this point, see Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 37–38, and 97; and Herman Bavinck, “Het onbewuste,” a chapter in the volume titled *Verzamelde opstellen op het gebied van godsdienst en wetenschap* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1921), 184, 186, 202; ET: “The Unconscious,” in *Essays on Religion, Science, and Society*, ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic: 2008), 175–98.

²⁴ Herman Bavinck, *Christelijke wereldbeschouwing* (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1904), 93; ET: *Christian Worldview*, ed. and trans. Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, James Eglinton, and Cory Brock (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2019), 132.

²⁵ Herman Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 3rd ed. (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1918), 1:277; ET: *Reformed Dogmatics*, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1, *Prolegomena*

This same stress on the whole man is evident in Bavinck's discussion of the image of God. The image of God extends to the entire man; nothing in man is excluded from it. Man is the image of God insofar as he is man, and he is man insofar as he is the image of God. That image, therefore, is found in soul and body, in all his faculties and powers, in all conditions and relationships.²⁶ This image of God in the narrow sense includes especially three virtues: knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. Through the exercise of these three virtues head, heart, and hand are kept in proper balance and work together [12] in perfect harmony.²⁷

If man is essentially a unity, a totality, a wholeness, it follows that pedagogy must not split man into parts, or educate only one aspect of man's many-sided nature to the neglect of other aspects, but must aim at training the entire man. This very point Bavinck makes in a significant sentence on page 80 of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*: "Sound pedagogy may not consist in mere instruction of the intellect or mere education of the will, but has man himself as its object; it must strive to go behind intellect and will, behind soul and body, and attempt to form the person himself into a man of God, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."²⁸

It ought certainly to be obvious by this time that Bavinck believed in the unity of the soul. Man is one, and must be thought of as one, treated as one, trained as one. Though we may think of man from different aspects and look at him from different sides, though we may even distinguish different powers and faculties within his soul, the fundamental unity of man must never be lost sight of. This Bavinck would insist upon.

(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 268–69 (hereafter *RD*, 1). See also Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 214, where the same point is stressed.

²⁶ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:596; ET: *Reformed Dogmatics*, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 2, *God and Creation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 555 (hereafter *RD*, 2).

²⁷ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 94. See also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 225, where this view is contrasted with Kant's conception of man; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 207.

²⁸ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 80.

The Primacy of the Heart

We may now pass on to another aspect of Bavinck's psychology, namely, what I have chosen to call *the primacy of the heart*. By this I mean that in Bavinck the heart is considered to be the source and fountain of all mental life, the [13] core of man's personality. All of man's functions, faculties, and powers are considered as issuing from the heart and as determined and controlled by the heart. Because this matter is of primary importance for the subject of this thesis, I shall take the liberty of expounding Bavinck's views on this point in considerable detail. The question of the exact meaning of the concept *heart* in Bavinck may safely be deferred until after this survey has been completed.

Bavinck's conception of the primacy of the heart is derived directly from the Scriptures, as will become evident. There is no book in the world, Bavinck remarks, in which the heart is so prominent as Holy Scripture;²⁹ in the Bible intellect and will are decidedly in the background, whereas the heart is in the foreground.³⁰ When speaking of the heart, Bavinck again and again quotes Prov. 4:23, which might therefore be considered as a key verse for this discussion: מְכַל־מִשְׁמֶר נָצַר לְבָבְךָ בֵּי־מִמְנוּ תוֹצְאוֹת חַיִּים: ("Above all guarding keep thy heart, for out of it are the issues of life").³¹ The word תוֹצְאוֹת, translated "issues," means literally "outgoings," from יָצָא, "to go out." The text therefore teaches that all the essential [14] actions, thoughts, and function which constitute life come forth out of the heart, which for that reason is to be guarded with all diligence, as the source and center of life. This is precisely the view of the heart which Bavinck develops in his psychology.³²

²⁹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 59.

³⁰ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 67.

³¹ Among the many places where Bavinck refers to or quotes this text, the following may be noted: *Beginselen der psychologie*, 14, 138; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 188; *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 182; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 173 ("gates of life"); *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 61, 77, 80, 118; *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598; ET: *RD*, 2:556.

³² That Bavinck's conception of the heart remained basically the same throughout his life will be evident from the variety of sources quoted on this point, ranging from the *Beginselen der psychologie* of 1897 to the *Verzamelde opstellen op het gebied van godsdienst en wetenschap* of 1921; ET: *Essays on Religion, Science, and Society*. In all of these

On the basis of these and similar texts from Scripture, Bavinck teaches that the heart of man is the center of all his mental life. In his *Beginselen der psychologie* of 1897 he proves from Scripture that the heart is the organ of all the higher mental life of man: of emotions and passions, of desire and will, and also of thinking and knowing, adding the following significant statement: “The heart thus determines the direction of a man’s life; it is the source and motive-power of his consciousness and desire, of his intellect and will; all mental functions and activities of man have their center in the heart.”³³ More than twenty years later Bavinck expressed exactly the same view in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*: “They [that is, the faculties and powers of man] are many and manifold, but they find their center and source in the heart. Out of it are the issues of life, of the life of the intellect, of the feeling, and also of the will.”³⁴ But the clearest statement of the primacy of the heart, together with the relation between the heart and the two main [15] types of mental activity which Bavinck distinguishes, I found in his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*:

Whereas the spirit is the principle and the soul is the subject of life in man, the heart, according to Holy Scripture, is the organ of his life. It is first of all the center of *bodily life*, but further, in a metaphorical sense, the basis and source of all mental life, of emotions and passions, of desire and will, even of thinking and knowing. Out of the heart are all the תוֹצְאוֹת הַיָּד, Proverbs 4:23. This mental life, which has its origin in the heart, divides itself into two streams. On the one hand, one may distinguish that life which includes all impressions, ideas, sensations, perceptions, deliberations, thoughts, knowledge, and wisdom; which, particularly in its higher form, has the *nous* as its organ; and which embodies itself in words and in language. On the other hand, from the heart also originates all the emotions, affections, passions, inclinations, impulses, desires, and decisions of will, which must be directed by the *nous*, and which express themselves in deeds.³⁵

works, his view remained fundamentally identical with that set forth in the *Beginselen der psychologie* of 1897.

³³ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 14.

³⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 80. Of similar import are statements found on pp. 61 and 63. Cf. also p. 118, where the heart is called “the center and hearth of the psychical organism.”

³⁵ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598 [italics mine]; ET: *RD*, 2:556.

This carefully worded statement makes Bavinck's chief psychological emphasis very plain, and indicates that, according to him, the heart is the source of both of the two streams of mental activity which comprise the life of the mind.

If the heart, then, is the deepest center of man's soul life, it would seem to follow that religion, which is man's most comprehensive activity, should also have its seat in the heart. This is, indeed, Bavinck's position. He touches upon this point briefly in the first volume of his *Dogmatiek*, where he says: "The heart is the very center of religion."³⁶ He seems here, however, to understand by heart [16] merely the center of man's emotional life, since in the immediately preceding context he has been discussing the importance of feelings and emotions in religion. Of greater value for our purpose is a later statement, taken from *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*: "The heart is the hearth and the source of the life of the intellect, of the feelings, and also of desire and will; not only do science and art; but also religion and ethics find their origin there."³⁷ Obviously Bavinck here means by heart the inner core of man's total self, as described above, and makes it the source of religion and ethics, as well as all other mental and spiritual activities. On a later page of the same volume Bavinck remarks: "Both [that is, the history of religion and the psychology of religion] have established beyond all doubt that religion has not been imposed upon man from the outside . . . but that it has its deepest source in the heart of man."³⁸ We may conclude, then, that for Bavinck the heart is not only the center of man's general mental or psychical activity, but also of his moral and religious activity; out of it are also the issues of his spiritual life.

Let us now go on to note the relation between the heart and the various specific faculties or functions of the soul. We may begin with the intellect. In his discussion of the faculty of knowing (*het kenvermogen*) in the *Beginselen der psychologie*, [17] Bavinck devotes considerable space to the impressions, ideas, sensations, and

³⁶ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:275; ET: *RD*, 1:266.

³⁷ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 61. I have taken the liberty of translating "het religieuze en het ethische leven" by "religion and ethics."

³⁸ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 204. See also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 176: "Religion is beyond doubt a matter of the heart." ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 167.

images which, he says, form the working capital of the knowing-faculty. These impressions, especially those received in early youth, remain to the end of life; they are of various sorts; physical, religious, ethical, and aesthetic. They precede all conscious life and all thinking. Then he goes on to say:

The richest, deepest life, also of the knowing-faculty, lies behind intellect and reason, in the heart of man, as Scripture calls it. Out of it are the issues of life. Out of it come man's thoughts and deliberations. There folly originates. What kind of philosophy one has, as Fichte rightly remarked, depends on what kind of man he is; one's philosophy is frequently nothing else than the history of the heart.³⁹

Here Bavinck draws a parallel between the impressions and ideas which form the raw material for knowing, and the Scriptural conception of the heart, ascribing primacy and determination to the heart.

In his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, Bavinck gives special attention to the Biblical passages in which the term heart is used, so as to determine the Scriptural meaning of the term. In discussing the Scriptural data, the first meaning to which he calls attention is this: "The heart is in Holy Scripture first of all the organ of imagining and thinking"; following this statement he enumerates the passages where this view is found.⁴⁰ A little further on he makes specific reference to the Greek word *nous*. After showing that Paul uses the word [18] *nous* to denote the organ of thinking,⁴¹ Bavinck goes on to say: "But this activity of thinking is not found loosely by itself in man, but hangs together with his entire personality. Man thinks as he is . . . the *nous* always has a particular moral quality."⁴² After citing a number of passages which establish this view, he concludes: "All these passages show that the *nous* in Scripture is not a neutral faculty, but is intimately related to man's character."⁴³ If, now, we may draw a

³⁹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 77. Cf. also p. 188. ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 126; cf. 24.

⁴⁰ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 63.

⁴¹ Bavinck does not explain how both the heart and the *nous* can be considered organs of thinking, but simply leaves these two statements side by side.

⁴² Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 69.

⁴³ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 69.

parallel between a man's character and his heart, we may conclude that the Scriptural understanding of the *nous* confirms the relation between heart and intellect which Bavinck has been expounding: namely, that the heart is the source for the activity of the intellect.

The second meaning of the term heart in Scripture which Bavinck mentions is that of being “the organ of the life of feeling, the seat of all emotions and passions.”⁴⁴ As in the previous case, he lists a number of passages where the term heart is used in this sense. In his *Beginselen der psychologie* he also mentions that the heart is the seat of the emotions.⁴⁵ So, with respect to the emotions also, the [19] heart is basic.

In the third place, according to Bavinck, “the heart is in Scripture also the source and organ of desiring and willing.”⁴⁶ Once again, a number of texts are cited in proof. A few pages further, he singles out the will for special treatment. After noting that there is no specific Old Testament word for willing, he discusses the two New Testament words used for that function, βούλομαι and θέλω.⁴⁷ However, here the same relationship obtains between will and character which was noted in connection with *nous*:

The first word [βούλομαι] denotes particularly the readiness and inclination which is the fruit of deliberation, while the second [θέλω] has reference more to the action of the will itself. Even when this last word is used, however, it is repeatedly evident that this willing, too, is not abstract but concrete, and hangs together with the character of the person.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 63. It is interesting to note that, although Bavinck only recognizes two faculties in man, the knowing-faculty and the desiring-faculty, he nevertheless follows the more modern threefold division in his discussion of the Scriptural meaning of the term heart.

⁴⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 166; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 218.

⁴⁶ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 64.

⁴⁷ Bavinck himself does not give the Greek words here, but I have supplied them after a study of the passage cited. Ed. note: If Hoekema did intend to point to a single passage, it is likely Rom. 7:19; other passages cited by Bavinck include: John 1:13; Eph. 2:3; 1 Pet. 4:3; Matt. 7:12, 8:3, 12:38; Mark 6:25, 10:35; and John 5:6.

⁴⁸ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 70.

Further on in the same paragraph, Bavinck quotes Paul's confession in Rom. 7:19, "For the good which I would [θέλω] I do not," adding: "Even this will is no arbitrary or purely formal choice, but the expression of a powerful personality, who wills the good or the evil with all of his heart."⁴⁹ We may conclude then, that, as in the case of thinking and feeling, so it is with willing. Willing is not an isolated function, sundered from the rest of man's personality, but is intimately connected with man's character and gives expression to that character. Using the Scriptural term once again, we may say [20] that for Bavinck willing comes up out of the heart and is determined by the heart. Not thought, not emotion, not will, but the heart is primary and central in Bavinck's psychology.

Before we proceed further, another subject demands our attention: namely, the relation between the heart and the "unconscious" or "subconscious" aspect of mental life. To what extent is the heart in Bavinck parallel with the subconscious life, and to what extent does it also include conscious phenomena? This is a question which we must face before we can define accurately what Bavinck means by the heart.

Unfortunately, Bavinck nowhere clearly defines this relation. Although he occasionally mentions the subconscious aspects of mental life, he nowhere definitely indicates how the heart fits into those phenomena. All we can do is to gather what Bavinck has said about the unconscious, compare it with what he has said about the heart, and draw our own conclusions.

In a general way, we may say that Bavinck recognizes the importance of the subconscious background of all mental activity. As will become evident when we discuss the faculties, Bavinck holds that behind thinking and willing there is a great deal of semi-conscious or subconscious mental activity, which prepares the way for thinking and willing, forms the raw material for them, and even in a certain sense directs them.

Through his consciousness man tries to give guidance to his life, but that life itself comes up out of the depths of his personality. . . . Beneath consciousness there is a world of instincts and inclinations, vague notions [21] and desires, dispositions and

⁴⁹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 70.

susceptibilities. . . . Beneath the head lies the heart, out of which are the issues of life.⁵⁰

Here Bavinck stresses the importance of the subconscious, and in a general way equates it with the heart.

In his *Beginselen der psychologie* Bavinck points out that just as the knowing-faculty (*het kenvermogen*) is rooted in certain innate dispositions and tendencies, so the activities of the desiring-faculty (*het begeervermogen*) are rooted in instinctive drives and inclinations. He mentions such drives as the instinct of self-preservation, the sex instinct, the instinct of imitation, and so on. At the close of his discussion he states: “All these instinctive drives, to use Scriptural language, together form the heart, out of which are the issues and determinations of life.”⁵¹ Here, too, he seems to identify the heart with these innate drives, which modern psychology would place in the so-called subconscious.

Bavinck’s most thorough discussion of the subconscious is found in his essay, “Het onbewuste,” found in the collection of essays called *Verzamelde Opstellen*, which was published after his death.⁵² Here he says that there are innate faculties, capacities, dispositions, inclinations, functions, and whatever else one wishes to call them, which, previous to our consciousness and our will, form us and mold us into what we are, thus laying the foundation for our [22] thinking and willing.

This is not the exception but the rule; conscious life is borne and animated by the unconsciousness; our sensing and perceiving, our feeling and willing, our thinking and speaking, our religious, moral, scientific, and artistic convictions, our insights and prejudices, our sympathies and antipathies, all root deep down beneath consciousness in our soul.⁵³

And he summarizes the paragraph by saying: “In the unconscious, in the soul itself with all that is innate in it, lies the root of human personality; soul and consciousness are decidedly not identical; the self is much richer than the ego.”⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 182; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 173.

⁵¹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 138; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 189.

⁵² Bavinck, “Het onbewuste,” 184, 186, 202; ET: “The Unconscious,” 175–98.

⁵³ Bavinck, “Het onbewuste,” 195; ET: “The Unconscious,” 186.

⁵⁴ Bavinck, “Het onbewuste,” 195; ET: “The Unconscious,” 187.

In this illuminating paragraph, in which the workings of the unconscious are so clearly described, Bavinck unfortunately does not mention the heart. On the concluding page of this essay, however, he says that the doctrine of the unconscious finds support in Scripture, since according to Scripture the soul is much richer and deeper than consciousness. To prove this he cites five Scripture passages, each of which contains the word *heart*, and refers to the hidden depths which are contained in the heart.⁵⁵ So we may draw from these passages the conclusion that, in a general way, Bavinck would identify the unconscious with the heart.

The clearest statement of the relation between the heart and the unconscious is found in Bavinck's *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*. There he states that by the heart we must understand the most hidden reality, the innermost core of man. [23] It is so deep and dark, he continues, that it is unfathomable for others and also for ourselves, and that in the last analysis only God can search and know the heart [here a number of Scripture passages are cited]. Then he remarks:

The heart is the seat of the hidden life of man, hidden not only from others, but frequently, and in a certain sense always, from himself. *There is the domain of what is nowadays called the unconscious.* As out of a hidden, subterranean spring, the life of thoughts, emotions, and desires streams out of the heart.⁵⁶

Here, then, Bavinck plainly states that in the heart is found the domain of the unconscious. We may therefore safely say that all Bavinck says about the unconscious he would likewise assert about the heart. There, in the heart, are found all the unconscious or subconscious tendencies which are the roots of conscious action, as described above. This parallel between the subconscious and the heart would therefore certainly confirm the point we have been making thus far; that for Bavinck the primary source of human mental and spiritual life is in the heart.

It must not be concluded, however, that the heart is to be restricted to the unconscious, and that, therefore, there is an absolute identification between the two. Such a conclusion would seem to be wholly unwarranted, even though, as has been mentioned, Bavinck nowhere clearly delineates the relation between heart

⁵⁵ Bavinck, "Het onbewuste," 207; ET: "The Unconscious," 197. The texts mentioned are: Ps. 44:22, Prov. 4:23, Jer. 17:9, 10; 1 Cor. 14:25, and 1 Peter 3:4.

⁵⁶ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 61 [italics mine].

and the subconscious or unconscious. The plain fact is, however, that Bavinck speaks of the heart, following Scripture, as the organ of thinking; and surely subconscious thinking is a contradiction in terms. When [24] Bavinck quotes Jesus as saying to the Pharisees, “Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts?”, surely he did not have in mind unconscious activity. Then, too, the heart in Bavinck is also the organ of feeling and willing. So we shall have to infer that by the term heart Bavinck would include the activity of what modern psychologists call *the unconscious*, though he would not restrict the functioning of the heart to subconscious activity. Like the iceberg, which is mostly submerged but partly above water, the heart in Bavinck’s psychology would seem to be chiefly below consciousness, and yet partly above the subconscious level.

A further question remains to be considered before defining what Bavinck means by heart. It is this: What is the distinction, in Bavinck’s thought, between heart, soul, and spirit? It is not easy to distinguish these three, since all three refer to the psychical or spiritual side of man, and since all three view man as a totality. The distinctions between them must, therefore, not be pressed too far.

In his *Beginselen der psychologie*, Bavinck discusses this question.⁵⁷ He first proves from Scripture that the spirit of man must be distinguished from the Spirit of God on the one hand, and of the animal on the other. Then he gives a number of Biblical references where spirit and soul are used in parallel fashion, or interchangeably. For example, man is sometimes said to consist of body and soul, and at other times of body and spirit. Psychical functions and states are ascribed now to the spirit, and then [25] to the soul. Dying is sometimes described as a departure of the soul, and sometimes as a yielding up of the spirit. Those that have died are sometimes called spirits, and sometimes souls.⁵⁸

However, Bavinck continues, though spirit and soul are fundamentally one, still there is a difference between them; they are synonymous but not identical. Spirit is the principle of life, and soul is the subject of life. The soul is the subject

⁵⁷ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 1–13. Ed. note: The editor of the second edition did not include these pages which are found in section 3 of the first edition, “The Psychology of Holy Scripture,” because Bavinck had elaborated them in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*.

⁵⁸ For the Scriptural references, see Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 12.

of all man's mental and psychical functions, whereas the spirit is the substance, the principle, the ground of this life; man is soul, but he has a spirit. "Soul is therefore used for all those activities and conditions which reveal themselves most clearly in the body, whereas spirit points to those activities of the soul, which, at least apparently, are less dependent on the body."⁵⁹

In his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* Bavinck repeats this distinction, but expands it somewhat:

Man is a spirit because he has not come forth out of the earth like the animals but has had the breath of life breathed into him by God; because he has received his life-principle from above, from God; because he has a spirit of his own, distinct from the Spirit of God; and because he is as such related to the angels, is able to ponder spiritual, heavenly things, and can if necessary also exist without a body. But man is soul because from the very beginning his spiritual constituent, in distinction from the angels, has been fashioned and organized for a body; because through the body he is bound to the earth and to the sensuous and the external, also for his higher life; because he can climb up to the higher only from the lower; because he is [26] therefore a sensuous, material being, and as such is related to the animals. Man is therefore an *animal rationale, un roseau pensant*; a being who stands between angels and animals, related to both and distinct from both, and who in himself unites and reconciles heaven and earth, invisible and visible realities.⁶⁰

Bavinck takes virtually the same position in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, only with this difference, that there he begins with the distinction between soul and spirit, and ends with their fundamental unity. After repeating the distinction sanctioned above between spirit as the principle and soul as the subject of life, he continues:

As spirit man is related to the invisible world; as soul to the visible. To the spirit therefore belong especially those attributes and activities which demonstrate man's relative independence of the world; to the soul particularly those capacities and states in which his dependence on his earthly environment expresses itself.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 13.

⁶⁰ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:597–98; ET: *RD*, 2:556.

⁶¹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 58.

In the next paragraph, however, Bavinck stresses the overlapping of the two terms: “Nevertheless, we may not speak of an essential, substantial difference between the two. Spirit and soul refer to the same inner man, looked at from different sides.”⁶²

It is obvious from this distinction that it is not easy to express clearly the distinction between soul and spirit in Bavinck. Both refer to the spiritual side of man; both stress the unity of man’s personality. Both refer essentially to the same spiritual substance; Bavinck vigorously repudiates the trichotomic view which would make them different substances.⁶³ Through his soul man is related to [27] this material world; through his spirit, to the invisible, spiritual world. Yet, because these terms are used interchangeably in the Scriptures, it would seem wise not to press the distinction too far. The soul, says Bavinck, is the subject of life. It must, then, be identical with the self or the ego which is the bearer of all the mental states, the executor of all man’s decisions and actions. In discussing the unity of the soul, we found that the terms *soul*, *ego*, and *self* are used synonymously in Bavinck. So we may say, in conclusion, that the soul stands for the subject of man’s actions, the psychical side of man; and that spirit stands for the same psychical side, only with special reference to man’s relation to spiritual realities.

From soul and spirit, now, heart must be distinguished. This distinction is expressed in Bavinck’s *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* as follows: “Whereas the spirit is the principle and the soul the subject of human life, the heart is the organ whereby he [man] lives.”⁶⁴ This same expression [namely, that the heart is the organ of man’s life] is found on page 61 of Bavinck’s *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, which represents his latest utterance on this subject. However, on page 62 of this same work, Bavinck expresses himself as follows: “The heart . . . is the central, innermost, and most receptive and sensitive organ of the human soul.” This last statement would seem to indicate the relation between soul and [28] heart most clearly: the soul is the subject of man’s acting and thinking, the

⁶² Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 58.

⁶³ See Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 12, 13; *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:597–98; ET: *RD*, 2:556–57; *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 58.

⁶⁴ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 13. See also Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598 for a similar statement; ET: *RD*, 2:556.

substantial ego, the self; whereas the heart is the central and innermost organ of that soul. On this basis, the heart is then not identical with the soul, or the self, or the ego, but is the most important organ through which the soul or self functions.

We see, then, that heart in Bavinck is not identical with the soul, but is the innermost organ of the soul. It is not the whole of mental life, but its source. In Bavinck's words, "The heart is the source but not the content of the life of the soul."⁶⁵

Summarizing, then, we may say that by the heart Bavinck means the core of man's personality, the source and center of all his physical, mental, and spiritual life: the life of the intellect, of the feelings, and of the will. The heart is therefore the center of man's religious life, of his ethics, of his science and his art, and of his philosophy. Willing and thinking are not isolated actions, but are intimately connected with man's character, since they have their source and directive center in the heart. The heart is the seat of the hidden life of man; in it is found the domain of what recent psychology has called the "subconscious self." Yet the heart is not wholly identical with the subconscious, but is also the center of conscious activities such as thinking and deliberate willing. Chiefly submerged below the conscious level, the heart is yet partly above that level. It is the central and innermost organ of the soul. [29]

Bavinck would distinguish within the soul of man a peripheral aspect and a central aspect. The central aspect is the heart, while the peripheral aspect includes all the thoughts, desires, feelings, impulses, and actions which issue from the heart. When Bavinck speaks of the heart, then, we are to think of the inner core of the self, out of which, as from a subterranean spring, the various streams of mental and spiritual activity come forth.

Like all mortals, however, Bavinck was not always consistent with himself. He seems on occasion to have used heart as the center of the emotions only. We have already noted one instance of this use of the word.⁶⁶ Another instance is found on a succeeding page of his *Dogmatiek*,⁶⁷ where he says that when the knowledge of God penetrates into the heart, it arouses all sorts of emotions. But

⁶⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 14.

⁶⁶ See Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 15–16.

⁶⁷ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:277; ET: *RD*, 1:268.

we may excuse Bavinck by saying that in such instances, which are not frequent,⁶⁸ he is using heart in the popular sense, which identifies it with the emotions. It is understandable that Bavinck should slip into this popular view occasionally; it is not easy to be always rigorously consistent.⁶⁹ [30]

In the paragraph above, Bavinck was quoted as saying that the knowledge of God, which is prior to everything else in man's relation to God, must penetrate into the heart. In similar fashion, at another place, Bavinck says that religion has not only a doctrinal content, but is above all a means to arouse and strengthen man's religious life. "That religious life," he continues, "works out and ought to work out into all directions: into the intellect and heart, feeling and will, soul and body."⁷⁰ These statements might seem to look like denials of the primacy of the heart which we have been ascribing to Bavinck, since in them first religious knowledge and then religious life is made prior to the heart. However, when Bavinck holds that out of the heart are all the issues of life, he does not mean that ideas, desires, and emotions are formed in the heart prior to and apart from the influence of the external world. Not at all. In order to attain to knowledge, man must look outside of himself, use his senses, and read God's Word. "The heart is therefore not an independent source of knowledge, but the central, innermost, and most receptive and sensitive organ of the human soul. The entire outside world influences it, through all kinds of means and along all kinds of ways."⁷¹ It is not therefore a denial of the primacy of the heart to say that knowledge must be derived from outside the heart. Religious knowledge must be received

⁶⁸ Other places where Bavinck seems to use heart as equivalent to the emotions are *Beginselen der psychologie*, 138; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 188; *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:605, 650; *RD* 1:565, 605; *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 68. Bavinck also occasionally uses the expression "head, heart, and hand" to denote the whole man: *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:277; *RD*, 1:268; *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 94. Here head would seem to stand for the intellect, hand for the will, and heart for the emotions.

⁶⁹ There are also instances where Bavinck seems to identify the heart with the will: *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 3:683; ET: *RD*, 3:590; Herman Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," in *Verzamelde opstellen op het gebied van godsdienst en wetenschap* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1921), 209, 214; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," in *Essays on Religion, Science, and Society*, 200, 204.

⁷⁰ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 214.

⁷¹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 62.

by the heart, and thus it must affect all of life.⁷² Neither does it militate against the primacy of the heart to say that religious life [31] must penetrate into the heart. So it must, but it must also again work out of the heart, so as to influence all of man's activities. The heart is the center of man's religious life; the center of impression as well as the center of expression.

The Role of the Faculties

Having now established the primacy of the heart which is basic to Bavinck's psychology, let us go on to consider another important aspect of his psychological teaching: his doctrine of the faculties. The Dutch word *vermogen*, which Bavinck uses, is difficult to translate; it comes from a verb which means "to be able," and literally stands for an ability or a power. When applied to the powers of the soul, our word *faculty* is perhaps the best translation, although it is by no means a perfect equivalent.

When we say that there are different functions or faculties in the soul, we must immediately confess that we stand in the presence of a great mystery. For how is it possible for the soul, which is a unit and is not divisible into parts, nevertheless to possess diverse powers? All language used to describe the functions and workings of the soul must be figurative and vague; we cannot really understand how a unified soul can have diverse functions. Yet we must believe in the possibility of this diversity amidst unity if we are to psychologize at all. Bavinck traces the possibility of such differentiation in the midst of unity to the existence of God who, though a unified being, [32] has nevertheless created all the diversity we know.⁷³ Bavinck therefore affirms that, in the light of Scripture, man is not monistically or dualistically constructed, but is diversity amidst unity.⁷⁴

That Bavinck does not mean to deny the unity of the soul by his doctrine of the faculties is evident from his definition of a faculty: "By faculty (*facultas, potentia, virtus*) we must understand nothing else than a natural capability of the

⁷² Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 222.

⁷³ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 115; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 111–12.

⁷⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 80.

soul for a certain type of mental activity.”⁷⁵ A faculty, it will be seen, is not an independent entity, but an ability which belongs to the soul and is exercised by the soul. So, for instance, Bavinck continues: “It is always the same soul which functions in the various activities, sometimes more, sometimes less consciously and actively; the soul is always the *principium a quo*.”⁷⁶ Similarly, on page 2 of the *Beginselen der psychologie* he plainly states that it is the soul which perceives, thinks, feels, desires, and wills. So, on page 152: “Pleasure and displeasure are . . . functions which the soul exercises through the desiring-faculty.” The soul has and exercises the power of moving the body and its members.⁷⁷ It is the soul or the self to which the so-called freedom of the will must be ascribed.⁷⁸ These statements are [33] very important. They show that Bavinck does not mean to set up the faculties as independent entities, functioning apart from the soul, but that the soul functions through them. Whether Bavinck’s practice agreed with his theory, however, remains to be seen.

Bavinck distinguished only two faculties in the soul, *het kenvermogen* and *het begeervermogen*: the knowing-faculty and the desiring-faculty (the latter he occasionally called *het streefvermogen*, the striving-faculty). In this thesis we shall use the expressions *knowing-faculty* and *desiring-faculty* to indicate these two.

Did Bavinck first teach and then later reject this doctrine of the faculties? This is the allegation made by Dr. Cornelius Jaarsma in his doctoral thesis on Bavinck’s Educational Philosophy: “Bavinck accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of faculties, cognition and striving, in his *Principles of Psychology*, written in 1897, but refutes these in his *Victory of the Soul*, which appeared approximately twenty years later.”⁷⁹ I have, however, gone carefully through the lecture referred to, *De overwinning der ziel*, published in 1916, but find no evidence that Bavinck there repudiates his doctrine of the faculties. He does say in that lecture that thinking

⁷⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 42. The original has: “eene der ziel van nature eigene geschiktheid tot eene psychische werkzaamheid.” ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 66.

⁷⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 42; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 66.

⁷⁷ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 171; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 224.

⁷⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 180–81; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 225–26.

⁷⁹ Cornelius Jaarsma, *The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1935), 78.

is a function entirely different from the formation and association of images,⁸⁰ but he has said that already in his [34] *Beginselen der psychologie* of 1897.⁸¹ He also says in the later work that willing is not a form of desiring or wishing, but a unique and distinct power of the soul.⁸² But this he likewise said before.⁸³ Again he lays great stress in *De overwinning der ziel* on the unity of the soul as the subject of all man's mental states, and on the identity of the personality amid the changes wrought by time.⁸⁴ However, this too is nothing new; in the first part of this chapter I called attention to over twenty-five references to this point in the *Beginselen der psychologie*, citing several as instances.⁸⁵ Bavinck always stressed the unity of the soul and the continuity of the ego.

So there is no evidence that Bavinck repudiates the faculty doctrine in *De overwinning der ziel*. Neither is there any such evidence in other late Bavinck works, as Jaarsma suggests in a later remark.⁸⁶ Bavinck always regarded "psychic life as a unified whole," as we have shown above. As to refuting the doctrine of the faculties in his later works, [35] here is a statement taken from his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* of 1920: "Man possesses not only the faculty of sensuous perception and sensuous desiring, but is also endowed with a higher knowing- and striving-faculty: intellect, reason, and will."⁸⁷ And in the last work Bavinck ever penned, published posthumously in 1921, we find the following statement:

Desiring itself as a deed presupposes a consciousness, an awareness, an image of what one desires; however, it does not arise from that consciousness, nor is it produced thereby, but it points to another original faculty or power in the soul. And that

⁸⁰ Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 23.

⁸¹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 98; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 146.

⁸² Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 24.

⁸³ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 167–69; cf. also p. 146; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 196; cf. 222.

⁸⁴ Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 24–26.

⁸⁵ See above, p. 6 f.

⁸⁶ Jaarsma, *The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck*, 83: "Though beginning his study of psychology with the emphasis upon the Aristotelian faculties, he [Bavinck] refuted this position in his later works and asserted that psychic life must be regarded as a unified whole, interrelated, and one might better speak of functions than faculties."

⁸⁷ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 197.

desiring as a faculty, as a potentiality, is present in the soul from the beginning; both (knowing- and desiring- or striving-faculty) are as faculties equally original.⁸⁸

This certainly does not sound like a repudiation of the doctrine of the faculties! Although it is true, as we shall see, that in his latest writings Bavinck seemed to evince more appreciation for the interrelation of man's various powers than before, and seemed to be less inclined to make one power sovereign over another than he had been earlier, he never repudiated the doctrine of two faculties which we are now about to unfold.

We begin, then, with the cognitive or knowing-faculty. By this Bavinck means the power or faculty whereby man becomes aware of reality;⁸⁹ whereby he senses, perceives, remembers, thinks, and understands. It is important for our [36] purpose to note that man's ability to think and reason is, in Bavinck's psychology, not separated from his personality or character, but is closely connected with the rest of his mental life. We have already called attention to this relationship on a previous page.⁹⁰ In his *Beginselen der psychologie*, his earliest psychological work, Bavinck already stresses this point. In connection with the doctrine of innate ideas, he says that to speak of innate ideas is in part too broad, since actual ideas are not innate, but in part too narrow, since much more is innate in man than the mere faculty of forming ideas. Man comes into the world with many dispositions and capacities; and the various activities of the cognitive faculty, such as sensation, perception, memory, thought, and so on, all point back to the existence of such original, inborn capacities. As soon as man begins to perceive, think, judge, and act, he begins to exercise these various inborn capacities, and to apply the principles which are implicit in them.⁹¹ This would tie in with our discussion of the unconscious. Previous to the exercise of consciousness, there are dispositions and capacities in the soul of man which make conscious activity possible and

⁸⁸ Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," 212; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," 202–3.

⁸⁹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 46; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 70.

⁹⁰ See above, p. 12 f.

⁹¹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 68–69; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 117–18.

direct it. The connection of all this with the primacy of the heart, which, as we have seen, is largely parallel with the unconscious, is obvious.

These natural, inborn capacities can only develop [37] through the operation and influence of the outside world.⁹² The first type of activity with which all knowing begins is sensation. When sensations are related to their cause, they become perceptions, in the formation of which the soul is not passive, but active.⁹³ Next Bavinck discusses the so-called subconscious activities of the soul, and comes to the conclusion that a very rich and full life precedes intellect and reason, consciousness and self-consciousness.

So little do intellect and reason form the essence of man and the entire content of the knowing-faculty, that they should rather be called particular functions thereof, which only begin their work when the foundations of human knowledge have already been deeply and widely laid, even down into the subconscious.⁹⁴

Once again, the connection between the subconscious and the intellect, and therefore between the heart and the intellect, is obvious.

Bavinck, in agreement with what he calls the earlier psychology, distinguishes between a lower and a higher knowing-faculty. All knowledge begins in sensation, but man, in distinction from the animals, can also climb up higher. Beside the lower *sensus* (αἴσθησις) man also has an *intellectus* (νοῦς). It is through his intellect that he can see the invisible in the visible, the permanent in the changing, the universal in the particular.⁹⁵

This higher knowing-faculty must again be differentiated into intellect (*verstand*) and reason (*rede*). These two [38] are not two different faculties, but only one faculty.

They differ in this respect, that reason denotes the lower, discursive type of thought, which comes to knowledge along the long and arduous road of concepts, judgments, and conclusions — in short, of reasoning; whereas intellect denotes the possession of

⁹² Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 69; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 119.

⁹³ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 75; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 122.

⁹⁴ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 82; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 130.

⁹⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 98–99; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 146. Ed. note: Bavinck's use of the Latin and Greek terms in this sentence is only found in the original 1897 edition; Hepp did not include them in the revised 1923 edition.

the knowledge of that truth. . . . Reason is related to intellect as movement to rest, as acquiring to possessing. . . . Intellect is insight, knowledge of the being of things.⁹⁶

This brief survey will tell us succinctly how reason functions, according to Bavinck. Bavinck was too much of a thinker himself to disparage reason or deny the importance of reason in understanding reality and in serving God. Man must use his God-given intellect. All reality was first thought before it was created; hence it can also be understood by man, whose thinking powers were created by God.⁹⁷ Religion may be a matter of the heart, but it can never be sundered from the objective knowledge of God.⁹⁸ Over against Schleiermacher, Bavinck holds that knowledge belongs to the very essence of religion.⁹⁹ This much can be said in favor of Hegel's view, that he recognized the importance of reason in the service of God.¹⁰⁰

But, on the other hand, Bavinck just as strenuously repudiates the error of exclusive dependence on reason. Knowledge or science can never take the place of religion.¹⁰¹ The [39] error of the Greeks was that they made too much of the intellect.¹⁰² The error of modern rationalism was that, rejecting the revelation of God, it attempted to deduce from man's reason all that he needed in order to live a religious and moral life. The very bankruptcy of reason which led to nineteenth-century romanticism was historical proof of the untenableness of this rationalistic position.¹⁰³ Reason, for Bavinck, is a necessary tool for the knowledge and manipulation of the world, but it is by no means the only tool. It is just as wrong to make too much of reason as to make too little of it. Reason can never be set up as an independent source of knowledge or criterion of religion; it can never take the place of the revelation of God.

⁹⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 99; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 147.

⁹⁷ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 199–200.

⁹⁸ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 176; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 167.

⁹⁹ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 191; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 179.

¹⁰⁰ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:263; ET: *RD*, 1:256.

¹⁰¹ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:265; ET: *RD*, 1:257.

¹⁰² Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 17.

¹⁰³ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 173–76; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 165–67.

The Question of the Primacy of the Intellect

In this connection, we need to consider an important question touching on a very basic issue in Bavinck's psychology: namely, whether Bavinck believed in the primacy of the intellect or not. It has recently been asserted by reputable committee of theologically trained men that Bavinck [40] taught the primacy of the intellect.¹⁰⁴ It has been the main thesis of this chapter, however, that Bavinck taught the primacy of the heart. Hence we shall have to examine this point before proceeding further, to see whether Bavinck really held to the primacy of the intellect or not.

In a very specific, restricted sense, Bavinck does teach a certain primacy of the intellect over the rest of man's mental life: specifically, over the will and the desires. In his *Beginselen der psychologie* he first of all points out that there is a certain priority of the knowing-faculty over the desiring-faculty. There can be no movement, emotion, or feeling, he points out, unless a sensation or image, no matter how weak it may be, precede; without consciousness no feeling or desire is possible.¹⁰⁵ It will be noted, however, that this is merely a temporal priority of the knowing-faculty, or the intellect in a very broad sense, but nothing more.

Of greater consequence for our purpose are the places where Bavinck ascribes to the intellect the function of [41] guiding and directing the rest of man's mental processes: specifically, the lower desiring-faculty and the will. This thought is rather prominent in Bavinck's psychology, as I shall endeavor to point out.

For instance, to begin with his earliest work, Bavinck teaches that what distinguishes a mere craving or drive from a desire is that a desire is always directed

¹⁰⁴ Report of a Committee on a Complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in the *Minutes of the Thirteenth General Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church* (Philadelphia: Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1946), 59. With reference to a passage quoted in translation from Bavinck's *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598–99 (*RD*, 2:556–57) this committee makes the following statement: "In this passage Bavinck says: 1) there are two powers of the soul — the intellectual and volitional; 2) the intellectual power has the primacy — it leads and governs the will; 3) Western theology, since the days of Augustine, has held this view." [Note: the reference to Bavinck's *Dogmatiek* given above is to the third edition of 1918. The Committee apparently used a different edition, since their page reference is different.] Ed. note: The previous note is by Hoekema.

¹⁰⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 130; *ET: Foundations of Psychology*, 181.

by a preceding image toward a particular object. Desiring therefore depends on the image (*voorstelling*), and is guided and directed by it. For, he continues, *ignoti nulla cupido*. What one does not know, one cannot desire. Desires therefore differ as one's circumstances of life alter the sphere of ideas and images among which he lives.¹⁰⁶ Since image-formation is a function of the knowing-faculty or intellect in the broad sense, this points to a kind of primacy of guidance on the part of the intellect.

In his discussion of the will, Bavinck makes this point very clear. Willing, he says, is not the same as desiring, but a distinct type of action which can only take place after the higher knowing-faculty with its intellect and reason has preceded.¹⁰⁷ A long struggle may ensue before the final decision is made; but whether the struggle be long or short, the decision of the will is always the fruit of rational deliberation. Thus will in the narrow, specific sense can be defined as “the higher desiring-faculty which, after rational deliberation, chooses the true or apparent good and directs the soul [42] thereto.”¹⁰⁸ Here we see that the intellect serves to give guidance in every decision of will.

We find the same thought in Bavinck's *Dogmatiek*. There he says that the emotions, affections, passions, inclinations, impulses, desires, and decisions which originate in the heart must be directed by the *nous* or mind.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Bavinck states in his *Overwinning der ziel* that willing is a unique power of the soul which chooses an actual or surmised good on the basis of rational motives.¹¹⁰ And in his “Primaat van verstand of wil” he likewise stresses that not only consciousness but

¹⁰⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 143–45; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 193–95.

¹⁰⁷ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 169; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221.

¹⁰⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 170; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221. In the original the term knowing-faculty (*kenvermogen*) is used, but this is obviously a mistake. Cf. what Bavinck says on p. 179 of the same volume: “The will is not a separate faculty, but is nothing other than the desiring-faculty (*begeervermogen*) itself in its highest form”; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 232. Note also that the will is discussed as a subdivision of the section titled, “Het Begeervermogen” (The Desiring-faculty).

¹⁰⁹ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598. For the entire quotation, see p. 11. This is the passage which was referred to in the report of the Committee from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.

¹¹⁰ Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 24.

reason precedes the will, presents it with various ideas and motives, and advises it how to choose.¹¹¹

Because the intellect guides the will in its decisions, Bavinck does speak of a certain primacy of the intellect. Going back now to his *Beginselen der psychologie*, we notice that he says, after discussing the above point, “*There [43] can therefore be no doubt about the primacy of the intellect.*”¹¹² By this he means that the deliberations of the mind always precede the decisions of the will. The intention of this position, Bavinck continues, is not to deny that man can ever act against better knowledge, for he often does. Nor does Bavinck mean to deny that the passions often exercise a more determinative influence on a man’s decisions than the calm deliberations of this mind. It is a matter of common experience that, when a decision is to be made, the strongest passion often rules, even though sober common sense would dictate otherwise. How does Bavinck harmonize these acknowledged facts with the primacy of the intellect he defends? In this way: the intellect to which primacy is ascribed is the “practical reason.” Bavinck follows Aristotle in distinguishing a practical and a theoretical reason. The theoretical reason judges whether a thing is good or bad.¹¹³ In connection with the primacy of the intellect, now, Bavinck says that the will always follows the final judgment of the *practical reason*. The will never acts blindly; it is always led by some kind of intellectual judgment. However, “that final judgment of the practical reason is by no means identical with the highest expression of reason or conscience, but is based on inclinations, desires, and passions, which finally succeed in stupefying the intellect, [44] as it were, and in making the desired thing appear good.”¹¹⁴ A drunkard, Bavinck continues, knows that drinking is not good for him; many rational considerations advise him against drinking — yet the passion for drink so influences his judgment that he finally deems one glass good and desirable.

¹¹¹ Bavinck, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” 213; ET: “Primacy of the Intellect or the Will,” 202–3.

¹¹² Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 187 [italics mine]; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221.

¹¹³ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 105 ff.; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221

¹¹⁴ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 187; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221. This entire discussion will be found on pp. 186–88.

Thus to man's darkened intellect, sin appears as a desirable good. Even when man does evil, he does so because he deems it to be good.

It will be seen that this is a primacy of the intellect of a very restricted sort. In fact, it could even be called a "sham" primacy, since what is really primary in the last-mentioned cases is the evil passion or desire. It is at least questionable whether the term *primacy* best describes the functioning of the intellect which Bavinck has here been expounding.

And now it is highly significant to note that Bavinck himself, in one of his latest writings, questions the propriety of the term *primacy* as an expression of the relation between intellect and will. I refer to his essay, "Primaat van verstand of wil" (Primacy of Intellect or Will), found in his *Verzamelde Opstellen* of 1921. Since this essay, published after Bavinck's death and therefore presenting his mature view, is so crucial for the matter we are discussing, I shall reproduce its main thoughts in some detail.

Bavinck first points out that intellect and will have [45] a much smaller place in mental life than is usually imagined. There is much more in the knowing-faculty, Bavinck asserts, than just the intellect. "We must carefully note that the intellect is decidedly not the entire extent of consciousness, *is, in fact, not even the most important aspect thereof*, but that it is only a specific function of the knowing-faculty."¹¹⁵ We also find much more in the desiring-faculty — so Bavinck continues — than just the will: namely, feelings, affections, passions, drives, and so forth. A man lives daily much more from his images, imaginations, suppositions, emotions, and desires than from logical reasonings and deliberate decisions of the will.

So, Bavinck continues, when we discuss the primacy of intellect or will, we must consider carefully what we mean. Are we then thinking only of intellect or will in the narrow, restricted sense, or are we thinking of consciousness and striving in their widest signification [in other words, of the entire knowing-faculty and the entire desiring-faculty]? In the last instance, we are concerned not with one problem, but with several — or, rather, the same problem will appear in

¹¹⁵ Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," 210 [italics mine]; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," 202–3. Note that Bavinck did not consider the intellect to be the most important aspect of man.

several stages. For the sake of brevity, we shall distinguish three: Does primacy belong to the instinct or to the drive behind the instinct? to the image or to the desire? and then, finally, to the intellect or to the will? [46]

Before we proceed to discuss these questions, however, we must first of all determine what is to be understood by primacy. Does this mean only a *chronological priority* — that the one comes before the other? Or does it mean also that one of the two is *pre-eminent* over the other, is more excellent than the other, surpasses the other? Or must we add still a third thought: namely, that this so-called primacy of intellect or will also involves a certain lordship, dominion, or *sovereignty* (*heerschappij*) of the one faculty over the other, so that the one faculty rules over the other? Bavinck adds that these questions are not superfluous in view of the meaning attached to the word primacy in such an expression as “the primacy of the pope of Rome.”¹¹⁶

First Bavinck discusses the question of the primacy of instinct or drive. An instinct, he says, is usually described as “an unconscious and yet purposive activity.” However, Bavinck points out, this description is not entirely accurate. For the functioning of an instinct is always preceded by an awareness of pleasure or displeasure; hence it is not correct to say that instinctive activity is wholly unconscious activity. If we may say, now, that this awareness of pleasure or displeasure comes through the knowing-faculty, then there is a certain priority of the cognitive datum over the volitional act. However, Bavinck continues, “*one cannot speak of pre-eminence (voorrang) or sovereignty (heerschappij) of the one over the other.* There is, on the [47] contrary, harmony and co-operation between these two factors.”¹¹⁷

How about the relation between image and desire? It cannot be contradicted that there can be no desires without images of some sort. One cannot desire the totally unknown. There is no pleasure or displeasure, no love or hate, no inclination or aversion of which we do not possess some kind of consciousness.

¹¹⁶ Bavinck, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” 211 [italics mine]; ET: “Primacy of the Intellect or the Will,” 202–3.

¹¹⁷ Bavinck, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” 211 [italics mine]; ET: “Primacy of the Intellect or the Will,” 202–3.

However, though desiring itself as a deed presupposes a consciousness, an awareness, an image of what one desires, it does not arise from that consciousness . . . but points to another, original faculty or power of the soul. That desiring as a faculty, as a potentiality, is present in the soul from the very beginning; both (the knowing- and the desiring-faculties) are as faculties equally original; in this respect, therefore, we cannot speak of primacy, or even of priority. And although, as has been said, the image precedes desiring as a deed, *this priority cannot be identified with primacy, with pre-eminence, or with sovereignty.*¹¹⁸

When man's self-interest is at stake, Bavinck continues, he can call white black and the truth a lie, which demonstrates how desire can dominate over the mental image. In other words, the image has influence over the desire, but the power of the desire over the image (and over consciousness in general) is often much greater. Image and desire therefore answer to each other, complement each other; both continually affect and influence one another.¹¹⁹ [48]

All of this shall become still more clear, continues Bavinck, as we consider, in the third place, the question of the primacy of the intellect or the will. He begins by criticizing the voluntaristic position of Schelling and others, who sundered the will from the rest of mental life and specifically from consciousness. Such a will, Bavinck remarks, ceases to be will in the strict sense and becomes either blind fate or arbitrary chance. But will in its true sense is to be described, according to an old definition, as rational self-determination, and is as such to be clearly distinguished from striving and desiring. It follows, then, that consciousness and reason precede the will. It is, in fact, both the theoretical and the practical reason which precede the will: reason with its norms of true and untrue, good and evil, beautiful and ugly. Or, to put it differently, it is the intellect which precedes the

¹¹⁸ Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," 212 [italics mine]; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," 202–3.

¹¹⁹ It will be seen that here Bavinck takes a different stand than he did in his *Begin-selen der psychologie* (see above, p. 30). There he said that desire is guided and directed by the image, whereas here he refuses to attribute sovereignty to the image, and points to an even greater influence of the desire over the image.

will — not, however, as a mere formal faculty, but as filled and enriched with knowledge.¹²⁰

“But also in this case,” Bavinck continues, “*priority is decidedly not to be identified with primacy, with pre-eminence, or with sovereignty.*”¹²¹ To be sure, intellect and [49] reason present various ideas and thoughts to the will, place it before the necessity of a choice, and advise it how to choose. But they have no other power than that of rational and moral persuasion, and can have no other, since the freedom of the will, which is an undeniable fact, excludes all force. Conversely, however, the will has great power over the entire conscious life, also over intellect and reason. For, in the first place, it is the will which starts perception and thinking going and keeps them going; attention is therefore at least as much an activity of the will as of the intellect. Further, the will, rooting as it does in desiring and frequently in covetousness, drives perception and thinking in a particular direction. Otherwise one could not speak of a darkening of the mind by sin. To summarize, intellect and will stand in a reciprocal relationship; the head enriches the heart, but the heart leads and guides the head.¹²²

Bavinck concludes this essay by saying:

Let us therefore not dispute about the pre-eminence of intellect or will. Both are excellent gifts, placed by God in human nature. Each has his own domain, and is sovereign within it. In order to acquire knowledge the intellect (the knowing-faculty) is necessary; in order to determine our attitude toward the world which is grasped by knowledge, and in order to work in that world, the will (the desiring-faculty) is indispensable. Both must be formed and developed in the child; instruction and training, development of the intellect and formation of the character, need to go hand in hand. Every moment they

¹²⁰ Once again notice that Bavinck has modified his position. In *Beginselen der psychologie* (see above, p. 31) he said that the will always follows the practical reason, but here he would include the theoretical reason as well.

¹²¹ Bavinck, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” 213 [italics mine]; ET: “Primacy of the Intellect or the Will,” 202–3. Notice that here Bavinck emphatically repudiates the primacy of the intellect! All that he here recognizes is a certain temporary priority of the intellect.

¹²² Bavinck, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” 214; ET: “Primacy of the Intellect or the Will,” 202–3. Notice that the heart is here used as being more or less synonymous with the will.

influence each other: the intellect the will, and the will the intellect. Sin has disturbed the unity and harmony between the two, and has stationed enmity there instead of friendship. But Christian education seeks to restore [50] harmony and co-operation; it gives back to each the honor which is its due; it strives for the perfection of the entire man.¹²³

In this essay, representing Bavinck's mature position, we arrive at a significant modification of his earlier view. In the *Beginselen der psychologie*, as we have seen, Bavinck stated that there can be no doubt about the primacy of the intellect, since the intellect guides the will. In his explanation of this point he made clear that by intellect he had in mind the practical reason. However, there he evidently intended by primacy more than just chronological priority, since, in his opinion, the will always follows the final judgment of the practical reason. That final judgment, therefore, determines what man shall do; on the basis of this position the intellect is primary not only in the sense of priority, but also in the sense of sovereignty. And on the basis of this statement, one could certainly conclude that Bavinck champions the primacy of the intellect.

However, when one takes into account the essay just summarized, matters stand differently. There Bavinck throws out the question of what is meant by primacy, suggesting three possible meanings: Chronological priority, pre-eminence, or sovereignty. Then he proceeds to discuss the relation between the knowing-faculty and the desiring-faculty on three different levels, in each of which he recognizes only a primacy of priority, but not a primacy of pre-eminence or [51] sovereignty. And in his summarizing paragraph he says that neither intellect nor will is pre-eminent or sovereign over the other, but that each is sovereign within its own domain, as it functions in accordance with its created nature. Each influences the other; each must receive its proper honor; ideally there is not rivalry but harmony and co-operation between the two — and hence Christian education must aim at the perfection, not of a part of man, but of the entire man.

Here we have a different position. Bavinck no longer accords sovereignty to the reason, not even to the practical reason. The judgment of the reason, to be

¹²³ Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," 214; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," 202–3.

sure, is prior to the act of the will. We may also still say, as we said before,¹²⁴ that the intellect or reason perform a guiding function — that its duty is to make clear the issues which are involved in a choice, and to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness, desirableness or undesirableness of an act. That we may continue to acknowledge as Bavinck’s consistent teaching throughout — even in this latest essay.¹²⁵ But what Bavinck denies in this essay is that such guidance must be construed as involving sovereignty or lordship over the will; in fact, he even *denies here that we can properly speak of the primacy of the intellect*, since primacy ordinarily connotes sovereignty. Intellect, he asserts, is not sovereign over the will, but complements the will; each is sovereign in its own domain. And these are the last words Bavinck ever spoke on the subject. [52]

We may conclude by saying that if all one means by the expression “primacy of the intellect” is that a functioning of the knowing-faculty is always prior to any other human act, and that it is the duty of the intellect to guide man in his decisions, to lay bare the issues, and to make judgments about the rightness or value of an act, one may allow that Bavinck taught such a primacy. But if one means by that expression that the intellect is the most excellent of man’s powers, or that it is sovereign over the rest of man’s functions, then Bavinck, according to his sober, mature judgment, would deny that primacy in that sense can be ascribed to the intellect. Sovereignty is not to be ascribed to the intellect, and neither to the will; it is to be sought elsewhere. Our previous discussion has shown that Bavinck would place this sovereignty in the heart, out of which are all the issues of life, and which determines and gives direction to all of a man’s activities. And if one wishes to use the term *primacy* in the sense of sovereignty, then he will have to say that what Bavinck taught was the primacy of the heart.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ See above, p. 29 f.

¹²⁵ See above, p. 35.

¹²⁶ It need hardly be added here that Bavinck emphatically repudiated the primacy of the intellect in the ontological sense characteristic of the Greeks: namely, that the intellect is the essence of man, and that whatever in man is not intellect partakes more or less of non-being. This view, he points out repeatedly, is directly opposed to Scripture. Cf., e.g., Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 17, 66; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 21, 110; and Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 107.

For if there is anything which our study of Bavinck's psychology ought to have made plain, it is that what he makes primary or central in human nature is the heart. We have [53] devoted an entire section of this chapter to that point,¹²⁷ in which abundant evidence was given to show that that was truly Bavinck's position. In this connection, it is interesting to go back to the very passage quoted by the Committee of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church to prove that Bavinck believed in the primacy of the intellect.¹²⁸ It is true, to be sure, that Bavinck in this passage does say that the emotions, passions, impulses, desires, and decisions of man must be directed by the *nous* or mind, and that he therefore ascribes a guiding function to the intellect, as we have explained in the preceding discussion. However, in that very same passage he says as plainly as he says it anywhere that what is really basic and fundamental in human nature is not the *nous* or intellect, or the will, but the heart. For he here calls the heart the basis and source of all mental life, and adds that the two streams of mental life which he distinguishes, the cognitive and the appetitive, have their origin in the heart. So this very passage, cited to substantiate Bavinck's doctrine of the primacy of the intellect, really establishes his belief in the primacy of the heart.

We may go on to note a few other points which show that what Bavinck says about the intellect does not controvert his emphasis on the primacy of the heart. Bavinck does, as we have seen, ascribe a certain guiding function to the intellect. But the intellect does not hang in mid-air. On [54] the contrary, it is intimately connected with the rest of man's nature, specifically with his heart. We have already discussed the relation between the heart and the intellect, noting that the functions and activities of the intellect are originated and directed by the heart, and that the *nous* is closely related to man's character.¹²⁹ We have also discussed the relation between the heart and intellect in connection with the unconscious.¹³⁰ For Bavinck, we have seen, thinking is but a specific function of the knowing-faculty; basic to thinking and behind it are all the other functions of

¹²⁷ See above, pp. 9–23.

¹²⁸ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598–99; ET: *RD*, 2:257. See the translation of this passage on p. 11 above.

¹²⁹ See above, pp. 12–13.

¹³⁰ See above, pp. 15–18.

that faculty: sensation, perception, memory, imagination, and so on. Furthermore, the entire knowing-faculty, in turn, is rooted in certain innate dispositions and tendencies. These innate inclinations lay the foundation for both our thinking and our willing. So we may say that behind the operation of the intellect is the inner, chiefly subconscious core of man's personality which Bavinck calls the heart. It is the heart which originates and directs the functioning of the mind; as a man is in his heart, so he thinks. That this is Bavinck's own conception of the relation between heart and mind is proved by the following passage, which occurs in the midst of his discussion about the so-called primacy of the [practical] intellect:

The proponents of the primacy of the intellect do not deny, therefore, that the lusts and inclinations, the desires and the passions, generally tip the scale when it comes to a decision of the will, and that the heart makes its mighty influence felt upon the head. No, out of the [55] heart are the issues of life, also of the life of the intellect.¹³¹

What Bavinck says about the guiding function of the intellect, therefore, does not invalidate his emphasis on the primacy and centrality of the heart.¹³²

That Bavinck did not hold to a one-sided intellectualism which ignored the other aspects of man's personality has been abundantly demonstrated by his emphasis on the whole man.¹³³ It is also very clear from the following passage, taken from his *Bijbelsche Psychologie*:

Although religious education must include intellectual instruction, it embraces more and aims at a higher goal. It . . . must strive to fashion the youth religiously in such a way that they shall love and serve God with all their mind, inclinations, and will. Knowing God, without loving and serving Him from the heart, is unfruitful, dead orthodoxy, not even worthy of the name of knowing. . . . The knowing of which Scripture speaks, of which Jesus speaks in John 17:3, is something entirely different from

¹³¹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 188; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 241. See also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 183; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 173.

¹³² As we shall see, however, in our subsequent evaluation of Bavinck's psychology, the doctrine of the faculties does hinder him from working out the centrality of the heart in a wholly satisfactory and consistent way.

¹³³ See above, pp. 7–9.

mere external knowledge; it is intimately bound up with love, it is one with love, and therefore also bestows eternal life.¹³⁴

It is obvious that Bavinck did not think that all one needs to do in religious education is simply to fill the intellect with the proper ideas and concepts, leaving the rest to take care of itself. Bavinck consistently taught that religious education, and all other kinds of education as well, must aim at the whole man. [56]

In the same volume Bavinck states more than once that the knowledge of God which man needs for salvation must have its source in the heart. In connection with Calvin's discussion of the knowledge of God, Bavinck says: "If the knowledge of God is of this sort [a practical knowledge] then, however, it is obvious that it cannot be the fruit of intellectual reflection, but must have its beginning and source in the heart of man."¹³⁵ And on a subsequent point he adds: "Religious truth, Christian truth, more than any other kind of truth, is directly related to life. It is truth received by faith, which therefore is to be accepted not merely by the intellect, but also and even primarily by the heart, that thus alone it may fully become our spiritual possession."¹³⁶ So once again we see that, even where the activity of the intellect is concerned, Bavinck would still make the heart basic and central in man. And thus we may sum up this entire discussion by saying that Bavinck teaches a priority of the intellect, but a primacy of the heart.¹³⁷

A few words remain to be said about the other faculty which Bavinck distinguishes in the soul, the appetitive faculty, which he calls *het begeervermogen* — literally, the faculty of desiring. Bavinck admits that this name by no means adequately covers all the functions he wishes to include in this faculty: [57] "Desiring is only one of the functions of this desiring-faculty. To it belongs every action whereby the soul determines its actual relation to things, and hence

¹³⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 214.

¹³⁵ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 203.

¹³⁶ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 222.

¹³⁷ Cf. Jaarsma, *The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck*, 79–80, in which he makes a similar evaluation of Bavinck's teaching on this point. For example, on p. 80 he says: "Priority of cognition in the formation of purposes and in setting goals of action does not necessarily mean primacy."

not only desire and will, but also inclination and instinct, pleasure and displeasure, emotion and passion.”¹³⁸

Bavinck refuses to recognize a separate faculty of feeling, preferring to classify the feelings and emotions as functions of the desiring-faculty.¹³⁹ As has been indicated above, he also includes the will under the desiring-faculty. Hence his conception of this faculty is very broad, including all of man’s emotional life, all of his drives and passions, all of his desires and longings, and all the phenomena which we call acts of will. The more modern tendency is to recognize willing and feeling as two distinct types of mental activity. Bavinck, however, following Augustine and Calvin, prefers to subsume both willing and feeling under one faculty,¹⁴⁰ and therefore to speak of only two *vermogens* in man.

Bavinck distinguished what he called the “*lagere begeervermogen*” (lower desiring-faculty) from the higher. In this lower desiring-faculty he includes such things as the functions controlled by the autonomic nervous system, common reflexes, and innate drives and impulses. Further, he discusses instincts, desires, emotions, and passions as also belonging to the lower desiring-faculty, though [58] higher up in the mental scale than the functions previously mentioned.¹⁴¹ He makes a good deal of these instinctive and emotional functions, since they are basic to the higher functions of the desiring-faculty.

Bavinck fully recognized the importance of the emotions in the mental life of man, especially in motivating his decisions. In his discussion of the so-called primacy of the practical reason, he points out that what generally tips the scales in a volitional decision is the emotional element: the feelings, passions, and desires involved.¹⁴² He points out the large role emotion plays in our life in connection

¹³⁸ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 131.

¹³⁹ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 44–65.

¹⁴⁰ Bavinck does, however, admit that willing is a function entirely distinct from desiring (*Overwinning der ziel*, 24). One wonders whether there then remains any justification for still grouping the two under the same “faculty.”

¹⁴¹ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 131–66; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 177–225.

¹⁴² Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 187–88; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 238–41.

with his discussion of the soul,¹⁴³ of the spirit,¹⁴⁴ and of the heart.¹⁴⁵ He opposes Kant's view that the emotions are just diseases of the mind,¹⁴⁶ and maintains throughout that feeling is an integral and necessary aspect of the life of the soul. In fact, he asserts that man's fellowship with God must necessarily affect his emotional life and arouse his tenderest feelings, and that it is the emotions which give religion its warmth, life, and power, in contrast with dead intellectualism and cold moralism.¹⁴⁷

But the highest and most important function of the desiring-faculty is willing. As the knowing-faculty goes from sensation and perception up to thought and reason, so the [59] desiring-faculty gradually rises from the lower forms of instinctive movement, wishing and desiring, to its highest function, that of willing.¹⁴⁸ Note that, according to Bavinck the will is not an isolated function, separate from the rest of man, but is closely related to the so-called "lower" functions on the one hand and to intellect and reason on the other.

This relation of the will to the intellect has previously been noted.¹⁴⁹ What distinguishes willing from desiring, according to Bavinck, is the rational deliberation which enters into every voluntary decision. Hence the will is defined as "the higher desiring-faculty which, after rational deliberation, chooses the true or apparent good and directs the soul thereto."¹⁵⁰

The will, then, is intimately connected with the rest of man's nature. We have previously noted this fact in connection with Bavinck's discussion on the Scriptural words used for willing.¹⁵¹ Here it remains necessary only to add that, for Bavinck, both the lower desiring-faculty and the intellect have their roots in

¹⁴³ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 35–36.

¹⁴⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 48.

¹⁴⁵ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 64.

¹⁴⁶ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 161; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 212.

¹⁴⁷ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:275; ET: *RD*, 1:266.

¹⁴⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 166–74; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 219–24.

¹⁴⁹ See above, pp. 29 and 31.

¹⁵⁰ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 170; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 221. See above, footnote 108.

¹⁵¹ See above, pp. 14–15.

the heart. So the will, as well as the reason, has its ultimate source in the heart of man. The will is not an isolated function, unconnected with man's character, and wholly arbitrary in its functions, as the Pelagians [60] teach,¹⁵² but is intimately bound up with man's personality, and is a true expression thereof. And since man's personality has its chief source in the heart, the will roots in the heart.

Having now considered the doctrine of *vermogens* or faculties in Bavinck, we may conclude by saying that what Bavinck teaches about the faculties of man by no means controverts his emphasis on the primacy of the heart since, as we have seen, the faculties have their source and center in the heart. Bavinck does, it is true, divide man's mental life into two streams, but both streams originate in the heart of man, and are directed by the heart.¹⁵³

The Heart as the Seat of Sin

Two aspects of Bavinck's psychology remain to be considered: the relation between the heart and sin, and the bearing of the centrality of the heart on the doctrines of regeneration and conversion. So far, we have been considering man as he is, without considering the effects of sin on his nature. But any Christian anthropology must take into account the fact of sin — a fact of which Bavinck was well aware. What, now, according to Bavinck, are the psychological implications of sin? Has sin also affected the heart, the center and source of man's character? [61]

Bavinck discusses this question in the second half of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, which deals with the psychology of religion. He begins by pointing out the psychological antecedents of the first sinful deed. Basing his remarks on the Genesis account of the Fall, Bavinck points out that the sinful deed of eating the forbidden fruit was not an isolated act, utterly unrelated to Eve's mind or character, but that it was preceded by a change in her heart. Many ideas, desires, and images preceded the sinful deed. Doubt had been aroused,

¹⁵² Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 3:29; ET: *RD*, 3:50; cf. also Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 118.

¹⁵³ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 2:598; ET: *RD*, 2:257; cf. also Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 118.

and also unbelief, pride, and lust. “Before the woman reached out her hand, a radical change had taken place within her; before she touched the tree and thus transgressed God’s commandments by an overt deed, she had already become a different person within.”¹⁵⁴ The relation of this point to the primacy of the heart is obvious. According to Bavinck, the first sin, like every subsequent sin, was preceded and caused by a change in the heart.

Not only did the first sin have certain psychological antecedents; it also had definite psychological results. Bavinck mentions a number of these, including shame, guilt, and terror before God. What we are especially concerned with, however, is the relation between sin and the heart. On page 105 of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* he states that no sin occurs in isolation from man’s responsibility or from other sins, but that every sin is related, directly or indirectly, to all others; sin always arises out of an “unholy [62] fountain,” which is also the source of all other sins. Now, although Bavinck here does not mention the heart by name, we may safely infer that he has reference to man’s heart as having been corrupted by sin and as therefore now the source of sin. It would certainly have to follow from his stress on the primacy of the heart that sin must have affected the central organ of man’s personality. As we shall see in a moment, this is exactly what Bavinck did teach.

However, we must first of all face a difficulty here. From the fact that the heart is recognized as the deepest center of man’s activities, it would certainly seem to follow that the heart should likewise be recognized by Bavinck as the seat of sin. Surprisingly enough, however, there are a number of places where Bavinck speaks of the will as the seat of sin. He does so in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, on page 116,¹⁵⁵ although on a later page he modifies this statement so as to include not just the will proper, but the entire desiring-faculty as the seat of sin.¹⁵⁶ In his *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring* he similarly says that sin is

¹⁵⁴ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 96 f.

¹⁵⁵ “. . . Sin, looked at from the subjective side, occurs only by means of the will, and has its seat in the will.”

¹⁵⁶ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 118.

seated in the will of the creature,¹⁵⁷ and in his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* he speaks of the will as the actual subject of [63] sin.¹⁵⁸

At first blush, these passages would seem to contradict the primacy of the heart. Certainly, if the heart is the source of all of man's mental and spiritual activities, then sin, it would seem, must have its seat also in the heart, and not in the will, which is but one of man's functions.

As a matter of fact, there are a number of places where Bavinck does, either implicitly or explicitly, call the heart the seat of sin. In his essay on the unconscious, he concludes by saying that the doctrine of the unconscious finds support in Scripture, since Scripture makes the unconscious aspect of man's nature basic in its doctrine of sin. To prove this point he cites five Scripture passages, four of which refer to the heart. The obvious implication is that sin originates in the heart, as these passages also teach.¹⁵⁹ In his *Dogmatiek*, when speaking of original sin, Bavinck says: "It rules over the whole man, over intellect and will, heart and conscience, soul and body, over all of his faculties and powers. His heart is evil from his youth up, and is the source of all kinds of sins."¹⁶⁰ In another volume of the same work, speaking of sin in general, he asserts: "It is an inner, moral corruption of the whole man, not only of his thoughts, words, and deeds, but also of his [64] intellect and will; and, again, not of these alone, but also of his heart, out of which all iniquities proceed; a corruption of the innermost core of his being; in fact, of the ego itself."¹⁶¹ And in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* he explicitly states: "Sin does not have its origin and seat primarily in thoughts, words, and deeds, but goes back much deeper into man's nature, having affected and corrupted even the most hidden motives of his heart."¹⁶² Bavinck proves this point by citing virtually the same texts which were referred to above in connection

¹⁵⁷ Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 266; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 240.

¹⁵⁸ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 3:140; ET: *RD*, 3:142.

¹⁵⁹ Bavinck, "Het onbewuste," 207; ET: "The Unconscious," 197. The Scripture passages which trace sin to the heart are: Gen. 8:21, Ps. 51:12, Jer. 17:9, Mark 7:21. The last-named passage is especially significant, for in it Jesus says: "For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed. . ."

¹⁶⁰ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 3:114; ET: *RD*, 3:119.

¹⁶¹ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:78; ET: *RD*, 4:91.

¹⁶² Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 120.

with the unconscious. On Gen. 8:21 he remarks that, according to this passage, whatever the heart brings forth, in the form of thoughts, deliberations, lusts, or inclinations, has been polluted by sin. With reference to Mark 7:21, Bavinck says that sin does not arise from anything outside of us, such as food and drink, but comes forth from the heart, as from an unholy fountain.

From the statements just cited, it is evident that Bavinck would not deny that sin has its seat in the heart. Unfortunately, however, he does not teach this with complete consistency. He does at times give the impression that sin has its seat in the will. Of course, he may have done this to safeguard man's responsibility for sin, to maintain the ethical nature of sin, and to avoid the error of identifying sin with anything material. It should also be noted that when he speaks of the will as the seat of sin, he means the [65] entire desiring-faculty. He would therefore include under will those subconscious impulses and drives which he has elsewhere located chiefly in the heart.¹⁶³

Behind the will, as we have seen, is the heart, out of which are all the issues of life and all the activities of man's soul. Taking into account this relationship, and remembering the statements where he traces sin to its root in the heart, we may say that Bavinck does teach, though not consistently, that sin has its seat in the heart. And this point, again, fits into his Scripturally-based psychology which makes the heart the center and source of man's personality. Sin, having corrupted man's nature, has first of all corrupted man's heart. The source thus having been polluted, it is impossible that the stream which issues from that source shall not also be polluted. What Bavinck teaches, therefore, about the psychological implications of sin does not conflict with his doctrine of the primacy of the heart, but corroborates that doctrine. [66]

¹⁶³ See above, p. 17. In this connection it is interesting to note Professor Berkhof's comment. After stating his conviction that sin has its seat in the heart as the central organ of the soul, Berkhof adds: "There is a sense in which it can be said that sin originated in the will of man, but in that case the will does not denote any actual volition as much as the volitional nature of man. There was a tendency of the heart underlying the actual volition." Quoted from Louis Berkhof, *Reformed Dogmatics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1932), 1:220. Ed. note: See also Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941), 233.

The Heart as the Center of Spiritual Renewal

It remains now to consider the psychological implications of regeneration and conversion. Scripture teaches not only man's fall into sin, but also man's renewal by the Holy Spirit. How, now, according to Bavinck, does this renewal take place? If, as we have seen, the center and inner core of man's nature is the heart, it would stand to reason that a renewal of that nature should begin with a renewal of the heart. And this is precisely what we find in Bavinck.

To begin with regeneration, Bavinck teaches that regeneration is an act of God's Spirit in which spiritual life is bestowed upon the sinner, and which therefore takes place before conversion. This change takes place in the innermost part of man's nature, which is, as shall become clear from the passages cited, the heart. Our chief source for Bavinck's teachings on this point is the section on "Roeping en Wedergeboorte" (Calling and Regeneration) found in the fourth volume of his *Dogmatiek*. On page 26 of this volume Bavinck states that regeneration is a work of God whereby man is changed and renewed within, and that it may therefore be properly designated as the gift of a new heart. On the following page he says that regeneration, which ultimately includes the restoration of the entire world to its original perfection, begins in the heart of man. On page 52 he advances as the Reformed view of regeneration that "not only the deeds and not even the faculties alone, but the whole man with all his faculties, with soul and body, with intellect, heart, and will, is the subject of regeneration."¹⁶⁴ [67]

Over against the Arminians, who make regeneration ultimately depend on the free will of man, Bavinck holds that in regeneration the Spirit of God enters man's heart immediately and directly, and there brings about regeneration, without being dependent in any sense or to any degree on the will of man.¹⁶⁵ Over against others who hold that regeneration consists solely in an illumination of the intellect, Bavinck maintains that the Spirit does not merely change the intellect,

¹⁶⁴ Ed. note: *RD*, 4:52, 72.

¹⁶⁵ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:64. Cf. also p. 48. ET: *RD*, 4:81; cf. 69.

but directly and immediately brings about a change in the will.¹⁶⁶ So there is no “primacy of the intellect” here.

Bavinck ties in the Scriptural doctrine of regeneration with his own psychology. He makes clear that on the basis of the psychology of his day, which denied the existence of the soul, and called the mind just a name for all its thoughts and feelings, there is no room for regeneration in the real sense of the word. But regeneration becomes meaningful only if one believes in a substantial soul or self behind the psychic phenomena, which self has been corrupted by sin and needs to be renewed.¹⁶⁷ The bearing of all this on the doctrine of the heart is obvious.

In giving his positive construction of the meaning of regeneration, Bavinck refers to Scripture passages in which regeneration is called circumcision of the heart (Deut. 30:6), the creation of a clean heart (Ps. 51:10), and the taking out of the stony heart followed by the bestowal of a heart of flesh (Ezek. 11:19).¹⁶⁸ After having refuted [68] inadequate and one-sided views of regeneration, Bavinck describes his own view in the following words:

The entire man is the subject of regeneration. Not merely his deeds, his acts and his walk, his life-direction and life-goal, his images and activities are changed, but the man himself is renewed in the core of his being. To designate this core the Scriptures use the word heart, out of which are all the issues of life — the life of intellect, feeling, and will. Since according to Jesus’ word all unrighteousness and foolishness proceed out of the heart, it follows that the change called regeneration must also take place there. And in that change all the parts, faculties, and powers of man participate, each according to its nature and measure; not just the lower or the higher faculties, not merely intellect and will, not merely the soul or the spirit, but the whole man with soul and spirit, intellect, will, and emotions, consciousness and feelings, shares in the blessings of regeneration.¹⁶⁹

All this ties in most beautifully with the conception of the primacy of the heart which we have been attributing to Bavinck. If man is to be renewed by

¹⁶⁶ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:64. Cf. also p. 48. ET: *RD*, 4:81; cf. 69.

¹⁶⁷ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:77; ET: *RD*, 4:91.

¹⁶⁸ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:72. Cf. also p. 19. ET: *RD*, 4:87; cf. 47.

¹⁶⁹ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:80; ET: *RD*, 4:93.

God's Spirit, he must be renewed in the center and core of his being. This as we have seen, is the heart. And therefore, with perfect consistency, regeneration is described as a renewal of man's heart.

What finally are the psychological implications of conversion? Conversion, according to Bavinck, is the outward change from the service of sin to the service of God, wherein the inner transformation wrought in regeneration becomes manifest. Since conversion roots in regeneration,¹⁷⁰ it is obvious that it, too, involves a change in the heart of man, since the regeneration from which it issues is, as we have seen, a renewal of the heart. This is, indeed, Bavinck's [69] position. True conversion is not merely a superficial change, but a transformation which involves the heart of man.

So, for example, in his "Primaat van verstand of wil" Bavinck points out that, over against the intellectualism of the Greeks, Christianity emphasized the importance of spiritual renewal (regeneration) and of faith and conversion, which are even more matters of the heart than of the head.¹⁷¹ In his discussion of faith in the first volume of *Dogmatiek* Bavinck makes clear that the ordinary means whereby faith is wrought is the preaching of the Word; for, says he, there is no other way to the heart of man than through his head.¹⁷² The obvious implication is that faith (which is generally included in conversion) is a matter of the heart. When Bavinck speaks of the testimony of the Holy Spirit as his ground for our faith, he constantly refers to it as the testimony of the Spirit *in the hearts of believers*.¹⁷³ And on a later page he declares that faith "roots in the mysterious depths of the regenerate heart."¹⁷⁴ Clearly, then, faith as integral part of conversion, is an activity of the heart of man.

¹⁷⁰ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:149; ET: *RD*, 4:149–50.

¹⁷¹ Bavinck, "Primaat van verstand of wil," 209; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," 202–3. Cf. also Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 204–6; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 189–91.

¹⁷² Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:611; ET: *RD*, 1:570.

¹⁷³ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:632, 633, 639, 640. Cf. p. 643, where the Spirit is said to open the heart. ET: *RD*, 1:588, 594, 595; cf. 597.

¹⁷⁴ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1:637; ET: *RD*, 1:591–92. Cf. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:97, where true faith is spoken of as "geloof des harten" (faith of the heart); ET: *RD*, 4:108.

The fourth volume of Bavinck's *Dogmatiek* also [70] contains a chapter on "Geloof en Bekeering" (Faith and Conversion). Here Bavinck, speaking of the illumination of the Holy Spirit which precedes faith and conversion, describes it as a shining by God's Spirit into our hearts, and as an enlightenment of the eyes of the heart.¹⁷⁵ A later discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in faith and conversion describes Him as one who "penetrates into the innermost parts of man, opens the closed and softens the hard heart."¹⁷⁶ In connection with the story of Lydia, it is said that in her case the simple preaching of the Word was the means which God used to work conversion in her heart.¹⁷⁷ In the midst of a discussion of repentance, conversion is again called a matter of the heart.¹⁷⁸ And on another page in the same chapter we find an illuminating statement of the difference between faith and conversion, and their mutual relatedness to the heart:

True conversion, then, involves the whole man: his intellect, his heart, his will, his soul, and his body; it causes him to break with sin all the way down the line, and places his entire person and life in the way and service of God. In conversion the emphasis falls on the will; faith and conversion both issue from regeneration, and both root in the heart; but whereas faith operates more in the sphere of the intellect, appropriating the forgiving grace of God in Christ, conversion exercises its activity more in the sphere of the will, turning the will away from evil and toward the good. As, however, intellect and will have a common root in the heart of man, and are never separated, but constantly influence each other, so it is with faith and conversion. They remain always closely related to [71] each other, supporting and strengthening one another.¹⁷⁹

In conclusion we may say that, according to Bavinck, both regeneration and conversion have their roots in the heart of man. What Bavinck teaches, therefore, about the renewing operations of the Holy Spirit in man substantiates our thesis

¹⁷⁵ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:85; ET: *RD*, 4:99. The Scripture passages quoted in this connection are: 2 Cor. 4:6 and Eph. 1:18. .

¹⁷⁶ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:117; ET: *RD*, 4:125.

¹⁷⁷ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:136. Cf. also p. 116. ET: *RD*, 4:139; cf. 124.

¹⁷⁸ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:165; ET: *RD*, 4:162. The Scripture passages quoted to prove this point are: Jer. 3:10, Luke 1:17, Acts 16:14, Rom. 2:29; 10:10.

¹⁷⁹ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 4:153; ET: *RD*, 4:152.

that for him what is primary and basic in man is the heart. For the work of the Spirit in regeneration and conversion is said to take place in the heart of man, and thus to transform the entire personality. When a polluted spring is purified, all the streams which take their rise from it are similarly cleansed, and so it is also with man. When the heart is renewed, the man is renewed.

Summarizing this chapter, we may say that we have shown that, according to Bavinck, what is primary and basic in human nature is the heart, out of which are all the issues of life. We have proved this by noting what Bavinck says about the unity of the soul, by quoting direct statements of his concerning the primacy of the heart, by noting the role of the faculties in Bavinck's psychology, and by observing the relation between the heart and sin, as well as that between the heart and spiritual renewal. A critical evaluation of Bavinck's psychology will be given in chapter 8 of this thesis, following upon a more thorough historical and Biblical study of the chief anthropological problem which concerns us here: namely, the question of what is primary or determinative in human nature. [72]

Chapter 2

The Position of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd

Before proceeding to our historical investigation, let us briefly take note of an important recent development in the Netherlands which serves to substantiate Bavinck's position on the centrality of the heart in human nature.

Bavinck, as we have seen, teaches a primacy of the heart; the heart is for him the center and source of all man's physical, mental, and spiritual activities. And now it is extremely significant to note that a contemporary movement among Reformed Christians in the Netherlands takes exactly the same position with respect to the heart that Bavinck takes. I refer to the movement known as the "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" (the philosophy of the idea of law), which is an attempt to construct a distinctive Calvinistic philosophy. The leading figures in this philosophical movement are Dr. H. Dooyeweerd and Dr. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, both at the present time professors at the Free University of Amsterdam. Building on the foundations laid by Bavinck and Kuyper, they are attempting to construct a philosophy which will be in harmony with the basic postulates of Reformed theology, and will seek to reflect the essence of the Reformed faith.

I shall not attempt, in this thesis, to give an exhaustive exposition of this philosophy, nor of the anthropological views of either or both of these men, but shall try [73] to indicate briefly what position this new philosophy takes with respect to the chief problem of this study: namely, what is fundamental or primary in man. And we shall find that, on this fundamental issue, these men are in perfect agreement with Bavinck, though differing from him on other matters.

In giving this brief survey, I shall use especially the following works: Vollenhoven's *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, published in 1933; Dooyeweerd's three-volume magnum opus, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*,

published in 1935 and 1936; and a small volume titled *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* by J. M. Spier. This last work is a brief, yet rather comprehensive exposition of this new philosophy.¹

The Heart as the Concentration-Point of All Temporal Functions

It will be recalled that, according to Bavinck, the heart is the source and center of all man's physical and mental life. In Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd we find this same view, only in slightly different language. The heart is called the concentration-point of all temporal functions. Quoting the same passage which is found so frequently in Bavinck's writings, "out of the heart are the issues of life," Spier writes: "The heart is the concentration-point of our entire human existence. Out of it come forth all our deeds, our thoughts, our feeling, our speaking, our loving, our believing — in one word: all the outward [74] expressions of our life."² It will be noted that this language sounds very similar to Bavinck. In fact, Spier goes even further in expressing this centrality of the heart. He claims — and he is only reflecting the "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" when he does so — that in the heart man transcends not only the various temporal functions of life, but even time itself. According to this philosophy time is inextricably bound up with the entire cosmos; the cosmos is, in fact, imbedded in time as in a matrix. There is one point in the universe, however, where time is transcended, and that is the heart of man. "For man is the only creature which cannot be characterized by a specific temporal function, since in his heart he concentrates all temporal functions in a

¹ Ed. note: Dirk H. Th. Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1933). The second and third works Hoekema refers to have been translated into English: Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1953–1958); Johannes M. Spier, *An Introduction to Christian Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1954). Unlike the Bavinck references in the previous chapter for which we provided the ET references, the references to these works remain unchanged from Hoekema's own citing.

² Johannes M. Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* (Zutphen: Ruys, 1938), 24. Once again, the translations of this Dutch material are in every instance mine.

point which reaches out above the temporal.”³ Similarly, on another page, Spier says: “Man transcends the cosmic time-boundary in one respect: namely, in his heart, the religious concentration-point of all his temporal functions.”⁴ So then, according to Spier, the heart is the center of all man’s temporal activities, and the “spot” where he transcends time.

This point is also clearly expressed by Dooyeweerd himself: [75]

The heart is the truly transcendent root of human existence; the only point wherein we transcend the diversity characteristic of temporal reality. As the Scripture expresses it: Eternity has been set in man’s heart. The heart is the fullness of our selfhood, the truly transcendental concentration-point of our existence, in which all temporal functions meet.⁵

Here we have the same thought, that the heart is the central point in man, out of which all of his functions issue. Dooyeweerd vigorously repudiates all attempts to make anything less than the heart, any single function of man, the center or root of man’s existence. “The transcendent root of our creaturely existence is found, not in theoretical thought, in feeling, in our aesthetic function, or in our rational-moral functions, but in the heart as the religious concentration-point.”⁶ Dooyeweerd would therefore repudiate also any primacy of the intellect or will or feeling, in the sense that any one of those functions should be called sovereign in man or made the root of man’s existence, but would place the primacy in man’s heart, as Bavinck also did. And for Dooyeweerd the heart is decidedly not to be identified with man’s emotional life, or even with man’s faith-life; it is, as has been stated, the concentration-point of all his functions.⁷

³ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 49. This point also, however, is in perfect agreement with Bavinck, who similarly places the heart above time. See p. 8 above, and footnote 22.

⁴ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 66. See also p. 64.

⁵ Herman Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935–1936), 1:30.

⁶ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:31–32.

⁷ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:472.

The Heart as the Religious Root of Man's Existence

In our previous discussion it was also observed that for Bavinck the heart is the center of man's religious life. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd speak in similar vein. For them [76] the heart is the religious root of man's existence. In his preface to the first volume of *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, Dooyeweerd explains that the great turning-point in his thinking was the discovery of the religious root of thought itself. "I began to understand," he says, "the central significance of the heart, which Scripture again and again designates as the religious root of man's entire existence."⁸ And again, on another page, he says that "the fullness of our selfhood exists only in the religious center of our creaturely existence, where the direction of our entire life is determined with respect to the truly absolute Source of all things."⁹ It need hardly be added that this center is the heart. Thus Bavinck and Dooyeweerd are fully agreed here.

It must not be thought, however, that when Dooyeweerd speaks of the heart as the religious root of man's existence, he is thinking only of believers. Quite the contrary. He is thinking of all men, since all men are religious in the sense that they must rest on some ultimate principle of being. If men will not believe in God, they will believe in an idol. To say that a person is an unbeliever is not to say that he has no faith, but that the faith is wrongly directed: that is, to an idol instead of to God.¹⁰

It is in a man's heart, so says this new philosophy, that this basic relationship of man to God is determined.¹¹ In the heart man directs himself to the Source of all things. He may seek this Source in God, or he may seek it in some [77] aspect of creation, and therefore in an idol.¹² But, in any event, he must take some position. It is impossible to be neutral in one's heart. That heart either loves God or hates Him. It either belongs to Christ or stands outside of Him. It

⁸ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:iv–v.

⁹ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:31.

¹⁰ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 99.

¹¹ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 24.

¹² Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 66.

has either been renewed, or still lives in apostasy.¹³ But whatever man's relation to God may be, whatever religious position he may take, the heart is the center of his religious life.

By nature man is a sinner. What, now, is the seat of sin? Bavinck, we have seen, placed this seat in the heart, though not with complete consistency. What does the "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" say about this question? Spier cites Genesis 8:21 to prove that the heart is the fountain of all sin.¹⁴ In another connection he points out that from the moment of the Fall the heart of man has become corrupted. Then he continues:

We therefore recognize in our philosophy that sin has a deeper ground than the temporal functions. It hides most deeply in the religious center of our existence, as Christ says: "For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, railings" (Matt. 15:19).¹⁵

And Vollenhoven makes a similar statement:

It [sin] does not touch merely a part of his [man's] existence, but his whole life. For his heart is untrustworthy; in fact, precisely out of that heart, out of which are the issues of life, come forth evil thoughts and many other abominations, which defile him.¹⁶

[78] So there can be no doubt about the fact that, for Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, sin roots in the heart of man.

The only hope for man as a sinner is to be renewed by the Spirit of God. Bavinck, as has been explained, teaches that this renewal takes place in the heart of man, since the heart is the center of our life, and since genuine renewal must begin at that center. The "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" advances the same view. In the footnote in which he lists the various meanings of heart according to Scripture, Spier states: "The word heart is used in Scripture . . . as the deepest center of our entire temporal existence, where the renewing operation of the Spirit of God takes place in believers (Ps. 51:10)."¹⁷ Later on, in connection with the

¹³ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 24. See also p. 118.

¹⁴ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 24, footnote.

¹⁵ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 119.

¹⁶ Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, 42–43.

¹⁷ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 24, footnote.

corruption wrought by sin, Spier says, “Only after the Holy Spirit through His almighty power has renewed the heart, do the functions of the believer again . . . begin to work properly.”¹⁸

This spiritual renewal manifests itself in faith and conversion. We have previously noted that, according to Bavinck, faith and conversion are matters of the heart. In Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd we find the same view. Spier explains the relation between faith and the heart as follows:

Faith is not the same as the heart. For faith, as a temporal function, is to be distinguished from the other functions, whereas the heart is the supra-temporal religious center out of which all the functions issue. Therefore Scripture says that with the heart we believe unto righteousness.¹⁹

[79] Again, on a following page, Spier asserts that all faith appeals to some kind of revelation, whether one seeks that revelation in the Word of the only true God, or in the supposed revelation of his false god. “That revelation,” he continues, “grasps man in the heart of his existence; it touches the center of his life.”²⁰ God’s revelation, consequently, according to this new philosophy, touches man in his heart; and it is with the heart that man either accepts or rejects that revelation.

In similar vein, Vollenhoven writes: “What a man believes depends, in the final analysis, on what kind of heart he has.”²¹ So faith comes out of and is dependent on the heart. It is to be noted once again that by faith these men do not mean saving faith in the strict sense of the word, but something which is common to all men. “For,” continues Vollenhoven, “faith as a function is present with all men. But whereas in the case of Christians it gives heed to the Word of God, in the case of non-Christians it directs itself to a substitute for that Word.”²² In either case, however, faith is still a function of man’s heart.

¹⁸ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 121.

¹⁹ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 99.

²⁰ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 100.

²¹ Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, 40.

²² Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, 40.

This point is also evident from Professor Dooyeweerd's definition of faith: "Faith is the being grasped in the heart of our existence by a revelation from the Source."²³ Whether [80] that revelation is construed as being contained in the Bible, in the Koran, in nature or history, or anywhere else, faith consists in being grasped by the revelation in one's heart. Faith is exercised and directed by the heart. For, as Dooyeweerd says elsewhere, "Only in the heart does the function of faith find its religious concentration-point, and from that root of our existence the direction of our believing is determined."²⁴

So there is no conflict whatever between Bavinck and this newer philosophy. Both make the heart the center of man's religious life and the center of regeneration and faith. All of this serves to confirm the point that, for a consistently Christian anthropology, the heart is the most primary and fundamental aspect of man.

The Heart as the Starting-Point for Philosophy

But there is another emphasis in this new Calvinistic philosophy which advances somewhat beyond Bavinck. I refer to the postulate that the heart is also the starting-point (*uitgangspunt*) of philosophy. Now this is not an idea absolutely foreign to Bavinck; he does say that what kind of philosophy one has depends on what kind of man he is, and that one's philosophy is frequently nothing else than the history of his heart.²⁵ But Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have worked out this idea of the primacy of the heart in philosophy in much detail, making it an integral part of their system. [81]

Spier makes plain what these men mean by a starting-point, and why it is necessary. Philosophy, he says, is scientific, systematic thinking about the entire cosmos. In order to think systematically, however, the philosopher must have a "point of vantage" from which he can gain a panoramic view of the totality of the cosmos in all of its diversities and relationships. Professor Dooyeweerd also

²³ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 2:230. The original reads: "gegrepenheid in het hart onzer existentie door een openbaring van de *Archee*."

²⁴ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 2:228.

²⁵ See above, p. 13.

speaks of this point of vantage as an “Archimedic-point” (*Archimedisb-punt*), referring to Archimedes who is alleged to have said, “Give me a point where I can stand, and I shall move the earth.” So, in philosophy, all depends on the point where one stands. If that point is a true Archimedic-point, from which all of reality can be seen in proper perspective, one’s philosophy will be sound. But if that point is inadequate, affording a glimpse of only a part of reality, or giving a distorted view of reality, one’s philosophy is bound to be similarly inadequate and therefore false.²⁶

Before setting forth what this philosophical starting-point is, according to the “*Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*,” it will be instructive first of all to see what it is not. In the history of philosophy probably the most commonly adduced starting-point has been that of human reason. But Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven most vehemently deny that a Scriptural philosophy can find its starting-point there. So, for instance, Vollenhoven points out that when Thomas Aquinas posited “natural reason” as the only organ for philosophy, he took a [82] stand not only opposed to Augustine, but opposed to Christian philosophy as a whole.²⁷ Similarly Dooyeweerd asserts: “As soon as Christian thought began to imagine that it could find a true Archimedic-point for philosophy in the *naturalis ratio*, the philosophical apostasy of the Christian conception of the cosmos could no longer be checked.”²⁸ Later in the same volume he states that the Calvinistic philosophy to which he is committed repudiates all dependence on natural reason as a self-sufficient starting-point.²⁹ Reason is insufficient because it is only one of man’s functions, and because it, like all of man’s other functions, is rooted in the heart.³⁰

²⁶The discussion which has here been paraphrased is given in Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 23.

²⁷Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, 204.

²⁸Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:474. Cf. also p. 475.

²⁹Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:490. Cf. also Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 3:vi.

³⁰Statement by Professor Hendrik G. Stoker, professor of philosophy and psychology at the University of Potchefstroom, South Africa, in a personal interview on Aug. 14, 1946.

In this connection it is significant to note that this new philosophy also repudiates the “primacy of the intellect,” as commonly understood. Dooyeweerd, in fact, links the concept of the primacy of the intellect with the view which affirms the sufficiency of natural reason in philosophy — a position which, as we have seen, he vigorously opposes.³¹ He also speaks disparagingly of the medieval controversy about the primacy of the will or intellect in God, implying that this whole dispute was out of place in Christian theology, stemming, as it did, from a rationalistic philosophical position.³² [83] Similarly, these men deny that anything in human nature can be called “higher” than anything else, since, according to them, this perpetrates the error of “partial theism.” “Partial theism,” according to these men, consists in drawing the line which should divide God from the world through the cosmos, thus deifying an aspect of the cosmos. The result of this error is that distinctions are made within the cosmos between what is “higher” and what is “lower.” As examples of this “partial theism” Spier cites the following: “the view that the soul of man is divine or ‘higher,’ whereas the body is the ‘lower.’ Also the conception that the ‘higher’ is to be found in man’s ‘reason,’ since God is the ‘Absolute Reason.’”³³ It is obvious that this new Calvinistic philosophy would repudiate any “primacy of the intellect” which would make reason or intellect higher or nobler than the will, let us say, or the feelings. And on this point also it is in accord with Bavinck’s mature position.³⁴

Getting back now to the positive aspect of this question, what then, according to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, is the starting-point for philosophy? As has already been suggested, it is the heart of man. The “point of vantage,” from which philosophy begins, must be able to command a view of the totality of the cosmos, in all its relationships. This [84] point, so explains Spier, is only to be found in the heart of man. For out of the heart, says the Bible, are the issues of

³¹ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:474.

³² Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:475.

³³ Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 42. Cf. also Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte*, 64.

³⁴ Bavinck did, however, speak of “higher” and “lower” in man. For example, he distinguished between a higher and a lower knowing-faculty, as well as a higher and a lower desiring-faculty. On this point the new philosophy would not agree with Bavinck.

life. The heart is the concentration-point of our human existence. In the heart our relation to God is determined. It is therefore impossible, Spier continues, for the human heart to be neutral. It is either for Christ or against Him; it has either been renewed by the Holy Spirit, or still lives in apostasy from God.

Calvinistic philosophy therefore finds its starting-point in the *regenerated heart* of the believer, since it is there, in his heart, that the believer has received and appropriated the revelation of God in Christ. But non-Christian philosophies similarly find their starting-point in the human heart, only they originate in the *unregenerate heart* of man: the heart which has no part in Christ, and which through unbelief has closed itself to the revelation of God. That unregenerate heart, having fallen away from God, now seeks its security in some creature or some aspect of created reality, making it into a god. The non-Christian philosophies vigorously deny this. They all claim to be purely “objective,” denying that their philosophical systems are to any extent influenced by the personalities of the men who construct them, and that their hearts have anything to do with the formulation of their tenets. But, counters Spier, in order to philosophize at all, man must “absolutize” something, must make something the final ground of all existence. And this act of absolutizing something is in every instance a deed of the human heart. So, whether the non-Christian [85] philosophers deny it or not, the fact remains that the heart of man is always the point of origin for every philosophy.³⁵

When discussing the effect of sin on philosophy, Spier remarks in similar vein:

Philosophy, as coming forth out of the heart of man, partakes of the life-direction, which is the fruit of a religious choice in man’s heart. In the final analysis there are only two such life-directions — either toward the Lord or away from Him.³⁶

The point in man, however, where this fundamental differentiation of life-direction begins is his heart.

³⁵The above discussion of the philosophical starting-point has been paraphrased from Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 24–26.

³⁶Spier, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 117–18.

In all of this, Spier is only reflecting the point of view of the leaders of the “Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee.” For Dooyeweerd constantly stresses the same thought. “The Scriptural expression, ‘Out of the heart are the issues of life,’ must, properly understood, bring about a revolution in philosophical thinking.”³⁷ He goes on to show that medieval Christian philosophy never understood or appreciated this Scriptural truth, and hence tried to find the essence of man in his theoretical thinking — a position which is utterly at variance with true Christianity. Then Dooyeweerd continues to say that, according to Scripture, the heart is the true root of human existence, the true transcendent concentration-point of our nature, wherein all temporal functions meet, and that the heart is as such “also the necessary point of departure for philosophical thought since in all theoretical abstraction our selfhood is intellectually operative.”³⁸ [86]

These new Calvinistic philosophers make this conception of the heart as the “Archimedic-point” of philosophy quite basic in their system. All philosophy begins in the heart. Every philosophy therefore begins with a “non-rational commitment” — a basic postulate not derived from reason but arrived at by faith. And this faith-choice is made in the heart.

It ought to be obvious by this time, therefore, that there is no conflict between Bavinck and the “Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee” on the point of what is primary or fundamental in man. Both teach a primacy of the heart, in accordance with what they believe to be the anthropology of Scripture. Both make the heart not only the center of all man’s physical and mental functions, but also the center of his religious life and the starting-point for his philosophy. What Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have done is to work out this primacy of the heart in such a way as to assign it an integral place in their philosophical system. We may conclude, therefore, that this recent movement in Calvinistic circles serves to give significant support and confirmation to Bavinck’s teaching on the centrality of the heart. [87]

³⁷ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:29.

³⁸ Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 1:30–31.

Chapter 3

The Teaching of Augustine

We now begin our historical investigation. Our purpose in this investigation is to see what has been taught in the history of Christian theology on the question which forms the main subject of this thesis: namely, what is primary or fundamental in human nature. We shall go with this question to four outstanding Christian theologians: Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin; and shall attempt to find their answer to this problem. The contribution of each of these theologians on this specific problem shall then be compared with Bavinck's view, as set forth in chapter 1. Thus we shall obtain an historical background for our question, and shall have some theological basis for our final evaluation of Bavinck's position.

We begin our historical study with Aurelius Augustine, not only an outstanding theologian, but probably the greatest psychologist of the ancient world, who lived from A.D. 354 – 430. What did Augustine teach on the question which concerns us here? What, according to him, is primary and determinative in human nature?

It should be stated at the outset that one does not find in Augustine the stress on the primacy of the heart which we have found in Bavinck. He does, it is true, refer [88] occasionally to the heart. But he does not make the concept *heart* an integral and basic part of his psychology, as does Bavinck, and neither does he make the heart the source and center of all mental activities.

This is evident when we consider a few passages where Augustine did use the term heart. Probably the best known passage is the famous quotation from the *Confessions*: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it finds its rest in Thee."¹ From the same book the following quotation is taken: "Thou has stricken my heart with Thy Word."² Again, what Augustine most missed in the books of the Platonists, next to the omission of the name of Christ, was "the

¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, book 1, chapter 1.

² Augustine, *Confessions*, book 10, chapter 8.

tears of confession, Thy sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a broken and a contrite heart.”³ Augustine here uses the concept of *heart* in a more or less general sense, derived from Scripture.

Otto Zänker further suggests that there are several passages where Augustine uses the concept *heart* to denote the object of that miraculous working of God which has as its goal the creation of a good will.⁴ Of these passages Zänker quotes one: “*Legant ergo et intelligent, intueantur et fateantur, non lege atque doctrina . . . sed interna et occulte, mirabili et ineffabili postestate operari deum in cordibus hominum non [89] solum veras revelationes, sed bonas voluntates,*”⁵ observing that God is here said to work in the hearts of men, and there to bring about the renewal of the will. All this is in perfect agreement with Bavinck’s position. However, this view of the heart as the center of man where the renewing operation of God takes place cannot be said to occupy a leading position in Augustine’s thought. As we shall see, what is made most important in man is generally the will, and no attempt is made to go beyond the will to the heart, except, as has been noted, in a few scattered instances.

The Importance of the Will

We go on, then, to adduce a number of representative passages which make plain the importance of the will in Augustine’s thinking, deferring until later the question of what for Augustine is really primary or fundamental in human nature. We may begin by considering Augustine’s strong emphasis on the will as the cause of sin. “Either, then, the will itself is the first cause of sin, or there is no

³ Augustine, *Confessions*, book 7, chapter 27.

⁴ Otto Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907), 89. The passages to which he alludes are: *Contra Iulianum*, 5, 4; 6, 10; 2, 10; 3, 166; *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum*, 1, 38; *De Correptione et Gratia*, 45.

⁵ Augustine, *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali*, 25; quoted in Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 88. Ed. note: ET: “Let them therefore read and understand, observe and acknowledge, that it is not by law and teaching, [uttering their lessons from without,] but by a secret, wonderful, and ineffable power operating within, that God works in men’s hearts not only revelations of the truth, but also good dispositions of the will” (Philip Schaff, ed., *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887], 5:226; hereafter *NPNF*).

first cause of sin.”⁶ Even original sin is to be attributed to the will of man: “Sin does come from the will. Perhaps he wants to know, whether original sin also? I answer, most certainly original sin also. Because it, too, was engendered from the will of the first man; so that it both existed in him, and passed on to all.”⁷

[90] Zänker summarizes this point by saying, “*Die letzte Ursache des religiös-sittlichen Mangels ist der böse Wille, nicht Mangel an Erkenntnis.*”⁸ In fact, according to Zänker, Augustine holds that when we have said that the evil will of man is the cause of sin, we have said all that we can say, for we cannot go beyond the evil will. “*Woher aber dann der böse Wille? Das war die Endfrage aller Fragen. Augustin antwortet: Die Ursache des bösen Willens ist nicht zu entdecken.*”⁹ It is obvious that, in his doctrine of sin, Augustine ascribes the greatest importance to man’s will. Sin originated when man’s will turned away from God, and sin remains in man because he still wills to sin. Hence man is held accountable for his sin.

We may also note a few other passages where Augustine attaches great importance to the will: “For there is not anything that I perceive so strongly and intimately as the fact that I have a will, and that by my will I am moved to the enjoying of anything. But if the will, by [the action of] which I will and will not, is not mine, then I find not at all what I can say is my own.”¹⁰ Here Augustine seems to say that no other aspect of our nature is so peculiarly and intimately our own as our will. We have already noted the passage from *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali*, in which the renewing operation of God in the heart of man is described as not merely the giving of true revelation, but the creation of good wills.¹¹ Zänker, [91] in fact, puts it as strongly as this: “*Augustine . . . sagt: Ob wir gerecht leben, hängt ganz von unserm Willen ab; nec plus aliquid perficienda iustitia quam perfectam voluntatem requirit.*”¹² And Storz, another careful student of Augustine, expresses

⁶ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, 3, 17.

⁷ Augustine, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, 2, 48.

⁸ Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 149.

⁹ Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 75.

¹⁰ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, 3, 1.

¹¹ See above, p. 66, footnote 5.

¹² Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 90. The reference is to Augustine, *Epistulae*, 127, 5.

himself as follows: “*Diese Freiheit aber besteht darin, dass die Bewegung des Wollens in der selbsteigenen Macht des Menschen liegt, so dass der Wille die bewirkende Ursache der menschlichen Handlungen ist.*”¹³ To substantiate this view, he quotes, among others, a passage from the *City of God* which, in its entirety, reads as follows: “*Et ipsae quippe nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo eiusque praescientia continetur; quoniam et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae sunt.*”¹⁴ From these passages it is obvious that Augustine thinks of the will as of crucial and basic importance in human life.

There is another passage which is quite frequently quoted to prove that Augustine held that man is essentially nothing else than will: namely, *De civitate Dei*, 14, 6. The sentence usually quoted is this: “*Voluntas est quod quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.*”¹⁵ On the basis of this sentence, torn out of its context, it is then alleged that, to Augustine, “his fellow-men are ‘*nihil aliud [92] quam voluntates.*”¹⁶ This is, however, a gross perversion of Augustine’s meaning. Augustine is not speaking here about men in general, but about the emotions. He has just pointed out, in 14, 5, that the emotions of desire, fear, joy, and sorrow do not arise from the flesh, but may arise in the soul itself, apart from the flesh. Then he goes on to say, in 14, 6, “*Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis: quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum*

¹³ Joseph Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1882), 138.

¹⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 5, 9. Ed. note: ET: “How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes?” (*NPNF*, 2:92).

¹⁵ Ed. note: ET: “For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will.” (*NPNF*, 2:266).

¹⁶ James Morgan, *The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine* (London: Elliot Stock, [1932]), 176. It will be noted that Morgan lifts these words bodily from *De civitate Dei*, 14, 6, and applies them to men in general. For a similar instance of this use of the quotation, see Morgan, *The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine*, 145. Cf. also Archibald Alexander, *Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy* (New York: Scribner, 1898), 106, where this passage is quoted to prove that “the will is almost the same with the person.”

inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt."¹⁷

It is certainly obvious from the context that Augustine is not discussing men but emotions here. All he means to say is that the will expresses itself in all emotions, and that, in fact, in one sense these emotions can be said to be nothing other than wills. So Augustine does not teach in this passage that men are nothing other than wills, as Morgan and Alexander carelessly assume, but he does point out that the quality and ethical value of an emotion is determined by the will of the person having the emotion. And this again illustrates the great importance Augustine attached to the will.¹⁸ [93]

On the basis of these and numerous similar statements, many students of Augustine have come to the conclusion that, for him, the core of human personality is to be found in the will. So, for instance, Storz reproduces Augustine's position in these words: "*In der Fähigkeit zu wollen liegt der eigentliche Kern und Mittelpunkt der menschlichen Persönlichkeit.*"¹⁹ Rudolf Eucken says in similar vein: "*Er [Augustine] durchbricht aber diesen Kreis [den Gedanken-Kreise des Platonismus] und eröffnet neue Bahnen, indem das Verlangen nach mehr Kraft und Selbstleben ihn den Kern der Seele nicht mehr Kraft und Selbstleben ihn den Kern der Seele nicht mehr im Erkennen, sondern im Wollen suchen heißt.*"²⁰ Siebeck states, in reference to Augustine, "*Im Willen liege 'der eigentliche Kern unsere Wesens, sofern dies nicht*

¹⁷ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14, 6. Ed. note: ET: "But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will" (*NPNF*, 2:266).

¹⁸ It is rather surprising that even Rudolf Eisler, in his *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*. (Berlin: Miller, 1910), 3:1791, misinterprets this passage. He says, "*Der Wille ist also ein besonderes Vermögen, und dieses ist in allen übrigen Seelenfunktionen mit enthalten*" (*De civitate Dei*, 14, 6). But *De civitate Dei*, 14, 6 only teaches that the will expresses itself in all the emotions; it does not say that the will is contained in all the other functions of the soul.

¹⁹ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 139.

²⁰ Rudolf Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*. (Leipzig: Veit, 1907), 211.

eine im Natürlichen beschlossene, sondern eine ethische Bestimmung hat.”²¹ Adolf Harnack similarly asserts: “*Der Kern unseres Wesens liegt nach Augustin unstreitig im Willen.*”²² In fact, Kahl and Zänker go so far as to maintain that [94] *Augustine taught a primacy of the will over the other functions of the soul.* For Kahl, in describing Augustine’s position, says, “*Umgekehrt kommt vielmehr dem Willen der Primat über die anderen psychischen Funktionen zu, von denen er in keiner Weise abhängig ist.*”²³ And Zänker, whose study is more recent than Kahl’s and is in many respects a critique of Kahl’s, nevertheless reveals the same fundamental conception of Augustine’s anthropology in his title: *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin.*

On the basis of such evaluations as those just quoted, it sounds very much as though Augustine’s view would be at variance from that of Bavinck, who, we have seen, made the heart the center and most primary aspect of human personality. It would appear from the above assertions that Augustine would place the will where Bavinck places the heart, and that therefore there would be a fundamental difference between the two on the score of what is basic in human nature. A more careful investigation, however, will reveal that this is not the case.

It must, of course, be admitted that Augustine does lay more stress on the will than on any other aspect of human personality. His strong emphasis on the will ties in with his opposition to Greek intellectualism and with his stress on the responsibility and accountability of man.²⁴ But does [95] this prominent

²¹ Hermann Siebeck, “Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie in der Scholastik,” *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 93 (1888): 183; quoted by Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 16.

²² Adolf Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 3:114 ff.; quoted by Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 17. Ed. note: ET: “The kernel of our nature exists indisputably according to Augustine in our will.” Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. James Millar (London: Williams & Norgate, 1898), 5:123, footnote 1.

²³ Wilhelm Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns Scotus, und Descartes* (Strassburg: Trübner, 1886), 24.

²⁴ Aricius S. E. Talma, in his *De anthropologie van Calvijn* (Utrecht: Breijer, 1882), 4, footnote 1, points out that Augustine’s great controversies, first with the Manicheans, and later with the Pelagians, made it necessary for him to devote so much attention to the doctrine of the human will. For in both of these controversies erroneous views of the human will were at stake.

emphasis imply that Augustine would teach a “primacy of the will”? The concept of primacy, as Bavinck has pointed out, suggests not only temporal priority, or pre-eminence, but sovereignty over other mental functions. And sovereignty implies relative independence from the self or soul, since then not the self is sovereign over its activities, but a part of the self—in this case, the will. In fact, the whole idea of a “primacy of the will” implies that the will is a separate entity in the soul, which functions more or less independently of the self, and rules over the other powers of the soul.

But is this Augustine’s view? Is the will for him a separate entity in man, functioning independently of the self? Or is the will for him an activity of the whole soul or self, so that what is really sovereign in man is not the will as such, but the self functioning volitionally? It is my conviction that the latter represents Augustine’s true view.

The Unity of the Soul

This conviction is based on a number of considerations. First it is to be noted that Augustine, like Bavinck, taught and stressed the unity of the soul. Eisler, in fact, makes this stress Augustine’s unique contribution to the history of the *Seelenvermögen* question: “*Die Einheit der Seele in ihren [96] Funktionen betont Augustinus.*”²⁵ Similarly, Theodor Gangauf remarks that, according to Augustine, the soul is

*Ein Sein . . . welches in seiner substanziellen Selbstheit eine lebendige Einheit ist, indem die einzelnen Kräfte, welche je nach ihrer Beziehung benannt werden, nicht bloß ihre reale Einheit im Geiste als dem Subjekte haben, sondern auch zu einander selber in dem Verhältnisse stehen, dass nicht bloß die eine die andere und jede sich, sondern jede alle andern, und zwar nicht zum Theil, sondern ganz fasset.*²⁶

And Storz makes a very similar statement:

²⁵ Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*. 3:1287, in article titled “Seelenvermögen.”

²⁶ Theodor Gangauf, *Metaphysische Psychologie des heiligen Augustinus* (Augsburg: Kollmann, 1852), 177.

*Wie der Bestimmung der Seele als einer immateriellen Substanz, ebenso betont Augustinus das, was mit dem Begriffe einer immateriellen Substanz in ihrem Unterschied vom körperlichen Sein unmittelbar gegeben ist, nämlich die lebendige Einheit derselben trotz der Mehrheit der Kräfte, welche in ihr unterschieden werden.*²⁷

If it is clear that Augustine teaches the unity of the soul, it is obvious that we cannot split up the soul into various independent entities, alleging that one of those entities is sovereign over the others, and still claim to do justice to Augustine.

Augustine does speak of faculties in the soul, as Storz also points out.²⁸ But what, for him, is the relation between these faculties and the soul? Storz expresses this as follows: “*Das Verhältnis dieser Vermögen zur Seele selbst muss daher in dem Sinne aufgefasst werden, dass sie die Eine Wesenheit oder Substantialität mit der Seele selbst teilen.*”²⁹ [97] If one faculty cannot be made a substance in distinction from the other faculties, but derives its substantiality from the soul, it would seem to follow that one *Vermögen* or faculty cannot be made sovereign over the others, but that all the faculties must be subordinate to the soul itself. Windelband also advances this view. Speaking of the question of the primacy of the will or of the intellect, he says: “In Augustinianism the oneness of nature in the personality was so strongly emphasized, and the interrelation of the different sides of its activity so often made prominent, that a relation of rank was out of the question.”³⁰ And Charles Cochrane, a contemporary student of Augustine, makes the following statement, in connection with a discussion of the functions of the mind: “Finally, he [Augustine] asserts that in these functions is to be discovered a substantial unity, independent of and distinguishable from any relations which it may possess.”³¹ According to these men, therefore, Augustine taught that the soul is a substantial unity, and the functions or faculties of the soul are to be thought

²⁷ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 116.

²⁸ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, section 16, called “Die Seelenvermögen,” 129–47.

²⁹ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 116–17.

³⁰ Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 329.

³¹ Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 405.

of as subordinate to the unity of the soul. There would then seem to be no room for the “primacy” of any one of the functions over the other functions. [98]

The Will a Function of the Whole Soul

Let us now go to Augustine himself, to see whether he has been accurately represented by Storz, Windelband, and Cochrane, as quoted above. A most important work for our purpose here is Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity, composed in the years 400 to 428, and therefore representing Augustine’s mature viewpoint. In this work Augustine finds a number of analogies of the Trinity in human nature. The last — generally considered to be the best — of these analogies Augustine finds in the ternary of *memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas*. These three, says Augustine, are three and yet one; though they are three functions of the soul, they are united in one substance and one mind, as the three persons of the Trinity are united in one Godhead. Memory, intellect, and will are equal to each other, and are always active in all of man’s activities, just as the persons of the Godhead are equal to each other, and are simultaneously active in all the outward acts of God. It can be surmised that what Augustine says about these three functions or faculties of man under this head is of great significance for the question of whether we may speak of a primacy of the will in his teaching. We shall try to draw out some of these implications.³²

A passage of crucial importance in this connection is *De Trinitate*, book 10, chapter 11, section 18, which begins as [99] follows: “*Haec igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia.*”³³ Note that, according to this sentence, will and intellect are not only one life, but one mind and one substance. So the mind is one, though it has various functions; and

³² As far as I know, the protagonists of the “primacy of the will” in Augustine have never attempted to consider their views in light of books 10 and 15 of his *De Trinitate*.

³³ Ed. note: ET: “Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one substance” (*NPNF*, 3:142).

the primacy or sovereignty ought then to be ascribed, not to one of the functions, but to the mind or soul itself, which expresses itself in these various functions.

Then Augustine continues: “*Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum, quo una vita, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia. . . . Eo vero tria, quo ad se invicem referuntur: quae si aequalia non essent, non solum singula singulis, sed etiam omnibus singula, non utique se invicem caperent.*”³⁴ Here we learn that each of these three, memory, intelligence, and will, is equal to each of the others; and that intelligence is therefore equal to the will. How can one still maintain a primacy (pre-eminence, sovereignty) of the will in the face of a statement such as this? If each is equal to each, you certainly cannot make one dominate the others.

Continuing the quotation once more: “*Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem; et intelligo me intelligere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere.*”³⁵ Here we learn that, according to Augustine, the will and the intellect are not separate entities, with “egos” of their own, so that the one can dominate the other or the other the one, but that it is the one self that functions through them both. It is not the intelligence that understands and the will that wills, but it is I that understand, and it is I that will. So, then, willing is a deed of the self, of the ego, [100] of the entire man; and the same holds for understanding and memory as well.

In other words, according to the above-quoted passage from Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, the “faculties” are not separate, independent entities or agencies, nor partial expressions of the soul, but the whole soul expressing itself in certain specific ways. That this is a correct interpretation of Augustine’s view as developed in *De Trinitate*, 10, 11, is confirmed by a note appended to this passage by Dr. William G. T. Shedd:

³⁴ Ed. note: ET: “And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence. . . . But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other” (*NPNF*, 3:142).

³⁵ Ed. note: ET: “For I remember that I have memory and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will” (*NPNF*, 3:142).

This ternary of memory, understanding, and will is a better analogue to the Trinity than the preceding one in Chapter IX — namely, mind, knowledge, and love. Memory, understanding, and will have equal substantiality, while mind, knowledge, and love, have not. The former are three *faculties*, in each of which is the whole mind or spirit. The memory is the whole mind as remembering; the understanding is the whole mind as cognizing; and the will is the whole mind as determining. The one essence of the mind is in each of these modes, each of which is distinct from the others; and yet there are not three essences or minds.³⁶

The same view is found also elsewhere in Augustine's writings. Eisler quotes the following passage from *De Spiritu et Anima*, 13:

*Anima secundum sui officium variis nuncupatur nominibus. Dicitur namque anima dum vegetat, spiritus dum contemplatur, sensus dum sentit, animus dum sapit: dum intelligit, [101] mens: dum discernit, ratio: dum recordatur, memoria: dum vult, voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia quemadmodum differunt in nominibus: quoniam omnia ista una anima est, proprietates quidem diversae.*³⁷

From this citation we see that, despite the various functions which we may distinguish, the soul is still one; when we speak of the memory, the mind, or the will, we are simply giving different names to the one soul. What sense is there then in saying that the soul when it is called will is dominant or sovereign over

³⁶ Found in *NPNF*, 3:143, footnote 1 [italics original]. Jakob Brederveld, in his *De Leer der Zielsvermogens* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, [1925]), 68, similarly interprets Augustine. Speaking of Augustine's view of the soul, he says: "He [Augustine] does distinguish between various directions in the life of the soul, but this is never equivalent to separation or division [within the soul]. . . . In all its functionings the whole soul reveals itself."

³⁷ Quoted in Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*. 3:1287. Ed. note: ET: "The soul is called various names according to its function. For it is called [vital] soul when it vitalizes, spirit when it observes, sense when it perceives, [rational] soul when it knows. When it understands, [it is called] mind; when it discerns, reason; when it remembers, memory; when it wills, will. It is not, however, differentiated with regards to substance in the way that it is with regards to names: because all these is one soul, although with different qualities." More recent scholarship considers this work part of the pseudo-Augustine corpus, i.e., Augustinian in its content but not attributable to the Bishop of Hippo himself. See the Catalog of Medieval Manuscripts in Oxford Libraries at https://medieval.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/catalog/work_3880. A possible author is Alcher of Clairvaux (c. 1170).

the soul when it is called mind? According to this passage, willing is simply a name for the soul when it wills; willing, therefore, is not an independent entity, but the whole soul in the activity of willing. The same view is found in the *Confessions*: “*Cum aliquid vellem aut nollem, non aliud quam me velle ac nolle certissimus eram.*”³⁸ Here, again, we see that, according to Augustine, willing is an activity of the whole self.

Our question about the will has therefore been answered: the will for Augustine is not a separate entity in man, functioning independently of the self, but an activity of the whole soul or self. The will is simply the whole self as willing; the entire soul in a certain type of activity — just as thinking is the entire soul in a different type of [102] activity. We must be careful not to think of the soul in terms of the body. In the body, different functions must be assigned to different parts, as hearing to the ears, seeing to the eyes, speaking to the tongue, and so on. But the soul, which is immaterial, is not constructed that way. We may distinguish functions in the soul, but we cannot assign these functions to different parts of the soul. The various functions must be assigned to the entire soul; it is the whole soul that thinks, the whole soul that wills, and the whole soul that feels. Or, to put it differently, it is I who think, I who will, and I who feel. This, as we have tried to show, was precisely Augustine’s view of the soul. And on this basis there is no sense in disputing about which is primary or sovereign in man: the will or the intellect. Will and intellect are not separate entities, functioning like separate little men, one of whom is sovereign over the other, but both are simply different activities of the entire soul. What is primary and sovereign is neither of these functions of the soul, but the soul itself, which is the subject of both intellect and will. Michael Schmaus, a very painstaking recent student of Augustine’s psychology, confirms the point we have been making:

Augustinus kennt keine real von der Seele verschiedenen akzidentellen Potenzen im aristotelisch-thomistischen Sinn. Die Seele

³⁸ Augustine, *Confessions*, book 8, chapter 3; quoted in Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 139. Cf. also Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 15, chapter 22, section 42: “These three things, memory, understanding, and love, are mine, not their own; neither do they do that which they do for themselves, but for me, or rather I do it by them. For it is I who remember by memory, and understand by understanding, and love by love” (NPNF, 3:221).

*ist unmittelbar durch sich tätig. Das einheitliche Wesen der Seele entfaltet sich in den Tätigkeiten nach verschiedenen Richtungen. Die Seelenkräfte sind die Seele selbst in ihrer verschiedenen Tätigkeitsweise.*³⁹ [103]

The Will Inseparable from the Other Activities of the Soul

This last thought suggests another aspect of Augustine's thinking which is relevant to our subject, namely this: that willing is inseparable from the other activities of the soul, such as thinking, feeling, and remembering. Schmaus summarizes his discussion of the analogy of the Trinity found in *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas* by saying,

*Das Bild der Trinität, welches die drei oberen Seelenkräfte darstellen, lässt sich sonach auf folgende Formel bringen: Die numerisch eine Seele besitzt drei Grundformen ihrer durch das Wesen selbst erfolgenden Tätigkeit, zwischen denen relative Verschiedenheit herrscht, die einander aber sonst vollkommen gleich und voneinander untrennbar sind.*⁴⁰

Those words suggest that, according to Augustine, the will never acts independently of the memory or the intelligence, but that in every act of will, the intellect is also active, and vice versa. Let us look into this matter a little further.

For Augustine, as for Bavinck, willing is always accompanied by intellectual deliberation. Storz puts it this way: "*Dieses wahlfreie Wollen aber wäre nicht möglich ohne selbstbewusstes, vernünftiges Denken, ohne denkende Überlegung, welche auf den freien Willensentschluss vorbereitet.*"⁴¹ But this only goes to prove that willing and thinking are inseparable; that the one is always accompanied by the other. Heinrich Barth, a recent Augustine scholar, expresses this same thought in different words: "*Alles Wollen zielt hinaus auf das 'höchste Gut.' Auch Böses tut einer nur,*

³⁹ Michael Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1927), 272. Note also the copious references to other literature on this question on p. 272, footnote 3.

⁴⁰ Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 277.

⁴¹ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 139.

weil es [104] ihn 'gut dünkt' und er sich davon ein Glück verspricht."⁴² This view, which Barth ascribes to Augustine, is very similar to Bavinck's insistence that the will always follows the final judgment of the practical reason,⁴³ and again proves that, for Augustine, will and intellect always function together. There simply is no such thing as "abstract" willing, willing which is wholly isolated from the other functions of the soul.

In similar vein, Storz points out that for Augustine the will is always influenced by motives. "*Eine Willensbetätigung ohne alle Motive gedacht, wäre eine rein zufällige und blinde Tätigkeit. Woher soll der Willensakt entstehen, wenn kein Motiv da ist?*"⁴⁴ Motives involve the emotions, as Storz proceeds to point out in the immediate succeeding context; and so we may say that, for Augustine, there is no act of will which is not also accompanied by emotional manifestations of some sort. Montgomery even attributes to Augustine a statement to the effect that we must all necessarily act in accordance with the strongest motive.⁴⁵ This would tie in with the emphasis of modern psychoanalytic schools on the importance of the drives and passions in influencing decisions of the will. At any rate, it further establishes the fact that, for Augustine, the will does not [105] function alone, but always acts together with the other faculties of the soul.

In connection with the analogy of the Trinity found in *memoria, intelligentia*, and *voluntas*, Schmaus discusses at some length the point that these three are indispensable to each other, and that one cannot exist without the other.

*Die Geistestrias ist nicht nur eine tatsächliche, sondern eine innerliche bedingte. Die Glieder der Trias fordern sich gegenseitig. Es kann keines ohne das andere sein.*⁴⁶

He goes on to give a particular illustration of this:

⁴² Heinrich Barth, *Die Freiheit der Entscheidung im Denken Augustins* (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1935), 73.

⁴³ See above, p. 31.

⁴⁴ Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 140.

⁴⁵ William Montgomery, *St. Augustine: Aspects of his Life and Thought* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914), 178.

⁴⁶ Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 275.

*Ferner ist unser Wille nicht blind. Oder dürfen wir etwa sagen, er wisse nicht, was er erstreben und was er vermeiden soll? Wenn er das weiß, dann besitzt er ein Wissen, das nicht ohne Gedächtnis und Denken sein kann.*⁴⁷

Augustine's point here is this: In order to know how to choose rightly, "the will" must know what to do and what to avoid. But "the will" cannot know this without the co-operation of memory and intelligence; hence all three are active in every act of will.⁴⁸

The implications of this point for our discussion are obvious. There is no such thing as a "pure" act of [106] willing. Every act of willing necessarily involves an activity of the intellect and memory as well. What, then, is the sense of saying that "the will" is primary over the other functions when, in every act of will, all the functions are active? "*Es kann keines ohne das andere sein,*" says Schmaus. That means, intellect cannot act without will, but neither can will without intellect. It is therefore just as true to say that the will is dependent on the intellect as that the intellect is dependent on the will. Each needs the other, and both are finally dependent on the self which functions through them. Seen in the light of this quotation from the fifteenth book of *De Trinitate*, it is just as silly to ask, Which is primary, the intellect or the will? as it is to ask, Which is primary, the heart or the lungs? Both heart and lungs must function if man is to live; both are equally necessary and indispensable; one cannot be called more necessary or more indispensable than the other. Neither can it be said that one rules the other; both are functioning members of an organism, and if there is any ruling to be done, it is the organism which rules both of them. So it is also with will

⁴⁷ Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 275 f. The reference is to Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 15, chapter 21, section 41: "*Numquid dicturum voluntatem nostram, quando recta est, nescire quid appetat, quid evitet? Porro si scit, profecto inest ei sua quaedam scientia, quae sine memoria et intelligentia esse non possit.*" Ed. note: ET: "Are we to say that our will, when it is right, knows not what to desire, what to avoid? Further, if it knows, doubtless then it has a kind of knowledge of its own, such as cannot be without memory and understanding" (*NPNF*, 3:221).

⁴⁸ I have put "the will" in quotation marks because this is figurative language. It is really not the will, but the self which chooses. What Augustine means is that, when the self functions in making a choice, in what we popularly call an "act of will," the intelligence and the memory are invariably involved.

and intellect in the mind. Both must function if man is to do or think anything at all; both are indispensable; one cannot be called more indispensable than the other. And neither can it be said that one is sovereign over the other, since both will and intellect are simply functions of a single soul. If there is any sovereignty to be ascribed, it must be ascribed to the soul.

A corollary of the point just discussed is that whatever is done by man, is done by all three together: memory, [107] intelligence, and will. Schmaus proceeds to show that this, too, was taught by Augustine:

Unser ganzes Tun hängt sowohl in seiner tatsächlichen Setzung wie in seinem Werte von diesen drei Faktoren ab. Alles, was wir tun, hat diese drei Kräfte zu seiner Ursache. Sind sie gut und recht geordnet, dann ist auch das von ihnen verursachte werk gut und recht. Recht und gut aber verhalten sich die drei, wenn sich das Gedächtnis vom Vergessen nicht täuschen lässt, wenn die Denktätigkeit keinen Irrtum begeht, wenn der Wille sich vom Unrecht freihält. Die drei Kräfte sind bei der Verursachung unserer Werke so eng miteinander verbunden, dass sie zu dem Zustandekommen jedes Werkes alle drei zusammenwirken.⁴⁹

This point, too, is of great importance for our discussion. “*Ab his tribus fit omne quod facimus,*” says Augustine. Whatever we do is done by all three: memory, intelligence, and will. Though one might at certain times be more conscious of the part his volition plays in an act, and thus ascribe that act especially to the will, he would be speaking inaccurately. For even when an act is ascribed to only one of these three powers, it is done by all three. Schmaus elaborates this implication of Augustine’s statement:

Auch wenn etwas nur einer Kraft zugeschrieben wird, so sind doch auch die anderen beiden mitbeteiligt und mittätig. Wenn wir z.B.

⁴⁹ Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 278 f. The reference which Schmaus here paraphrases is from Augustine, *Contra Sermonem Ariano-rum*, chapter 16: “*Tria itaque ista in hominis anima coetimus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem; ab his tribus fit omne quod facimus.*” See also Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 4, chapter 21, section 30. Ed. note: ET: “Let us reflect on these three powers in the human soul: memory, intelligence, and will; all that we do is done by these three.” Quoted in *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske, vol. I/18, *Arianism and Other Heresies* (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 153. The reference to Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 4, chapter 21, section 30 can be found in *NPNF*, 3:85–86.

auf Grund unseres Gedächtnisinhaltes einen Satz bilden, ein Wort aussprechen, so ist dieses Wort nicht lediglich ein Produkt des Gedächtnisses, obwohl es lediglich im Gedächtnis seinen Möglichkeitsgrund hat. Es ist vielmehr zugleich auch von der Vernunft und dem Willen bewirkt. Analog verhält es sich mit den beiden anderen Kräften. Was die Vernunft aus ihrem Inhalt ausspricht, spricht sie nicht ohne Gedächtnis und Wille. Was der Wille sagt oder schreibt, leistet er nicht ohne Vernunft und Gedächtnis. Durch das Zusammenwirken dieser drei Kräfte ist gezeigt, dass es [108] ganz gut möglich und denkbar ist, dass die drei göttlichen Personen nach aussen hin nur ein einziges gemeinsames Wirken haben und dass auch die Werke, die einer einzigen Person zugeschrieben werden, von allen dreien geschehen.⁵⁰

The Question of the Primacy of the Will

What, now, is left of the idea of a “primacy of the will” in Augustine? In the light of the view of human nature which we have just been elaborating, willing is simply an activity of the self or soul as a whole, always accompanied by thinking and remembering. Willing is simply the entire soul in the act of choosing. But when the soul is willing, it is also thinking and remembering; all three functions are always operative in everything that we do. How, now, can one still speak of a “primacy” of the willing function? What can this mean? It certainly is not true that willing is more indispensable than the other functions, since all three are equally indispensable. Neither can one properly say that willing rules over the other functions, since willing has no “ruling power” of its own, but is wholly subject to the self which wills. It is the self which rules and is sovereign. One cannot even say that the self is sovereign *only in the activity of willing*, for, as has been pointed out above, it never wills without thinking and remembering. It must do all three whenever it does anything, since, according to Augustine, “*ab his tribus fit omne quid facimus.*”

[109] What must we do, then, about those investigators who claim to have discovered a “primacy of the will” in Augustine? It lies beyond the province of this thesis to determine conclusively whether what they have found is due to a

⁵⁰ Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 278–79. The reference is again to Augustine, *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*, chapter 16. Ed. note: See previous note.

fundamental inconsistency in Augustine himself, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the investigators. Either possibility exists. It is very well possible, for example, that Augustine was not always consistent with himself in his psychological views. There are enough other instances of inconsistencies in Augustine to make this not at all improbable. It is perfectly well possible that in some of his writings Augustine failed to keep in mind the unitary nature of the soul and the simultaneity of its functions, as explained above. It certainly is true, as has already been pointed out, that Augustine greatly stresses the importance of the will, and calls attention time and again to the decisive role willing plays in the life of man. And it is possible that Augustine may in some passages make the will the inner core and the sovereign center of human personality, which rules and dominates the rest.

However, I have not been able to find a single passage which would compel me to attribute such a view to Augustine. There are many passages which make a great deal of the will — as being the first cause of sin, for example, or as being indispensable for the attainment of knowledge. But if, when reading such passages, we bear in mind the statement from *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*, “*ab his tribus fit omne quid facimus*,”⁵¹ we shall see that the will never acts alone, but always in [110] conjunction with the intellect and the memory. When Augustine speaks of the will, we may conclude that he is simply singling out one aspect of a complex act, but that the other aspects are also included. Everywhere that he says will, we may assume, in the light of the statement quoted above, that he means “will plus intellect plus memory.” And when we read Augustine in this way, we shall not find in him a “primacy of the will,” as Kahl and Zänker do.⁵²

Although, as said above, it is possible that Augustine teaches such a primacy of the will, in disagreement with the view ascribed to him above, *it is also possible that Kahl and Zänker, and other proponents of the primacy of the will in Augustine, have misunderstood and misinterpreted him.* It is possible that they approach Augustine

⁵¹ Ed. note: ET: “From these three originates everything that we do.”

⁵² This interpretation of Augustine is corroborated by Bavinck, who says, in the second edition of his *Beginselen der psychologie* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1923), 55: “It is therefore improper to represent Augustine, Duns Scotus, and others, as protagonists of the primacy of the will.”

with an erroneous conception of psychology to begin with. I, for one, would certainly object to Kahl's statement of the purpose of his investigation, as betraying an unsound psychology:

Wir beschränken uns darauf, den Willen einzig als psychische Funktion ins Auge zu fassen, und versuchen den Nachweis, dass Augustin ihn im Sinne des Indeterminismus als absolut frei von jedem äußeren und inneren Zwange gedacht hat, vor allem frei und unabhängig vom Verstande.⁵³

I would counter most emphatically that willing in man is never independent of the intellect, and that to hold such a view betrays a most vicious kind of faculty psychology. And neither [111] do I believe that Augustine held any such view, for the reasons amply given above.

Furthermore, Zänker, to my mind, betrays a similarly unsound psychology when he poses his problem as follows: "*Ist der Wille der Bestimmungsgrund des Erkennens . . . ? Oder ist umgekehrt das Erkennen, der Verstand, die vernünftige Erwägung der Bestimmungsgrund für den Willen . . . ?*"⁵⁴ These questions presuppose that will and intellect are two separate entities, one of whom must determine or dominate the other. But such a view is psychologically untenable, and, as I have shown, not representative of Augustine's mature thought. Zänker goes on to say:

Dabei kommt es nicht nur darauf an, festzustellen, in welcher Folge in jedem Moment des Handelns Denktätigkeit und Willenstätigkeit wirksam werden und welche dabei den virtuellen Vorrang hat, vielmehr darauf, welche von beiden im Leben der Entschlüsse den Ausschlag gibt.⁵⁵

So what Zänker has in mind when he ascribes a primacy of the will to Augustine is more than mere temporal priority, or even pre-eminence. The German expression, "*Ausschlag geben*" means "to decide the issue." In other words, Zänker has set himself to find out which of the two, intellect or will, ultimately decides the issues which arise in the volitional life of men. His conclusion is that, for Augustine, it is the will which finally casts the deciding vote, rather than the intellect. Zänker, therefore, is using the term "primacy" in the sense of *sovereignty*,

⁵³ Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens*, 3.

⁵⁴ Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 11.

⁵⁵ Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 11.

ascribing a sovereignty of the will to Augustine. However, the thought that willing, a [112] function of the soul, is sovereign over knowing, another function of the soul, implies that these two are not functions, but separate entities or agencies, and is equivalent to personifying the mental faculties. But this, as I have shown, was not Augustine's view. To put the problem in such a fashion to begin with, seems to me to begin from the wrong presuppositions, and thus to invalidate the entire investigation, for which I otherwise have the profoundest respect.⁵⁶

But how about those who say that, for Augustine, the core of human personality is in the will?⁵⁷ If, by such a statement they mean that the will is the sovereign, directive center of the personality, then I would say that such a view is at variance with the view which has been developed in this chapter, and that the view of these men must then be, as before, due either to an inconsistency in Augustine, or to a misinterpretation on the part of these investigators. It is not the task of this thesis to decide that question conclusively; it serves our purpose sufficiently if we have pointed out that the unitary view of the soul and its faculties is found in Augustine. However, it is also possible that by saying that Augustine placed the "*Kern unsere Wesens*" in the will, these men simply meant that Augustine attached greater [113] importance to the will than to the other functions of the soul, without necessarily denying the unity and final sovereignty of the soul itself. If this is what they mean by "*Kern*," there would be no disparity between such a statement and the view elaborated here.

Augustine Compared with Bavinck

In any event, there is no such outspoken opposition between Bavinck and Augustine as might at first be supposed. If those who claim that Augustine taught the primacy of the will are correct, then there is a fundamental difference between Augustine and Bavinck. But it is not at all certain that their view is the correct

⁵⁶ I am perfectly willing to admit that, if the question had to be put as Zänker puts it, one would undoubtedly have to ascribe a primacy of the will to Augustine. However, I am not at all sure that he has properly formulated the problem.

⁵⁷ See above, p. 69.

one. If we read Augustine in the light of his *De Trinitate*, books 10 and 15, it would seem that their view is mistaken.

Bavinck, we have seen, placed the chief emphasis on the heart, which he called the core of the personality, the center out of which are the issues of life. The heart, we have seen, is for him the inner organ of the soul. It is not one of the functions of the soul, but the inner core of the functioning soul itself. It is here that sovereignty must be sought, and not in any of man's functions, such as intellect or will. The view of human nature which we have ascribed to Augustine, and believe to be most truly representative of him, would agree substantially with that of Bavinck. Augustine, as we have said, does not make much of the heart. And he does seem to attribute a greater importance to the will [114] than to the other functions of the soul. Yet, basically, he holds to the soul's fundamental unity, and teaches that will, intellect, and memory are functions of the unified self, and not separate entities. All three of these functions are always operative in any act of man, and hence an act ascribed to one must be ascribed to all three. No one of the three can be called sovereign or primary, since all are functions of the soul; only the soul is primary and sovereign. Willing is simply the whole soul in the act of choosing; intellect is simply the entire soul in the act of deliberation; and we cannot say that the soul in one activity is sovereign over the soul in another activity, especially not since the soul is always engaged in both activities at the same time. So the soul is the true center and core of human personality; what is fundamental and primary in man is therefore the soul itself.

We owe much to Augustine for having thus carefully thought out the relations between the soul and its functions. His profound mind saw correctly that the soul is one and cannot be split up into independently functioning entities. A proper understanding of Augustine's contributions to our subject should keep us from ever falling into the pitfall of an unsound faculty psychology. All this agrees basically with Bavinck. Except Bavinck goes a step further in making the heart the actual center of man's personality. The soul in his system stands for the entire immaterial aspect of man, including all his functions; but the heart stands for the [115] center, or seat of the soul, from whence the functions are controlled, and which is therefore distinct from the functions themselves. This

further clarifies the problem, and also integrates into our psychology the Scriptural emphasis on the heart.⁵⁸

We may also observe that Augustine is in another sense a good corrective for Bavinck. Although Bavinck's view of the soul and its functions is basically correct, as we have seen, still he does at times lapse into a kind of faculty psychology which is inconsistent with his main thrust. There are passages, especially in his *Beginselen der psychologie*, where he seems to give the impression that the intellect and the will are two separately functioning entities in the soul, one of whom must lead and direct the other, or give advice to the other. All such language, however, is based on an erroneous conception of the soul, as we have been pointing out in our study of Augustine. If we keep in mind Augustine's view of the relation between the mental functions and the soul, we shall be able to correct Bavinck on this point. [116]

⁵⁸ It remains to be observed that Augustine, like Bavinck, did not assign the feelings and emotions to a separate "faculty" but classified them under the "Strebungsvermögen," the highest manifestation of which is the will. See Storz, *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus*, 135–47; and cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14, 6.

Chapter 4

The View of Aquinas

We continue our historical study with Thomas Aquinas (1225–1275), the outstanding theologian of the medieval period, and the outstanding representative of scholasticism. What did Aquinas say about the question of what is primary or fundamental in human nature?

We can begin by saying that, as was the case in Augustine, so also in Aquinas: the primacy of the heart is not stressed. References to the heart in Aquinas are few and far between; when he does speak of the heart, moreover, he does not impute to it the meaning that Bavinck does. In general, Thomas seems to teach that the heart is the principle of bodily movements and of the senses;¹ hence for the most part it has in his writings a purely biological meaning. Where he does touch upon the term heart as used in Scripture, he seems to identify it with only one of the functions of the mind. So, for example, he quotes Psalm 83:3, “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God,” explaining that here heart stands for the intellectual appetite, or will, and *flesh* stands for the sensitive appetite.² Aquinas seems, therefore, [117] not to have grasped the essential Biblical meaning of the heart, as standing for the central organ of all of man’s functions. He certainly does not make the heart primary in his system.

A Theoretical Primacy of the Soul

What, then, does he make primary in man? Theoretically, the soul. To begin with, Aquinas combats the Greek view that there are several souls in man. Plato had said that man has three souls: the nutritive, the concupiscible, and the rational; Aristotle had similarly ascribed to man a vegetative, appetitive, and rational soul.

¹ Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, I-II, 17, 9 (Part I-II, Question 17, Article 9).

² *Summa theologica*, I-II, 24, 3. Ed. note: Ps. 83:3 is cited from the Douay-Rheims Bible. The equivalent verse in most English translations is Ps. 84:2.

Aquinas, however, shows that it is impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. He agrees with Plato and Aristotle in distinguishing these three sorts of powers, but assigns all these powers to a single soul. “We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.”³

This soul, now, he calls the form of the body. “It belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body.”⁴ [118] And again, “The soul is essentially the form of the body.”⁵ In order to appreciate what Thomas here means, it is necessary to note what Aristotle, from whom Thomas borrows his philosophical terminology, means by form. Aristotle, it will be recalled, said that every individual has two aspects: that which is being developed, and that into which the development is passing. The former of these aspects he called *matter*, the latter, *form*. Form is therefore the goal for which a thing strives; the purpose for which it exists. Form is also the actuality or reality of a thing. The most real aspect of any object is its form. If we remember that Thomas uses form in this Aristotelian sense, it is obvious that when he calls the soul the form of the body he means that the soul is the most real aspect of the body. And, since man consists of soul and body, it would seem to follow that what is most primary or fundamental in man is his soul.

This point seems to be further confirmed when we consider the relation between the soul and the faculties in Aquinas. The soul is called the subject of its faculties, or powers (*potentiae* is the term Thomas most commonly uses). It is also called the substance of which the faculties are accidents. “All the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle.”⁶ And again, [119] “The essence of

³“*Sic ergo dicendum, quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva, et intellectiva, et nutritiva*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 76, 3). Except where specifically mentioned, the translations from the *Summa* are taken from the English edition of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, published by Burns, Oates, & Washbourne (London, 1922). Latin quotations are from the second Roman edition of the *Summa theologica*, published by Forzani et S. (Rome, 1925).

⁴ *Summa theologica*, I, 75, 5.

⁵“*Anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 76, 1, ad 4).

⁶“*Unde manifestum est, quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subjectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae, sicut a principio*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 6).

the soul is the cause of all its powers.”⁷ Furthermore, the chief faculties, intellect and will, are said to be in the soul as their subject.⁸ This is expressed in different words elsewhere, where Thomas says that both intellect and will are rooted in the same substance of the soul.⁹ So, seen in the light of these quotations, the soul would certainly seem to be more basic in Thomas’s anthropology, than any of the faculties, even including the intellect. Thomas, in fact, even makes a special point of asserting that the intellect is not the very essence of the soul, but merely a power of the soul.¹⁰

So far, Thomas would seem to agree perfectly with Augustine, who similarly made the soul the primary aspect of man, as we have seen. At least, we can certainly find traces of this view in Aquinas. So far, also, Thomas would seem to agree fundamentally with Bavinck, who made the heart, the [120] chief organ of the soul, primary in man, rather than any of man’s functions or powers. In order to be perfectly fair to Aquinas, we must recognize that, in theory at least, he subscribed to the unitary view of human nature as above described. As such, we may find in him confirmation for the basic correctness of this view as found in Bavinck.

An Actual Primacy of the Intellect

However, when we ask whether Thomas succeeded in working out consistently the implications of his unitary view of the soul, we shall receive a different answer to the question with which we began. I purposely stated above that *theoretically*

⁷“*Et ex hoc potest accipi, quod essentia animae est cause omnium potentiarum*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 6, ad 2).

⁸“*Quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere, et velle; unde potentiae, quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima, sicut in subjecto*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 5).

⁹“*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas, et intellectus, sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subjecto different . . . nunc autem, cum utrumque radicaretur in una substantia animae . . . consequens est, ut quod est in voluntate, sed etiam quodammodo in intellectu*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 78, 4, ad 1).

¹⁰“*Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 79, 1).

Thomas makes the soul primary in man. It is my conviction, however, based on considerable thought and study, that *actually* what is primary in man according to St. Thomas is not the soul, but the intellect. This conviction is based on a number of considerations, which I shall proceed to discuss.

To begin with, although Thomas teaches, as we have seen, that the soul is the form of the body, it is rather significant that he almost uniformly refers to the soul of man as the *intellectual soul*. It is the intellectual soul which “contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants.”¹¹ Thomas [121] explicitly states that “It is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.”¹² But why does he so frequently and consistently call the soul the intellectual soul? Obviously, because the intellectual function is the chief power of the soul; or, to put it differently, because the most important thing Thomas feels he can say about the soul is that it is intellect.

It is extremely significant in this connection to note that Thomas sometimes uses intellect as a synonym for soul. We have seen that he makes the soul the form of the body. But, in Article 1 of Question 76, in Part I of the *Summa*, he states, “We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body.”¹³ So here he makes the intellect the form of the body, and hence the primary aspect of man. Further along in the same article, Thomas actually identifies the intellect with the soul: “Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body.”¹⁴ According to this citation, it makes no difference whether one speaks of the [122] intellectual soul or of the intellect; both mean the same thing. If, then, the intellectual soul is primary

¹¹ “*Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quicquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, nutritiva plantarum*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 76, 3).

¹² “*Impossibile est, quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis, quam anima intellectiva*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 76, 4).

¹³ “*Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 76, 1).

¹⁴ “*Hoc ergo principium, quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis.*” Cf. also *Summa theologica*, I, 75, 2: “*Relinquitur igitur, animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus, vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum, et subsistens.*”

in man, and if the intellect is the same thing as the intellectual soul, it would seem to follow with inescapable logic that what is primary in man, according to Thomas, is the intellect.

Thomas explains in another place why he thus occasionally identifies the soul with the intellect:

Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power.¹⁵

Of all the powers of the soul, therefore, the intellect is the chief. In Thomas's own words, the intellect is the *virtus principalior* of the soul; the "principal virtue" (literally, the "more principal virtue"). Since principal, being derived from *primus*, means first, we may paraphrase Thomas's language to say that the intellect is, for him, the "most primary virtue" of the soul.

This view, that the intellect is the primary power of the soul, is expressed by Thomas in various ways. We shall mention just a few. Of great importance for our purpose is the third article of Question 82 (in Part I of the *Summa*) which is titled, "Whether the Will is a Higher Power than the Intellect?" In this article Thomas proceeds to show that the intellect is higher than the will, developing his point [123] as follows:

If the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will.¹⁶

¹⁵ "Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute" (*Summa theologica*, I, 79, 1, ad 1).

¹⁶ "Si ergo intellectus, et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur, et hoc apparet ex comparatione objectorum ad invicem: objectum enim intellectus est simplicius, et magis absolutum, quam objectum voluntatis: nam objectum intellectus est

He goes on to show that there is also a sense in which the will may be said to be higher than the intellect: namely, when the object of the will is higher than the object of the intellect, or when the object of the will is nobler than the soul itself. But, he summarizes, “Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.” His reasoning is plain. There may be cases in which the will is higher than the intellect. But, if we ask in a general way, whether the will is a higher power than the intellect, the answer will be no. For when we consider will and intellect by themselves, apart from their relations to other things, the intellect is seen to be higher and nobler than the will, because its object is simpler [124] and more abstract than the object of the will. Hence also, Thomas says, in the reply to the first objection, “And among other ends this [truth] is the most excellent; as also is the intellect among the other powers.”¹⁷ This article, therefore, leaves no doubt that Thomas considered the intellect to be the highest power of the soul.

It is interesting to note why Thomas called the intellect the highest power in man. In Question 77 of Part I of the *Summa*, Thomas states that the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers according to the order of nature, “forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things.”¹⁸ And in the next Question, Thomas adds this thought: “The higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends.”¹⁹ Since the object of the intellect is universal being, continues Thomas, it follows that the intellect is the highest power. These standards for estimating the highest power, it will be recognized, are typically Greek; in fact, Thomas prefaces his discussion of the intellect as the

ipsa ratio boni appetibilis: bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est objectum voluntatis: quanto autem aliquid est simplicius, et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius, et altius; et ideo objectum intellectus est altius, quam objectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad objectum, sequitur, quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior, et nobilior voluntate” (*Summa theologica*, I, 82, 3).

¹⁷ “*Intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.*”

¹⁸ “*Secundus naturae ordinem, prout perfect sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 4).

¹⁹ “*Quanto enim potentia est altior, tanto respicit universalis objectum*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 78, 1).

highest power by quoting Aristotle.²⁰ We may conclude, therefore, that Thomas derives his convictions about the [125] superiority of the intellectual powers, not from Scripture, but from Greek philosophy.

Another way in which Thomas expresses his view that the intellect is the highest power of the soul is in his doctrine of the image of God, given in Question 93 of the First Part of the *Summa*. Intellectual creatures alone, says Thomas, are made after the image of God.²¹ In fact, “the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect.”²² Hence man is said to be after the image of God because of his intellectual nature.²³ “Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind.”²⁴ According to this section, the intellect is not only the most excellent power in man, but also the most God-like, since it is specifically in his intellect that man bears the image of God. This idea, too, is obviously derived from the Greeks — specifically from Aristotle, for whom God is νοῆσις νοῆσεως.

This idea that the intellect is primary in man is [126] expressed in still another way by Thomas. In *Summa* I, 75, 4, the objector suggests that in 2 Corinthians 4:16 (“Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day”) the expression, “the inward man,” refers to the soul. In his reply to this objection, however, Thomas quotes Aristotle to the effect that a thing seems to be chiefly what is principal in it, for what the governor of a state does is attributed to the state itself. “In this way sometimes what is principal in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance

²⁰ “*Sed contra est, quod Philosophus in 10 Ethic. (cap. 7) ponit altissimam potentiam animae esse intellectum*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 82, 3).

²¹ *Summa theologica*, I, 93, 2.

²² “*Et sic imago Dei est magis in angelis quam sit in hominibus: quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 93, 3).

²³ *Summa theologica*, I, 93, 4.

²⁴ “*Id autem, in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus, sive mens; unde relinquitur, quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 93, 6).

with truth, is called the *inward* man.”²⁵ This passage suggests some significant observations. First of all, note how a remark of Aristotle, a pagan philosopher, is made the key to the interpretation of a text from Scripture! Then note also how, in accord with Thomas’s intellectualism, the “inward man” is made the intellect; the intellect, therefore, is the “inmost” aspect of man. And note especially that in this passage the intellect is said to be “*quod est principale in homine*,” and that its functioning is compared to that of the governor of a state. Certainly no clearer proof could be asked for the point that, for Thomas, what is primary in man is the intellect!

The idea of primacy, as Bavinck has pointed out, is [127] not only a concept of value but also a functional concept. It includes not merely pre-eminence but also sovereignty. Is, now, the intellect in Aquinas also primary in the sense of sovereignty? What is the function of the intellect in his doctrine of man?

To begin with, the intellect commands and moves the will: “A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.”²⁶ To be sure, the will is also said, in a different sense, to move the intellect; but the intellect is the final and ultimate mover. To an objector who counters that, if the intellect moves the will and the will moves the intellect, there will have to be an infinite regression of causes for every act, Thomas answers: “There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest.”²⁷ So then the intellect ultimately moves and commands the will, which, in turn, moves and commands all the other powers of the soul except the vegetative. Obviously, then, the intellect is the “high command” of the soul. [128]

²⁵ “*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum in 9 Ethic. (cap. 8 a med.), illud potissime videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso. Sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo: aliquando quidem pars intellectiva secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo interior.*”

²⁶ “*Hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis*” (*Summa theologia*, I, 82, 4). Cf. also *Summa theologia*, I-II, 9, 1; and *Summa theologia*, I-II, 17, 5.

²⁷ “*Ad tertium dicendum, quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statim in intellectu, sicut in primo*” (*Summa theologia*, I, 82, 4, ad 3).

Furthermore, the intellect is said to rule over the sensitive powers, that is, the powers of sensation and imagination. “The intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; whereof they direct them and command them.”²⁸ Again, the intellect is supposed to rule over the passions: “The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin; but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.”²⁹ Summing this all up, we may say that, according to Thomas, all the powers of man “below” the intellect, including the will, the sensations, and the passions, were to be controlled by reason.

Thomas does not mean to say, however, that in man’s present condition these “inferior powers” are always controlled by reason. He admits that because of sin they often are not ruled by reason as they should be. But he believes that they ought to be so controlled, and that in man’s state of innocence they were so controlled. “But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subjected to reason; so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.”³⁰ And again, “For this [129] rectitude [that is, the rectitude of man’s primitive state] consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul.”³¹ All of these citations abundantly demonstrate the primacy of the intellect in a functional sense in Aquinas. The intellect is for him not only the highest and noblest power in man, but also the ruling power.

In fact, this sovereignty of the intellect even holds in an ethical sense. Virtue, according to Thomas, consists in subjection to reason. “Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior

²⁸ “*Potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis: unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 4).

²⁹ “*Ad tertium dicendum, quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum: inquantum autem ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem*” (*Summa theologica*, I-II, 24, 2, ad 3).

³⁰ “*In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subjectus; unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 95, 2).

³¹ “*Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 95, 1).

powers regulated according to the dictates of reason.”³² Virtue, then, is primarily a rational matter; the reason must be subjected to God — the implication being that if only reason obeys God, the rest of man will naturally follow. This again shows the primacy of the intellect in Thomas. We have already noted how, according to Thomas, the passions are good only insofar as they are controlled by reason.³³ The same thing holds for the will. “Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.”³⁴ Thomas explains this by [130] saying that if the will tends to the good set before it by the sensitive appetite [that is, the passions], it pursues a lesser good; whereas if it tends to the universal good apprehended by reason, it pursues the highest good. The will, then, is seen to be midway between the intellect and the passions, much as in Plato and Aristotle. Evil is virtually identified here with sensuality, and goodness with rationality. All this is very true to Greek philosophy, but very untrue to Scripture.

We began this study by saying that *theoretically* Thomas makes the soul primary in man, and by quoting some statements to this effect. It ought to be evident by now, however, that *actually* Thomas makes the intellect primary and sovereign in man. Though he pays lip-service to the sovereignty of the soul, the actual development of his system posits the intellect as the ruling power in man. We might paraphrase a popular expression by saying that, in Aquinas, the soul reigns but does not rule; what really rules is the intellect.³⁵

³² “*Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt, quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, in inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 95, 3).

³³ See above, footnote 29.

³⁴ “*Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione eo modo, quo dependet ab objecto*” (*Summa theologica*, I-II, 19, 3).

³⁵ The interpretation of Aquinas developed above accords with that of most impartial investigators. I mention just two: Windelband in his *History of Philosophy*, 330, says, “The intellect [in Thomas] is the *supremus motor* of the psychological life.” And Kahl says in *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens*, 65, speaking about Thomas: “*Dem Verstande kommt der Primat vor dem übrigen Seelenpotenzen zu.*”

The Unity of the Soul Impaired

The result of all this is not only that Thomas's system has a predominantly intellectualistic flavor, but — what concerns us even more in this investigation — that in Thomas's anthropology the unity of the soul is impaired. For [131] not the soul, but one aspect of the soul is made primary in man. That such a position is disastrous for the unity of man's mental, moral, and spiritual life will become evident as we proceed.

In Thomas, the intellect is said to rule over the will, the passions, and all the so-called inferior faculties. But then one "part" of the soul (if we may speak of the soul as having parts) must rule over the rest of the soul. But this is equivalent to splitting up the soul, and setting "part" over against "part." Then the soul is not really one, in spite of Thomas's claims, but is divided. Just as it is unsound psychology to speak of a primacy of the will in man, as we have seen in connection with Augustine, so it is equally unsound psychology to speak of a primacy of the intellect, in the Thomistic sense. For, in either case, a function of the soul is made to usurp the sovereignty which belongs to the soul itself.

The lack of unity in Thomas's anthropology can be further demonstrated. Basic to Thomas's system is the division of human nature into what is higher and what is lower. We have already noted the reasons why Thomas made the intellect higher than the other powers of the soul. These other powers are arranged in a descending scale. Below the intellect is the will (the "intellectual appetite"); next in the downward [132] order are the passions (the "sensitive appetites"), divided into the concupiscible and the irascible; next come the exterior senses (sight, hearing, smelling, taste, and touch) and the interior senses (including imagination and what Aristotle called "common sense"); lowest of all are the vegetative powers, divided into three kinds: nutritive, augmentative, and generative.³⁶ So every power of the soul has a certain value attached to it; some are lower, others are higher, and the intellect is the highest of all.

³⁶ For this arrangement of the powers of the soul according to Thomas I am indebted to Charles A. Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1930), 65.

Now in the abstract I suppose it would be possible to arrange the various powers of the soul in a descending order without necessarily impairing the unity of the soul. But in Thomas this is not the case. As a matter of fact, instead of harmony and unity, we find in Thomas antithesis and opposition between the lower and the higher powers of the soul. We have already seen that, according to Thomas, the will is good when it is subject to reason, but bad when it follows the passions. The passions, too, we noted, are good only when they are controlled by reason; but when they are contrary to reason, they incline us to sin. So then we have an opposition within the soul, with reason on the one side, the sensual passions on the other, and the will in between the two, now attracted to one side, then to the other.

We have then, as the ethical consequence of Thomas's insistence on the primacy of the intellect, an antithesis [133] within the soul of man between reason and sense. One of our purposes in treating Aquinas in this historical survey is to show that, in spite of his profession of the Christian faith, he did not really transcend the Greek view of the soul.

There is no better place to show this than right here. The dualism between reason and sense which we find in Thomas is taken directly from Greek psychology. Plato, for example, divided man into a rational and an irrational soul, the latter being divided into a noble part (courage, also called will) and an ignoble part (the appetites and passions). Plato illustrated this theory in the *Phaedrus* by his myth of the charioteer. The soul, he says there, is like a chariot driven by two winged horses. The charioteer is the reason; he guides and directs the chariot, and therefore, the entire soul. The horses are of two diverse kinds; one is noble, while the other is ignoble. The noble horse (spirit, or will) is a lover of honesty and modesty and temperance, and needs only an occasional word of admonition. The ignoble steed (sense or passion) is insolent, deaf, and very hard to control even by the whip; he is constantly dragging the chariot down to sensuality and evil.

The points of resemblance between this Greek conception of the soul and that of Thomas are almost too obvious to need enumeration. The reason guides, as in Thomas; *the primacy of the intellect is therefore seen to have its origin in Greek, rationalistic philosophy.* The passions are ignoble and tend to draw man down into doing what is base and evil, as in Thomas; the only way the passions can be

kept from ruining [134] man's life is that they be controlled by reason, as Thomas also teaches. The will is not necessarily evil, but inclined to what is good; it can readily be controlled by reason and ordinarily is so controlled — again Thomas teaches fundamentally the same view. For both Plato and Thomas, the will is in the middle position between reason and sense; it is free to turn to either side; when it allows itself to be drawn away by sense it does wrong, but when it obeys reason it is good.

I have elaborated this similarity between Thomas and Greek thought in order to make clear that Thomas's psychology is fundamentally derived, not from Scripture, but from the Greeks. The dualism between reason and sense which he posits has its origin, not in the Biblical view of man, but in the Greek view. And this same antithesis between reason and sense runs through all idealistic philosophies, including that of Kant.³⁷

A more disastrous consequence of this antithesis between reason and sense which we find in Thomas is that it denies the seriousness of sin. If the will follows sense, it sins; if it [135] follows reason, it does good. But then the criterion of whether a deed is good or bad becomes a psychological one; all depends then on what part of the soul one follows in doing a deed.³⁸ Note, then, what happens: the will then is morally indifferent, and not totally depraved. It does not need to be renewed, but only to be "helped."³⁹ The passions of the body are then bad,

³⁷ "In der Ethik des deutschen Idealismus tritt die Unzulänglichkeit der sittlichen Grundanschauung darin zutage, dass das Sittliche letzten Endes auf die Herrschaft der Vernunft im Menschen gegründet wird. Das Sittengesetz ist nach Kant ein praktisches Gesetz der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundbegriffe, mit denen Kant in seiner Ethik operiert, sind ebenso wie in seiner Erkenntnistheorie die Begriffe Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft. Unser Wille steht entweder unter der Herrschaft der Sinnlichkeit oder unter der Herrschaft der Vernunft." Carl Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," *Studien zur Theologie Luthers* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1928), 163.

³⁸ Cf. Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," 222, where he says: "Die Begriffe gut und böse werden von der Scholastik auf den psychologische Gegensatz von Vernunft (ratio) und Sinnlichkeit (concupiscentia) zurückgeführt, während der Wille (voluntas) sittlich indifferent ist."

³⁹ This is precisely Thomas's view. Speaking of the passage, "It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth," Thomas says, "*Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud Apostoli non sic est intelligendum, quasi homo non velit, et non currat libero arbitrio; sed quia liberum arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur, et juvetur a Deo*" (*Summa theologiae*, I, 83, 1, ad 2).

and ought to be ruled by reason or else avoided. The ascetic implications of this view of the passions, which resulted in such medieval consequences as asceticism, priestly celibacy, and the doctrine of merit, can be readily deduced. Worst of all, this view implies that there is an aspect of man which is relatively free from sin: namely, his reason. If one but lets his reason control, he will do the good. Then man is not totally depraved, nor totally unable to keep the law; and then he only partially needs a Savior.

Perhaps all the consequences mentioned above can not be attributed to Thomas himself; it lies beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this question in detail. But that Thomas fundamentally misunderstood the Scriptural teaching on [136] sin is evident from his interpretation of Galatians 5:17, “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh.” Says Thomas, by way of explaining this passage, “The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against the reason.”⁴⁰ But this interpretation assumes that “the Spirit” in this verse stands for man’s reason. However, even a cursory reading of the context will convince one that Spirit here stands, not for man’s reason at all, but for the Holy Spirit (on which account the word Spirit is here capitalized in all the modern versions, including the King James), and that flesh in this passage stands for the entire sinful nature of man, including his depraved reason. Thomas thus waters down the antithesis between the Spirit of God and man’s entire sinful nature into an opposition between two aspects of man’s soul! All of this further confirms the point we have been making, that Thomas’s psychological antithesis of reason versus sense, which follows from his emphasis on the primacy of the intellect, disrupts the unity of the soul.

Thomas’s Doctrine of the Faculties

Another way in which it can be demonstrated that Thomas’s system does not maintain the unity of the soul is in his doctrine of the faculties. C. A. Hart, whose doctoral dissertation, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, is a [137] thorough

⁴⁰ “*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum per hoc, quod passiones rationi pugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 95, 2, ad 1).

study of the whole problem of the faculties in Thomas, maintains that “far from an attack upon the unity of the soul . . . the faculty theory, as St. Thomas explains it, may be considered as a positive protection of that unity.”⁴¹ I would agree that one might be able to hold to a doctrine of faculties without necessarily impairing the unity of the soul. But it is my conviction that the way Aquinas teaches the relation between the faculties and the soul does disrupt the soul’s unity.

Thomas expresses the relation in these words: the faculties are accidents of the substance of the soul. “As the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality.”⁴² According to Thomas, the soul is a substance; the faculties, however, are not substances, but simply accidents “inhering in” the substance of the soul. In order, now, to understand what Thomas means by this, we must know something about the medieval doctrine of substance and accidents. This distinction, which originated with Aristotle, was as follows: substance is something which exists in itself, and accident needs something other in which to inhere.⁴³ The [138] substance is consequently more truly *being* than its accidents, the function of the latter being chiefly to modify the substance.

Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said, *Metaph.* vii (Did. vi 1) that an accident should be described as *of something rather than as something*.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 112.

⁴² “*Cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet, quod sit accidens: et est in secunda specie qualitatis*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 77, 1, ad 5).

⁴³ “*Substantia est res, cuius naturae debetur esse non in alio; accidens vero est res, cuius naturae debetur esse in alio*” (Thomas, *Quodlibet IX*, Article 5, ad 2, quoted in Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 28). Ed note: Hart’s reference is incorrect; it should be *Quodlibet IX*, Article 3, ad 2.

⁴⁴ “*Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens; unde solae substantiae proprie, et vere dicuntur entia: accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur: sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in 7 Metaph quod accidens dicitur magis entis, quam ens [emphasis added]*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 90, 2).

Applying this, now, to the faculties, or, as they are more commonly called, the powers of the soul, it follows that they should be called *entis* rather than *ens*; they are not “beings” in themselves, but are “of being.” The faculties, being accidents, are not as real as the soul, which is a substance.

A further consequence of this manner of indicating the relation between the powers of the soul and the soul, is that these powers are not considered to be equal to the essence of the soul. For Thomas says, “It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it.”⁴⁵ And, in another place, Thomas expresses himself as follows: “It is manifest, therefore, that the essence of the soul itself is not the immediate principle of its operations; [139] but it operates through mediating accidental principles; whence the powers of the soul are not the essence of the soul itself but its properties.”⁴⁶

It will be recalled, however, that Augustine did not distinguish between the faculties of the soul and its substance or essence. In the chapter immediately preceding, Augustine was quoted as saying:

These three, therefore, memory, intelligence, and will, because they are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, hence neither are they three substances but one substance. . . . Consequently, these three are one in that they are one life, one mind, one essence.⁴⁷

According to Augustine the faculties which he there distinguishes are all one substance, one essence, and one mind. He does not say that these faculties are less real than the soul or mind itself; he says that they *are* the mind. He does not say that they cannot be identified with the essence of the soul; on the contrary,

⁴⁵ “*Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est dicere, quod essentia anima sit eius potentia: licet quo quidam posuerint*” (*Summa theologiae*, I, 77, 1).

⁴⁶ “*Manifestum est ergo quod ipsa essentia animae non est principium immediatum suarum operationum; sed operatur mediantibus principiis accidentalibus; unde potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae sed proprietates eius*” (Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, Article 12, quoted in Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 111. Translation in this case mine.)

⁴⁷ “*Haec igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia . . . Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia*” (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 10, chapter 11, section 18 [translation mine]).

Augustine asserts that they *are one essence*, and, since he is talking about the functions of the soul, the only essence he can mean is that of the soul. According to Augustine, therefore, the faculties are identical with the essence of the soul. And the consequence of this [140] view is, as we have pointed out, that the whole soul is active in each faculty; the faculties are simply different ways of describing the activity of the whole soul. As Shedd expressed it, “the understanding is the whole mind as cognizing; and the will is the whole mind as determining.”⁴⁸

Now it is precisely at this point that we find the exact difference between the teaching of Augustine and Thomas on the relation between the faculties and the soul. According to Augustine, the faculties are identical with the essence of the soul; whereas, according to Thomas, the faculties are not equal to the essence of the soul. Augustine maintained that the whole soul or mind is active in each of its faculties or functions, thus safeguarding the unity of the soul in all of its activities. Thomas *claimed* to be maintaining the unity of the soul, over against the Greek philosophers, but he did not successfully or consistently carry out this unity in his system. As I shall attempt to point out, his way of conceiving the relation between the faculties and the soul as that between accidents and their substance was actually disruptive of the unity of the soul.⁴⁹ [141]

For, first of all, this conception of the faculties makes them somehow accidental rather than essential to the existence of the soul. The faculties are not the essence of the soul, says Thomas, but accidents of its substance. But then the soul is considered to be a kind of substratum in which faculties “inhere.” This is, to say the least, a very mechanical conception of the relation between the soul and its functions. In fact, strictly speaking, if the functions are merely accidents of the soul and not essential to its being, the soul could exist without its faculties. This is, indeed, the conclusion drawn by Peter Coffey, whom Hart quotes as giving

⁴⁸ See above, p. 75.

⁴⁹ That this is the correct interpretation of the difference between Thomas and Augustine on this point is confirmed by a passage previously quoted from Michael Schmaus: “*Augustinus kennt keine real von der Seele verschiedenen akzidentellen Potenzen im aristotelisch-thomistischen Sinn. Die Seele ist unmittelbar durch sich tätig. Das einheitliche Wesen der Seele entfaltet sich in den Tätigkeiten nach verschiedenen Richtungen. Die Seelenkräfte sind die Seele selbst in ihrer verschiedenen Tätigkeitsweise*” (Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 272).

a correct interpretation of the relation between the soul and its faculties among the scholastics:

Even though the faculties of the soul be determinations of its substance, even though they flow from it as actualities demanded by its essence for the normal and natural development of its being, still it [the soul] is a complete subsisting essence of its kind without them; it possesses its essential perfection without them.⁵⁰

But I would counter that the soul is nothing without intellect, will, and emotion; these functions are not detachable from the soul, but *are* the soul in its most common functions. To think of these functions as accidental to the soul's being is certainly not to do justice to the unity of the soul in all of its activities.

The same objection can be made to the idea that the faculties are less truly being than the soul, which consequence, as we have seen, also follows from the [142] “accident-theory” of the faculties. Is intelligence less real than the soul? Is willing less real than the soul? Or are these nothing other than the soul in its most basic activities? That is what Augustine would say, as we have noted; and it is my conviction that Augustine sees more clearly here than Thomas. If the faculties are less real than the soul, then the unity between the soul and its faculties is something less than perfect. But Augustine maintained that it is perfect — that it is, in fact, a unity of essence and substance. And this is the only conception which will really safeguard the oneness of man's soul-life.

For, to continue, if the faculties are only accidents of the soul, as Thomas asserts, then the faculties are not the whole soul functioning, but only partial expressions of the soul. This is indeed the view which Hart, after a thorough study of this very question, attributes to Thomas: “It [that is, the faculty theory of psychology as propounded by Thomas] considers the faculty as an innate power to act in the soul or mind, the means by which the mind may express itself in a partial way.”⁵¹ But is this true? When we think or will, does the mind only express itself in a partial way? Is it not rather true that the mind expresses itself wholly in every true act of will, bringing all of its past experience, all of

⁵⁰ Peter Coffey, *Ontology* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1918), 250–51; quoted in Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 40.

⁵¹ Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 136 [italics mine].

its previous thinking and feeling, to bear upon the choice which is being made? This was the view of Augustine, and also of Bavinck. [143]

For Thomas, however, the faculties were only partial expressions of the soul. As a further substantiation of his conclusion, note that Thomas rather frequently refers to the faculties as “parts” of the soul. Hart makes a special point of saying that a faculty “is not a kind of mental molecule or ‘part’ of the soul.”⁵² Yet in the same volume he quotes Thomas as saying: “The powers of the soul are said to be parts not of the essence of the soul but of its total strength, as if it should be said that the power of a bailiff is part of the total authority of a royal court.”⁵³ Further, Thomas often speaks of “the vegetative part” of man,⁵⁴ and even, on more than one occasion, of the “intellectual part.”⁵⁵ But is it proper to speak of these functions as “part” of the soul? Does such language do justice to the soul’s essential unity?

Thomas tried hard to maintain the unity of the soul in theory. He even defined a faculty as follows:

A power [or faculty] is nothing other than the principle of operation of anything, whether it be active or passive; not indeed the principle which is the active or [144] passive subject but that by which the agent acts or the passive subject endures; just as the building art is a power in the builder who builds through it.⁵⁶

⁵² Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 94.

⁵³ “*Potentiae animae dicuntur partes non essentiae animae sed totalis virtutis eius; sicut si diceretur quod potentia ballivi est part totius potestatis regiae*” (*Questio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Article 11 ad 19, quoted in Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 36 [translation mine]). Cf. also *Summa theologica*, I, 78, 1: “*Potentiae enim animae dicuntur partes ipsius.*”

⁵⁴ “*Respondeo dicendum, quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 78, 2).

⁵⁵ “*Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere, memoriam esse in intellectiva parte*” (*Summa theologica*, I, 79, 6). See also above, footnote 25.

⁵⁶ “*Potentia nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicuius sive sit actio, sive sit passio; non quidem principium quod est subjectum agens aut patiens; sed id quo agens agit aut patiens patitur; sicut ars aedificativa est potentia in aedificatore qui per eam aedificat*” (Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, Article 12, quoted in Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 35 [the translation is Hart’s]).

Theoretically, this statement would make the faculties just modes of operation of the soul itself. But actually, in Thomas's writings, the faculties are frequently if not predominantly treated as though they operated independently — as though they were, in Thomas's own words, the actual subjects of the actions ascribed to them.

In proof of this, I would refer first of all to the earlier section of this chapter dealing with the primacy of the intellect in Thomas. There we observed that Thomas at times calls the intellect the form of the body, thus considering the intellect more as an entity than a faculty. Further, we noted that, according to Thomas, the intellect is said to move the will, although in a different sense the will may be said to move the intellect. But all such expressions, which occur with great frequency in Thomas, betray an "entity-view" of the faculties. It is just as if the intellect and will are separate "agencies" in the soul; one generally moves the other, but at times the other may move the one. Now if Thomas were consistent with the point of view advanced in the definition of the faculty quoted above, he would have to say that the soul ultimately moves the intellect and the will. But he ascribes movement to both the intellect and the will, thus [145] treating them as though they operated independently.

The intellect is further said to rule over the sensitive powers, the passions, and all the other "inferior" faculties. But if the soul is the real agent which acts through the intellect, to the soul should be ascribed dominion and sovereignty over the so-called "inferior" powers. That such sovereignty is actually ascribed to the intellect is further proof of the "entity-view" of the faculties in Thomas.

Then, also, Thomas spends a great deal of time and mental energy in assigning certain actions to specific faculties. For instance, to give just a few examples, enjoyment is called an act of the appetitive power;⁵⁷ intention is called an act of the will;⁵⁸ command is called an act of the reason;⁵⁹ and even the essence of happiness is called an act of the intellect.⁶⁰ In fact, at another place Thomas even goes so far as to say: "Now action is properly ascribed not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, but not to his tools.

⁵⁷ *Summa theologica*, I-II, 11, 1.

⁵⁸ *Summa theologica*, I-II, 12, 1.

⁵⁹ *Summa theologica*, I-II, 17, 1.

⁶⁰ *Summa theologica*, I-II, 3, 4.

Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.”⁶¹ Here the will is made the *principal agent* of an action; even though, in the definition of a faculty just quoted, Thomas [146] made a special point of saying that the faculty is not the active subject, but that through which the agent acts. In fact, in that definition the faculty was compared to the art of building and the soul to the builder; but in the quotation from the *Summa* given above, the will (which is one of the faculties of the soul) is compared to the builder! Surely it cannot be denied that in the *Summa* passage Thomas thinks of the will, not as a mode of operation of the soul, but as an actual subject of the act ascribed to it — in other words, as a distinct, self-functioning entity. And that conception of the will certainly disrupts the unity of the soul!

Now why should Thomas spend so much time trying to assign these various types of actions to various specific faculties? If the soul is really one, and if it is the subject of all the faculties (as Thomas theoretically claims), then what difference does it really make to what faculty an action is ascribed? Augustine would say, as we have seen, that what is ascribed to one of the three faculties (memory, intellect, or will) must be ascribed to all three; in fact, he goes so far as to say, “All that we do is done by these three.”⁶² On that basis, what is the sense of saying that happiness is an act of the intellect, when the will is invariably operative in it, as are also the feelings, the memory, and the senses? Happiness is a condition of the entire self. Thomas, by ascribing it to only one faculty “as to its essence,” betrays the disruptive psychology consequent upon his view of the [147] faculties of the soul.

Thomas, it seems, wanted to do justice to the unitary view of the soul which was implicit in his Christian convictions. But he was too deeply immersed in Aristotelian philosophy really to transcend the Greek conception of the soul. The substance-accident hypothesis which he applied to the relation between the faculties and the soul, derived as it was from Greek rationalistic philosophy, did

⁶¹ “*Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio aedificatori, non autem instrumentis; unde manifestum est, quod uti proprie est actus voluntatis*” (*Summa theologica*, I-II, 16, 1).

⁶² See above, p. 80.

not permit him to maintain in practice the unitary view of the soul which he held in theory. The result is that his psychology was more Greek than Christian.

Thomas Compared with Bavinck

This study of Thomas has demonstrated in a negative way the basic correctness of Bavinck's psychology. For it has shown the disastrous results which follow when one aspect of the soul is made primary. Thomas made the intellect the primary center of man's mental and moral life, and we have seen the psychologically disruptive consequences which followed from his position. This study of Thomas has proved that one cannot hold to the primacy of the intellect (in the sense which makes the intellect the ruling power of the human soul), and still maintain the unity of the soul. And in thus seeing the inadequacy of the Thomistic position, we have also seen the inadequacy of the Greek view of man, since Thomas's position is, in all its essentials, Greek.

After Thomas the question of whether the intellect or the will was primary in man was vigorously debated throughout [148] the rest of the Middle Ages.⁶³ Most of the leading scholastics of that period took part in the debate, taking either one side or the other. But from this very dispute we can learn the futility of such argument, and the error of thus formulating the basic problem of psychology. We can see this most clearly if we look for a moment at Duns Scotus. Scotus, as is well known, took a position opposed to that of Thomas, saying that not the intellect but the will is primary in human nature. It is both significant and enlightening to note the reasons why he took this stand.

Thomas had said that the object of the intellect is the true, whereas the object of the will is the good, and that the true is higher than the good — consequently, the intellect is higher than the will. But Scotus countered that, in his opinion, the good is higher than the true, since the good communicates something of its own being to him who desires it, which cannot be said of the true. Hence willing is higher than thinking.

⁶³ Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, 328.

Thomas had said that the highest virtue is wisdom, thus making the intellect whereby wisdom is attained the highest faculty in man. But Scotus replied that, according to the Apostle Paul, love is higher than wisdom (1 Corinthians 13), and that therefore the will, through which love is attained, is higher than the intellect.

Once again, Thomas had said that the intellect is the final cause and mover of the will, since it holds before the [149] will the recognized good as the object of its striving. Therefore, the intellect is higher than the will. But Scotus pointed out that it is the will which decides to what images and ideas existing in the mind the intellect shall attend to; hence it is the will which really determines the content of the intellect; and therefore the will is higher than the intellect.⁶⁴

Now we are not concerned here with the value or weight of these arguments. Seen in the light of a sound psychology, they are worth very little on either side; since both the will and the intellect are always active in every act of the soul, and since both are indispensable in the life of the soul. But what I am concerned to point out is that both Thomas and Scotus discuss exactly the same three questions about intellect and will; only one arrives at one answer, and the other arrives at the opposite answer to each of these three questions, neither being able to convince the other. And the same kind of procedure was carried out ad nauseam during the remainder of the medieval period.⁶⁵ Argument was piled on argument; but one saw the problem from this side, and the other from that — so that, after three centuries, the world was no closer to a solution of this problem than when the debate began. Surely no better proof is needed to show that this was a barren question, a question falsely formulated, and therefore productive of no [150] advancement in psychological understanding; the question, namely, of whether the intellect or the will is primary in human nature.

And the reason is obvious. Both sides of this question sought to make some partial aspect of the soul primary, and both were therefore equally unsound. From the psychological point of view, Scotus was just as one-sided and just as much in error as was Thomas. His arguments, instead of correcting Thomas, only showed

⁶⁴ For this brief analysis of the Thomas–Scotus controversy I am indebted to Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens*, 91–100.

⁶⁵ See Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, section 26, “The Primacy of the Will or of the Intellect,” 328–37.

the untenableness of both positions. And thus we have in the Middle Ages an historical demonstration of the impossibility of making any one aspect of the soul the primary “thing” in human nature.

All of this, conversely, demonstrates in a negative way the basic correctness of Bavinck’s position, who placed the primacy, not in any one faculty or power of the soul, but in the heart, which is the source and center of all the faculties. Bavinck, on the basis of Scripture, realized that any attempt to make one aspect of the soul primary is bound to end in destroying the unity of the soul. Hence Bavinck denied, in his “Primaat van verstand of wil,” that the intellect is sovereign over the other powers of the soul; and he denied with equal vehemence that the will has such a position of sovereignty. He ended his essay by saying, “Let us therefore not dispute about the pre-eminence of intellect or will,”⁶⁶ which is still the best answer to this whole medieval squabble. It is because [151] Bavinck was so zealous to guard the unity of the soul that he also opposed all dualism of body and soul, as we have seen,⁶⁷ and vigorously repudiated the antithesis between reason and sense as found in Thomas and the Greeks.⁶⁸

However, from this study of Thomas we can also see some of Bavinck’s errors. Though Bavinck transcended this Greek-medieval point of view in principle, as we have just seen, still he never entirely got away from it. He still speaks frequently about what is higher and what is lower in man, generally placing a power higher when it comes closer to reason. And he still often uses language which seems to treat the faculties as so many independent entities. We shall discuss all of this in greater detail when we come to evaluate Bavinck’s position. Our study of Thomas has at least helped us both to appreciate Bavinck’s essential soundness, and to see the more clearly the perils implicit in his occasional dependence on Aristotle and the Schoolmen. [152]

⁶⁶ See above, p. 36.

⁶⁷ See above, p. 5.

⁶⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 21; Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 89–90; see also Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, p. 122.

Chapter 5

The Contribution of Luther

We began our historical study with Augustine, who represents the view of the early fathers and the ancient period of church history. Next we noted the position of Thomas Aquinas, the outstanding representative of the medieval, scholastic tradition. We now wish to turn to the period of the Reformation, to see what the great Reformers taught about the question of what is primary in human nature. We begin with Martin Luther, who lived from 1483–1546.

The Will Primary?

What, according to Luther, is the most fundamental aspect of human nature? No simple, easy answer can be given to this question. Heinrich Lammers, whose book, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, is a rather thorough study of this question, comes to the conclusion that what is primary for Luther is the will. He expresses what he believes to be Luther's viewpoint on this problem as follows:

*In der Tiefe ist der Wille untrennbar vom Wesen des Menschen, er ist ständig in Bewegung, er fällt mit der Existenz des Menschen zusammen, er ist seine Substanz. . . . Im richtig verstandenen Willen erfasst man also den Kern des Menschen, den tiefsten Punkt des Lebens.*¹

[153] Again, Luther understood “*dass der Mensch in seinem Kern selbst lebendiger Wille ist*”;² in fact, Lammers goes so far as to state that, in his opinion, the discovery that the core and center of man is his will was Luther's decisive contribution.³ Once again, over against the primacy of the intellect which characterized scholasticism, Luther, according to Lammers, really established the primacy of the will;

¹ Heinrich Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen* (Berlin: Jünker und Dünnhaupt, 1935), 13.

² Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 33.

³ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 33.

“Das Primäre ist für ihn der immer wache Wille, den der Mensch bei aufmerksamer Beobachtung in sich findet.”⁴

Lammers bases this interpretation of Luther on a number of considerations. The first of these is that Luther recognized the will as the “Träger der menschlichen Lebenseinheit.”⁵

*Ferner gab die Einsicht in das wahre Wesen des Willens als dem Zentrum oder der Kraftquelle aller menschlichen Lebensäußerungen die Möglichkeit, diese Lebensäußerungen in ihrer Einbeit, ihrem organischen Zusammenhang zu verstehen.*⁶

What gives unity and continuity to human life is the will; hence the will must be the most primary and most central function in man.

A second consideration which seems to move Lammers to posit a primacy of the will in Luther is the fact that, according to Luther, the quality of the will determines the moral quality of the deed. Over against the scholastics, who held that a man's character is the result of his acts, Luther maintained that a man's acts flow from his character and are [154] determined by it. Every single act only reveals the persistent tendency of man's will; and, without the goodness of the will, no acts of man can ever give him a good character.⁷ Good deeds do not make the will good, but a good will produces good deeds.

*Luther fasst das Wollen des Menschen einheitlich organisch auf, nicht als vereinzelte mechanisch akkumulierte Willensakte. Alle einzelnen Taten und Willensregungen empfangen von einem einheitlichen Zentrum her ihren Charakter.*⁸

⁴ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 58.

⁵ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 18.

⁶ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 80.

⁷ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 10: “Vor allem in Abwehr der Aristotelischen, von den Scholastikern adoptierten Theorie . . . kämpft Luther dafür, dass das Handeln des Menschen vielmehr eine ‘substantia et virtus’ voraussetzt, das sich in den einzelnen Handlungen nur immer wieder die beharrende Tendenz des Willens durchsetzt, und ohne die Güte dieses Willens an sich niemals einzelne Handlungen dem Menschen einen guten Charakter verschaffen könnten.”

⁸ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 34.

Furthermore, Lammers seems to be convinced that for Luther the seat of sin in man is the will. For, so says Luther, in the depths of his will man finds himself opposed to God and God's love:

Luther sieht in aller Schärfe, dass der Wille des Menschen böse ist, und das heißt, dass nicht etwas am Menschen böse ist, sondern dass der Mensch selbst bis in die Wurzel hinein böse ist, dass das Böse die verderbte Natur selbst ist. . . . Was aber ist das Wesen des Bösen? Es ist ein Willenszustand.⁹

According to Lammers, Luther would say that the most significant thing one can affirm about man as he is by nature is that he is evil, and that the depth of this evil in him manifests itself in his evil will. [155]

However, if man is to do good, that too must involve his will; for only if his will is changed shall he be able to do any good.¹⁰ It is utterly impossible, however, for man to change his own will; if his evil will is to be made good, this must be done by God. "*Wenn der Wille 'wirklich' Gott zugewandt ist, erlebt der Mensch das — trotz des Bewusstseins der Freiheit — als Wirken Gottes oder als die 'Liebe Gottes' in ihm.*"¹¹ "*Wenn der Mensch gut ist, so ist er es durch die Beschaffenheit seines Willens, das heißt, durch das Wirken Gottes in ihm.*"¹² In fact, according to Lammers, even faith is essentially a transformation of the will, wrought by God. "*Es dürfte hiernach klar sein, dass der Glaube eine Wandlung des Willens meint, und dass diese Wandlung eine Gnade ist, denn sie betrifft ja den Menschen selbst, den Kern seines Wesens.*"¹³ According to this interpretation, which Lammers ascribes to Luther, the will is the "place" where God touches man, and where God changes man. Hence, too, Lammers makes the will primary in Luther.

Carl Stange, another Luther student, similarly seems to make the will primary in Luther's anthropology, calling Luther a voluntarist because of his emphasis on the bondage of the will, and because of his insistence that the moral

⁹ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 15. Cf. also pp. 64, 76, and 80. The last-named reference reads: "*Da das Böse in der Grundsicht, im Willen selbst wurzelt, richtet es sich gegen Gott, ist Gottfeindschaft.*"

¹⁰ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 64.

¹¹ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 13–14.

¹² Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 15. See also p. 17.

¹³ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 74.

worth of man is dependent not on his ideas, but on the [156] disposition of his will.¹⁴ In this connection, it is also significant to note that, in his *Bondage of the Will*, Luther frequently refers to the will as “the most excellent thing in man.”¹⁵

It is not surprising that the will was very prominent in Luther’s teaching. Over against the scholastics, who were always talking about the intellect as the most godly aspect of man, Luther quite properly insisted on the importance of the will. Whereas the scholastics made the will morally indifferent, Luther contended with all the vehemence at his command that the will of man is bound and enslaved to sin, and that the scholastic “*liberum arbitrium*” is a mere figment of the imagination, a product of unscriptural, rationalistic speculation. Over against Erasmus, who championed the scholastic view of the will, Luther felt constrained to write a vigorous polemic, *De Servo Arbitrio (On the Bondage of the Will)*. Since [157] Luther was a Reformer, and since one of the basic errors of the medieval church was its doctrine of the human will, it is not surprising that Luther spent much time and effort in combatting this erroneous view.

Furthermore, since Luther had been an Augustinian monk, had studied much in Augustine, and had been profoundly influenced by him, it is also not surprising that Luther should somewhat share the latter’s view of the will. Augustine, as we have seen, strongly emphasized the will, stressing will more than intellect, and repeatedly ascribing the origin of sin to man’s evil will. As Augustine had opposed Greek rationalism, so Luther felt compelled to combat medieval rationalism. That both, in parallel fashion, laid much stress on the will, is perfectly understandable.

¹⁴“*In diesen Gedanken über die Unfreiheit des menschlichen Willens zum Guten findet der Voluntarismus Luthers seinen deutlichsten Ausdruck. . . . Der sittliche Wert des Menschen hängt nicht von den Vorstellungen ab, die er hat, sondern von der Beschaffenheit seines Willens*” (Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 190–91).

¹⁵For example, note the following statements from Luther’s *Bondage of the Will*, taken from Johann G. Walch, ed., *Luther’s Sämtliche Schriften* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1888), vol. 18: “*Es steht daher diese Stelle Pauli ganz fest . . . dass der freie Wille, oder das Vorzüglichste in den Menschen . . . gottlos, ungerecht, und des Zornes Gottes wert sei*” (col. 1916). “*Aber solche Unwissenheit und Verachtung findet sich ohne Zweifel nicht in dem Fleische und den niedrigeren und gröberer Neigungen, sondern in jenen höchsten und vorzüglichsten Kräften der Menschen . . . und sogar in der Kraft des freien Willens selbst, in dem Keim der Ehrbarkeit selbst, oder in dem Vorzüglichsten, was im Menschen ist*” (col. 1922). “*Denn was ist ungerecht sein anders, als dass der Wille (welcher eins der vorzüglichsten Dinge ist) ungerecht ist?*” (col. 1923).

The Heart Primary?

According to Lammers and Stange, then, what is primary in Luther's anthropology is the will. However, as has already been intimated, it is possible to give other answers to this question. There are also passages in Luther which would seem to point to the primacy of the heart. A. F. Hoppe, the compiler of the index to *Luther's Sämtliche Schriften*, referred to above, credits Luther with calling the heart "*das beste Glied am Menschen und sein wesentlicher Theil.*"¹⁶ In the same connection, Hoppe attributes to Luther this sentiment: "*Gott will ein williges, fröhliches, gutes Herz, das mit Lust [158] gern bei Gott wollte sein; wer solches nicht bei sich findet, der rufe Gott an, dass Gott ihm um Christi Verdiensts willen ein solch Herz gebe.*"¹⁷ And, again, from the same paragraph, "*Siehe, dass du vor allen Dingen ein rechtschaffen Herz habest, darnach dass du gute Werke tuest. Dieselben werden Gott gefallen, wenn sie geschehen aus einem reinen Herzen.*"¹⁸ Statements such as these certainly sound as though Luther made the heart primary in man.

Other investigators have also found a primacy of the heart in Luther. Erdmann Schott quotes Luther as saying that good works will avail nothing, but that the heart must delight in Christ and in the Father; that, in fact, all is lost if the heart has not been cleansed.¹⁹ Lammers who, as we have seen above, champions the primacy of the will in Luther, also indicates the importance of the heart in various places. The law is only properly fulfilled, he says, when the heart and the law have become one.²⁰ Justification by faith is a transformation

¹⁶ Walch, *Luther's Sämtliche Schriften* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1910), vol. 23, col. 799.

¹⁷ Walch, *Luther's Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 23, col. 798.

¹⁸ Walch, *Luther's Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 23, col. 799.

¹⁹ Erdmann Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre* (Leipzig: Scholl, 1928), 50, footnote 1. The full quotation from Luther is as follows: "*Lasset fahren Werk, wie groß sie sind, Gebet, Gesänge, Geplärre, Gekläppere, denn es wird sicherlich keiner durch diese zu Gott kommen. Es ist auch unmöglich. Das Hertz muss ein Wohlgefallen haben in Christo und durch Christum zum Vater. Es ist ganz und gar verloren, wo nicht das Hertz gereinigt wird*" (*Weimarer Lutherausgabe*, I, 275, 38–39).

²⁰ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 10: "*Wenn schon überhaupt das Gesetz erfüllt worden soll . . . muss durch die Liebe aus Herz und Gesetz eines werden.*"

of our inmost will — that is to say, a transformation of the [159] heart.²¹ The will which delights in God’s law must be an irresistible compulsion which comes “*aus dem Kern, dem Herzen des Menschen.*”²²

It is, however, especially M. A. H. Stomps who works out and reveals the centrality of the heart in Luther. After giving a rather comprehensive survey of the Biblical teaching on the heart as the center of man’s spiritual and mental life, the seat of affections, thoughts, and moral decisions, and the source of all sins, Stomps indicates that for Luther this Biblical view was the decisive one. *Cor* for Luther is “*das Zentrum des Menschen.*”

*Wenn Gott das Zentrum des Menschen oder den Ganzen Menschen will, dann verlangt er das Herz, das heißt, den Grund des Menschen, den Seelengrund. ‘Nihil requirit ab homine praeter cor.’ Und die justitia ist rectitudo cordis. Das Herz ist der Grund des Menschen.*²³

And at another place Stomps credits Luther with saying, “*Das zum Willen geneigte Herz ist das Eigentlich-sein des Menschen.*”²⁴

From all of this it is certainly obvious that it will not do simply to attribute a primacy of the will to Luther, but that the heart also plays a central part in his [160] anthropology. In fact, we here for the first time in our historical study run into a view somewhat similar to Bavinck’s, who, we have seen, made the heart primary and central in man. The reason is probably this, that Luther derived his theology more directly from Scripture, which teaches the centrality of the heart, than either Augustine or Thomas.

However, when we ask exactly what Luther understood by the heart, we do not get a very clear-cut answer. What Stomps says is very true: “*Die Hauptsachs ist für ihn [for Luther, that is], wie das Herz gesinnt ist, und niemals die theoretische Frage, was das Herz, abgesehen von der Besinnung, ist.*”²⁵ The all-important question for Luther, as we shall see in a moment, is whether the heart is inclined toward

²¹ “*Denn bei der Rechtfertigung aus dem Glauben handelt es sich um die Wandlung des innersten Willens, des ‘Herzens’*” (Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 17).

²² Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 9.

²³ M. A. H. Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1935), 146–48.

²⁴ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 46.

²⁵ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 150.

God or away from Him; not the abstract psychological problem of what the heart is. So we are not sure exactly what Luther means by heart, except that he uses it often to indicate the inner core of man. It ought to be noted in this connection, however, that Luther often uses heart and will synonymously. Lammers cites the following from Luther's commentary on the Book of Romans: "*Nobilior, maior et deo gratior portio hominis, id est cor et voluntas.*"²⁶ Stomps also quotes from the same book: "*Si lex timore poenae vel amore utilitatis impletur, sine corde et voluntate est.*"²⁷ And in his discussion of the various senses which the word *voluntas* [161] may have in Luther, Stomps says that *voluntas* may often be used "*in dem Sinne von Herz, cor, ohne nähere Bestimmung.*"²⁸ This parallel between will and heart suggests some interesting possibilities. It may be, as Lammers seems to suggest, that when Luther uses the term heart, he means the will. But, on the other hand, it may also be that when Luther uses the term will, he means what the Bible includes under heart.

To the best of my knowledge, Luther nowhere clearly indicates the exact relation between heart and will. The fact that he frequently uses them interchangeably suggests that either he had too broad a conception of the will, or too narrow a conception of the heart. Luther, not being a systematic theologian, did not seem too much concerned about his use of terms, or about exact distinctions between terms. He used the term will in several senses, as Stomps points out,²⁹ and he may have been similarly ambiguous in his use of the term heart.

²⁶ Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 18, footnote 10. The reference is to *Romans*, 2:44, Ficker's edition. Ed. note: This is a reference to Johannes Ficker, ed., *Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1908).

²⁷ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 40. The reference is also to Ficker's edition of *Romans*, 2:186.

²⁸ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 27.

²⁹ "*Streng umgrenzt und eindeutig gebraucht wird weder intellectus-ratio, noch voluntas-affectus, noch sensus*" (Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 143). See also p. 149, where a three-fold meaning of *voluntas* in Luther's writings is distinguished: sometimes it means a *faculty*; sometimes it means the same as *heart* and refers to the whole man; and sometimes it is used as equivalent to *righteousness*.

The Whole Man Primary?

So what is primary in man according to Luther is sometimes the will and sometimes the heart; occasionally these two are even identified. But there is a third concept which is also used by Luther to indicate what is primary in man. Luther [162] had an aversion to splitting man up into parts, as the scholastics loved to do. Hence quite often he would use the expression, *the whole man*, “*der ganze Mensch*,” to indicate the subject of man’s actions. So, for instance, in his commentary on the Book of Galatians, he criticizes the followers of Aristotle who were not sure whether to locate the seat of sin in the rational or irrational part of man. But the Apostle, continues Luther, placed the seat of sin in the flesh, which stands for the whole man — not just the sensual passions, not just the intellect or the will, but all of these together.”³⁰ Stange makes the same point. The scholastics, as we have seen in our study of Thomas, located sin especially in the sensual “part” of man. Luther, on the contrary, used the term “*Fleisch*” (Latin: *caro*) to designate the sinfulness of man. “*Wenn der Mensch Fleisch genannt wird, so bezieht sich das nicht bloß auf das sinnliche Begehren. Vielmehr der ganze Mensch ist fleischlich.*”³¹ Enough has been quoted to show that, for Luther, the whole man is the subject of sin.

In connection with our discussion of the “primacy of the will” in Luther, we observed that, according to Luther, the quality of the will determines the quality of the deed. However, we also find in Luther statements to the effect that the moral judgment of a man concerns primarily his whole person. After showing that for Kant the disposition of man really determines his moral worth, Stange continues: [163] “*In Parallele dazu heißt es bei Luther: es kommt alles darauf an, dass die Person gut si. Nicht die guten Werke machen die Person gut, sondern die Person ist es, die den Werken ihren sittlichen Charakter verleiht.*”³² Again, on page 170 of the same volume, Stange points out how Luther’s ethics differed from those of medieval scholasticism:

³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Luther und Aristoteles* (Kiel: Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1883), 15.

³¹ Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 183.

³² Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 159 f.

*Das, was gut oder böse genannt wird [in Luther, that is], sind nicht mehr einzelne Seiten des menschlichen Lebens: als ob der Mensch gut wäre, wenn er seiner Vernunft folgt, und böse, wenn er sich von seiner Sinnlichkeit leiten lässt. Es ist vielmehr die ganze Person des Menschen, die gut oder böse genannt werden muss, je nachdem ob der Mensch nur den engen Kreis des eigenen Ich kennt oder aber in der Hingabe an den anderen sich selbst vergisst.*³³

Erdmann Schott makes a similar statement: “Für die Theologie ergibt sich das Urteil über die werke aus dem Urteil über die ganze Person, über das Ich.”³⁴ It is apparent from the above that, in one sense, what is primary in man for Luther is the whole person.

We may also see this in another way. Stange points out that the antithesis between flesh and spirit is the most basic concept in Luther’s ethics.³⁵ For Luther, however, this antithesis was not one between different “parts” of man, but one which concerned two fundamentally opposite dispositions of the whole man. “*Spiritum et carnem intelligo [164] totum hominem, maxima ipsam animam.*”³⁶ Again, Stange attributes to Luther the following criticism of the Roman Catholic doctrine of sin:

*Man unterscheide ‘in metaphysischer Weise’ zwischen Fleisch und Geist, als ob das zwei verschiedene Substanzen wären, während doch der ganze Mensch geistlich und der ganze Mensch fleischlich sei, je nachdem ob die Hingabe an Gott oder aber die Hingabe an das eigene Ich im Menschen die Herrschaft führt.*³⁷

Furthermore, we may see the primacy of the whole man in Luther very clearly when we see man in his relation to God. The whole of man and the whole

³³ Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 170.

³⁴ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 65.

³⁵ “In diesen beiden Begriffen Fleisch und Geist sind die beiden Grund- und Hauptbegriffe der Ethik Luthers gegeben. Die Prädikate gut und böse sind nicht durch die Begriffe Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit zu erläutern, sondern durch die Begriffe Geist und Fleisch. Damit ist der Ausgangspunkt und zugleich der Mittelpunkt der sittlichen Gedanken Luthers gewonnen” (Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 170).

³⁶ Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, in the Weimar edition of Luther’s works, II, 585; quoted by Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 148.

³⁷ Stange, “Luther und das Sittliche Ideal,” 173. Schott, in his *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, works out this thought in great detail.

of man's life is from God and should be directed to God.³⁸ When God is wrathful against a man, his wrath rests on the whole person; when God, on the contrary, is gracious to someone, his grace rests on the whole person.³⁹ Hence, we may say that the whole man is guilty, and that the whole man is also righteous [when he has been justified].⁴⁰ [165] Hence also repentance must not be concerned only with isolated deeds, but must above all be directed to the whole person.⁴¹ Similarly, faith also has to do with the whole man, and with the whole of his human life.⁴² From sentiments such as these, it would certainly seem as though what is primary in man for Luther is not any partial aspect of man, but the whole man.

We have already seen how, according to some investigators, what seems to be primary for Luther is the will. Now it is highly significant that Luther occasionally seems to use the term will in the sense of “whole man.” Stomps quotes from Luther's commentary on the Psalms to establish this point. In connection with the passage, “*in lege Domini voluntas eius*,” which is the Vulgate rendering for “his delight is in the law of the Lord” (Psalm 1:2), Luther points out that *voluntas* [will] here does not mean just a single faculty, but stands for delight, immediate readiness, and voluntary good pleasure — in other words, for a willingness of all

³⁸Theodor Pauls, *Luthers Anschauung vom Menschentum des Christen* (Bonn: Scheur, 1937), 18.

³⁹“*Jam sequitur, quod illa duo ira et gratia sic se habent (cum sint extra nos), ut in totum effundantur, ut qui sub ira est, totus sub tota ira est, qui sub gratia, totus sub tota gratia est, quia ira et gratia personae respiciunt. Quem enim Deus in gratiam recipit, totum recipit, et cui favet, in totum favet. Rursus cui irascitur, in totum irascitur*” (Weimarer Lutherausgabe, VIII, 106, 37–107; quoted by Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 66, footnote 3.

⁴⁰“*Als ganze Person ist der Mensch schuldig, ‘Sünder,’ und als ganze Person ist der Mensch ‘gerecht,’ also gerechtfertigt auch hinsichtlich seiner menschlichen ‘Natur’*” (Pauls, *Luthers Anschauung vom Menschentum des Christen*, 17).

⁴¹“*Dass also die Reue gehe nicht stücklich über etliche Werke (so die contritia und attritio) . . . sondern über die ganze Person, mit alle ihrem Leben und Wesen, ja über deine ganze Natur, und dir zeige, dass du zur Hölle verdammt seiest*” (Erlanger Lutherausgabe, XI, 282 ff., quoted by Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 65, footnote 1).

⁴²“*Demgegenüber ist Luthers Glaube ein tätiger Glaube, der es mit dem Ganzen Menschen und der ganzen Wirklichkeit des Menschenlebens zu tun hat*” (Pauls, *Luthers Anschauung vom Menschentum des Christen*, 18).

of man's powers and members.⁴³ Stomps comments as follows: "*Er bezieht [166] 'Wille' auf die ganze Person: der Wille aller Kräfte, aller Glieder.*"⁴⁴ Here will seems therefore to be identified with a readiness of the whole person to do the will of God; and this kind of willing Luther calls "*vera et plena et perfecta voluntas.*" Stomps points out in another connection that will is often used in Luther's *Bondage of the Will* in the sense of "the whole man":

*Es wird zwar an vielen Stellen [in the Bondage of the Will] voluntas mit ratio zusammengenannt . . . nicht aber in der Bedeutung von Vermögen; voluntas ist hier eben der ganze Mensch und dieser selbe Mensch kann sich verstehen.*⁴⁵

When will is used in the above-named sense, it is largely parallel with "*der ganze Mensch*"; in fact, it is then the whole man looked at from the point of view of his readiness or willingness. Will is then not a mere faculty, but the whole man as willing. If, now, this use of the term *will* be the predominant one in Luther, then what is called a "primacy of the will" in Luther may be nothing more than what has just been described as the primacy of the whole man, looked at from the point of view of his volitional ability. And then that "primacy of the will" which some students of Luther claim to have found in him does not disrupt man's unity, but only emphasizes that unity. [167]

Be that as it may, our brief survey has shown that it is not easy to give a simple answer to the question of what, according to Luther, is primary in man. Sometimes the will, sometimes the heart, and sometimes the whole man seems to be made the primary or basic aspect of man. Luther does not seem to have consistently taught the primacy of any one "thing" in man. He did not always use the terms mentioned above in the same sense, and he frequently used them interchangeably. Luther, in other words, does not seem to have been too concerned

⁴³ "*Quare cum dicit 'in lege domini voluntas eius,' utique vera et plena et perfecta voluntas intelligitur. . . . 'Voluntas' hic non ut in scolis accipitur, sed pro libertia spontanea que promptitudine et voluntario beneplacito — non prout distinguitur contra intellectum vel actum voluntatis, sed omnino pro voluntate omnium virium: ita quod omnes vires, omnia membra volenter sint in lege domini et libenter*" (Luther, *Commentary on the Psalms*, Weimar Ausgabe, III, 25; quoted in Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 41).

⁴⁴ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 43.

⁴⁵ Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 149 f.

about exactly what is primary in man; he was much more concerned about the question which will next occupy our attention: What attitude does man take toward God?

Luther's Religious View of Man

Luther's primary contribution to our problem lies in his religious evaluation of man. Schott points out that Luther recognized a neutral, merely psychological conception of the ego; of that ego, namely, which is the subject of all man's thoughts, feelings, and experiences. This ego Schott calls "*der neutrale Ich-Begriff*." It is the ego in this sense which the secular sciences study — psychology, logic, and so on.⁴⁶ It is the business of theology, however, to go beyond this "*neutrale*" or "*psychologische Ich-Begriff*" to the "*theologische Ich-Begriff*," which sees man, not just in relation to his psychological functions, but in relation to God. For the ego of which theology speaks is the ego addressed by [168] God.⁴⁷ And to see man in his essential wholeness, we must see him not only in his relation to the world which surrounds him, but primarily in his relation to God.⁴⁸ Only then do we really see "*der ganze Mensch*."

What, now, do we see when we look at man in his relation to God? We see several things. First of all, that man is by nature sinful, corrupt, and depraved. By nature he does not love or reverence God, but is hostile to God in all his deeds. This evil inclination of man by nature Luther, in harmony with Scripture, calls *Fleisch*. This badness is not just a matter of bad deeds, but a fundamentally evil disposition of his heart and will.

Stange shows how radically Luther transcended the medieval, scholastic view of man's sinfulness. According to medieval theology, as we have seen in our study of Thomas, the will is in the "middle" between reason on the one hand and sensuality or concupiscence on the other. The will, for the scholastics, has no specific character of its own, but is indifferent; it may either be ruled by reason

⁴⁶ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 52 f.

⁴⁷ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 58–59.

⁴⁸ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 62. Stange would add: We must also see man in relation to his fellow-men (Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," 167–70).

or determined by sensuality. A consequence of this view is that then the ethical quality of the will is wholly determined by the quality of its deeds. In the act of doing a good deed it is good; in the act of doing an evil deed it is evil. A moral judgment about a man then becomes a wholly quantitative affair: [169] whether the number of good deeds he has done exceeds the number of evil deeds, or vice versa.⁴⁹

Luther, on the other hand, repudiated this whole medieval scheme. Good and evil are not determined by any such standards as rationality and sensuality, but by the law of God. The will is not morally indifferent; on the contrary, the will is morally evil. When Luther says that man is flesh, he does not mean only man's sensual passions. The whole man is fleshly. This fleshly nature of man reveals itself in his will, *regardless of whether it is under the influence of sensuality or reason*. For in everything that man seeks, the will seeks itself and its own advantage. This holds true for sensual desires, but for rational willing as well. In fact, even man's moral striving reveals his egocentricity. For virtue is thought to make man more noble; hence man pursues virtue *only for the sake of his own honor*. Thus man's fleshliness reveals itself even in his "noblest" pursuits.⁵⁰

Luther, in fact, distinguishes two kinds of fleshly people: *sinistrales* and *dextrales*. The former show their fleshliness in yielding to their passions and lusts; the latter, in subduing their lusts and practicing virtue. The latter, adds Luther, is the worse of the two.⁵¹ One is reminded of Jesus' denunciations of the Pharisees, who were so wretchedly evil precisely because they thought they were righteous. [170]

From all of this it will be seen how thoroughgoing was Luther's conception of sin. Sin is not inherent in just a part of man's nature, but permeates man's entire being. Luther also asserts, in harmony with Scripture, that man is utterly unable to change this fundamentally evil inclination in his heart.

The only thing that can change man is God's grace. What needs changing is, once again, not just a part of man, but the whole man. Hence the transformation

⁴⁹ Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," 182–83. It is easy to see the connection between this view of morality and the medieval doctrine of merit.

⁵⁰ Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," 183–84.

⁵¹ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 6.

brought about by God's grace affects the whole man with all his powers; it makes him "a new man." Yet, though it does so, it does not at once annihilate the old nature; "old man" and "new man" remain side by side during the extent of this earthly life.

Hence, when we look at the believer in the light of his relation to God, we see a deep ethical antithesis in him. This antithesis, as has previously been pointed out, is not the Thomistic one of reason versus sense, but that of flesh versus spirit, *Fleisch und Geist*. *Fleisch* in Luther means the whole man as dominated by sin. *Geist*, on the other hand, means the whole man as transformed by God and hence turned toward God. So then there are "two whole men" in the believer: the old and the new man.⁵² The antithesis within him is not between two "parts" of his soul, as the scholastics taught, but between two "whole men," one of whom hates God, while the other loves God. [171]

However, this antithesis between *Fleisch* and *Geist* does not disrupt man's unity. For the "two whole men" of which Luther speaks are not two separate individuals, but two principles within the one man. This point, that the unity of the soul is not impaired by this doctrine of the "two whole men" can be demonstrated in two ways: First, by the psychological continuity between the two principles; that is, by the fact that the believer is conscious that he himself is both *Fleisch* and *Geist*.⁵³ Schott expresses this psychological continuity as follows: "*Einerseits bin ich Fleisch, und andererseits bin ich Geist; das sind die grössten Gegensätze, und doch ist es dasselbe 'Ich'*."⁵⁴ That Luther also held this view is obvious from the following quotation:

Vide, ut unus et idem homo simul servit legi Dei et legi peccati, simul justus est et peccat. Non enim sit: mens mea servit legi Dei, nec: caro

⁵² "*Sunt duo toti homines et unus totus homo*" (Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, in *Weimarer Lutherausgabe*, II, 586; quoted by Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 148).

⁵³ "*Zweitens aber betont Luther fortwährend, dass trotz der Scheidung zwischen dem 'neuen' und dem 'alten' Ich die psychologische Einheit im Menschen nicht zerrissen ist*" (Karl Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, I, 83; quoted in Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 1, footnote 1).

⁵⁴ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 3.

*mea legi peccati, sed ego, inquit, totus homo, persona eadem, servio utranque servitatem.*⁵⁵

It is the same man who serves the law of God and the law of sin; it is the same man who is just and a sinner. Schott adds the comment: “*Fleisch und Geist sind ein und derselbe Mensch. Das ist der Grund, warum der neue Mensch sich auch noch die Sünden des alten Adam zurechnen muss.*”⁵⁶ Again, on a [172] following page, Schott paraphrases Luther as saying: “*Mag es auch der ganze Mensch sein, der die Keuschheit liebt, mag es auch der ganze Mensch sein, den die Lust erregt — es ist doch immer nur ein und derselbe Mensch.*”⁵⁷ It is obvious from this that *Fleisch* and *Geist* in Luther are not to be construed as two distinct individuals, but that, in the believer, the same man is both flesh and spirit.⁵⁸

In the second place, it is to be noted that, though there are in the believer both a “new man” and an “old man,” the new man dominates the old. Both are not of equal strength; the new man takes the lead and sets the pace, gradually overcoming the old man. “*Daher vereinigt allerdings der Glaubende zwei ganze Mensch, ein doppeltes Ich, in sich; aber der eine Mensch hat über den andern immer schon den Zieg davongetragen.*”⁵⁹ Schott concludes the discussion of the main part of his book by saying:

Es ist der Ruhm der Gnade Gottes, dass sie uns mit uns selbst verfeindet. Gottes Wort spaltet den Christen, sodass der Glaubende ein doppelter Mensch ist. Aber der eine Mensch ist immer schon vom andern überwunden; jedoch nicht anders überwunden, wie überhaupt die ganze Welt für den Christen überwunden ist. Nicht im Fühlen — wenigstens nicht völlig — sondern im Glauben und in der Hoffnung. Im Glauben, das heißt, wir fühlen es nicht oder

⁵⁵ *Luthers Römerbriefvorlesung*, Ficker, II, 176, 5–9; quoted in Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 54, footnote 1.

⁵⁶ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 54.

⁵⁷ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 55. A footnote gives Luther’s original statement: “*Totus homo est, qui castitatem amat, idem totus homo illecebris libidinis titillatur*” (*Weimarer Lutherausgabe*, II, 586, 15–16).

⁵⁸ I say, “in the believer,” since there is, strictly speaking, no such ethical antithesis in the unbeliever. He is not spirit, but only flesh.

⁵⁹ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 68.

*nur unvollkommen. In der Hoffnung, das heißt, wir werden es ganz bestimmt einmal vollkommen fühlen.*⁶⁰

[173] These are beautiful words. They show us that, for Luther, the believer's condition is not one of continual vacillation between flesh and spirit, but that the spirit is conquering the flesh. One might even say that the believer's "essential" self is spirit, whereas his "peripheral" self is flesh. All this further shows that Luther's ethical antithesis did not disrupt the unity of man's soul.

Having now considered Luther's religious evaluation of man, we see the problem of what is primary in man according to Luther in a new light. For Luther, as has been said, the all-important question was not the abstract one of what is primary in human nature, but the more fundamental problem of what is the basic disposition of man's heart. Is man for God or against Him? Is he spiritually dead or alive? If one were therefore to ask Luther what is the essence of man in his unregenerate state, Luther might reply: flesh.⁶¹ But if one were to inquire about the essence of the believer, Luther might very well reply that it is spirit.⁶²

Luther's Anthropology Evaluated

We conclude with a brief word of evaluation. Luther's positive contributions to our problem include the following: (1) His essentially religious view of man — that is, his [174] insistence that man must first of all be seen in his relation to God; (2) his stress on the basic ethical antithesis in the believer between flesh and spirit; (3) his deep moral insight, that the character and value of a man's deeds are dependent first of all on the disposition of his heart and will; and (4) his emphasis on the importance of feeling in the volitional life of man.⁶³

⁶⁰ Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 71–72.

⁶¹ "Diesen Satz des Hugo von St. Victor [namely, that the 'form' of man is the soul] hat Luther aufgehoben und an seine Stelle die andere Formel gesetzt, dass das Wesen der Menschen Fleisch ist" (Stange, "Luther und das Sittliche Ideal," 174).

⁶² "Geist ist der Mensch, dem das Gnadewort von Christus ein freies, fröhliches, ungezwungenes Gewissen zu Gott gibt" (Schott, *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre*, 50).

⁶³ "Wollen ist eben darum nicht eine einzelne losgelöste seelische Aktion, weil es untrennbar ist von dem Strom des Fühlens, der unablässig im Menschen fließt, und dem er sich nie ganz entziehen kann" (Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 10).

Over against Thomas and medieval theology in general, Luther's outstanding contribution was his emphasis on the whole man. He thus opposed the soul-splitting theology of Thomas, denying that man is a substance with attributes.⁶⁴ Luther overthrew the primacy of the intellect, as taught by Thomas. He also denied the existence in man of a kind of a neutral "absolute reason" whereby man can determine what is good or evil.⁶⁵

Luther also opposed Thomas's speculative neutrality. For Thomas, man is more or less a neutral being, able to do good or evil. He needs the "assistance" of God, to be sure; [175] but he is able by himself to perform many "good works." But for Luther, as has been seen, man cannot be neutral. He is either for or against God. Luther therefore opposed Thomas's conception of the indifferent free will of man, the opposition within man of reason versus sense, the conception of isolated good works, and the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works.⁶⁶

Finally, what is the relation between Luther and Bavinck? Negatively, we may say that Bavinck had a clearer insight into the centrality of the heart and all of its psychological implications than Luther did. Luther does, as we have seen, occasionally speak of the heart as the center of man's psychical and spiritual life, but he does not develop this thought consistently. If Luther actually taught a primacy of the will, as Lammers claims, he would then be guilty of an anthropology just as one-sided as that of Thomas, in that a partial aspect of man is made primary. Essentially there is no room in a Christian anthropology for a

⁶⁴ "Wir haben gesehen, dass er [Luther] im Römerbrief-Komm. (II, 199, 200) die scholastische Auffassung, die den Menschen als Substanz mit Eigenschaften sieht, ausdrücklich ablehnt" (Stomps, *Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers*, 143).

⁶⁵ "Im Anschluss an diese Gedankengänge nun sagt Luther, dass es ein vom Willen und seinen ursprünglichen und miteinander kämpfenden Antrieben unabhängiges Denken, eine 'ratio absoluta,' die dem Menschen die freie Entscheidung zwischen Böse und Gut ermöglichte, nicht gäbe" (Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 59).

⁶⁶ "Mit der klaren Erkenntnis der Eigengesetzlichkeit des Willens und der damit ermöglichten Einsicht in die wahre Natur des Bösen wird das ganze theoretische Hilfsgerüst hinfällig, das die Lehre von der moralischen Autonomie des Menschen, von der damit gegebenen Möglichkeit verdienstlichen Handelns und von der Überwindung des Bösen durch solches Handeln trug: die souveräne Vernunft des Menschen, die Erkenntnis eines Guten an sich durch diese Vernunft und die nach dieser Erkenntnis getroffene freie Entscheidung des Willens" (Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 76).

primacy of will, though one might grant that, if one had to choose between the two, a primacy of will allows one to do better justice to the Scriptural view of man than a primacy of the intellect. But for the [176] Bible, as I hope to show in chapter 7, what is central and primary in man is not any one aspect or function, but the whole man, as concentrated in the core of man, which is his heart. Our investigation of Luther has, however, revealed that it may very well be that Luther really meant to stress the whole man when he stressed the will. At least, there are indications to that effect.

Bavinck certainly shared Luther's emphasis on the importance of the whole man. He also shared Luther's religious view of man: namely, that man should be seen primarily in relation to God. He certainly agreed with Luther on man's depravity, and on his need for grace. And Bavinck also held essentially the same view of the moral antithesis in the believer that we have found in Luther.⁶⁷ On the essentials, therefore, Bavinck and Luther were in perfect agreement.

However, as we shall see more fully when we come to evaluate Bavinck, Bavinck retained more of the concepts of the scholastic psychology than Luther cared to preserve. Bavinck did speak of "higher and lower" in man, of a primacy of the practical reason, of a conflict between reason and sense in the unregenerate, and so forth. These concepts, borrowed from the scholastics and ultimately from Aristotle, Luther repudiated. In doing so, he was more consistent with Scripture than was Bavinck. [177]

⁶⁷ "But the struggle between flesh and spirit is known only to the regenerate; he goes against sin as sin, because it displeases God. This is a struggle between old and new man in the one man: that is, between man insofar as he is regenerate, and man insofar as he still serves sin" (Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 147; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 197).

Chapter 6

The Position of Calvin

We now turn our attention to the other great Reformer, John Calvin, who lived from 1509–1564. We approach him with the same question which we have put to the other theologians studied in this survey: What is primary in man? In attempting to find Calvin's answer to this question, our chief source shall be his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, although his commentaries shall also occasionally be consulted.

There is one passage in the *Institutes* where Calvin makes the soul itself primary and sovereign in man:

But we have before stated from the Scripture, that it [the soul] is an incorporeal substance; now we shall add, that although it is not properly contained in any place, yet, being put into the body, it inhabits it as its dwelling, not only to animate all its parts, and render the organs fit and useful for their respective operations, but also to hold the supremacy in the government of human life; and that not only in the concerns of the terrestrial life, but likewise to excite to the worship of God.¹

Here a *primatum* is actually ascribed to the soul as a whole, [178] both in terrestrial things and in spiritual matters. This view, that it is the soul itself which is primary or sovereign in man, is, as we have seen, also the view of Augustine, and the view most in harmony with Scripture. However, this thought, that the soul is primary, does not seem to recur in Calvin; at least he does not carry it out consistently in his anthropology.

¹“*Sed etiam ut primatum in regenda hominis vita teneat: nec solum quoad officia terrenae vitae, sed ut ad Deum colendum simul excitet*” (*Institutes*, I, 15, 6). Latin quotations from the *Institutes* are from the 1559 Latin edition, found in Baum, Cunitz, and Reuss, eds., *Ioannis Calvinii opera quae supersunt omnia* (Brunsvigae: Schwetschke, 1892), vol. 2. The translation of the *Institutes* used in the body of the paper is that of John Allen, except where specifically indicated.

The Primacy of the Intellect

What rules in man, and therefore holds the primacy, according to Calvin, is generally held to be the intellect. Note first of all what Calvin says about the primitive state of man, before he fell into sin.

This term, therefore [the image of God] denotes the integrity which Adam possessed, when he was endued with a right understanding, when he had affections regulated by reason, and all his senses governed in proper order, and when, in the excellency of his nature, he truly resembled the excellence of his Creator.²

Once again, on another page, Calvin says:

The primitive condition of man was ennobled with those eminent faculties; he possessed reason, understanding, prudence, and judgment, not only for the government of his life on earth, but to enable him to ascend even to God and eternal felicity. To these was added choice, to direct the appetites, and regulate all the organic motions; so that the will should be entirely conformed to the government of reason.³

[179] We see that, for Calvin, man's primitive rectitude consisted in the subjection of his affections, appetites, senses, organic motions, and even of his will to the government of reason. Reason or intellect was therefore the ruling power in man before the Fall. Since this primitive rectitude represented man's perfect state, we may conclude that this sovereignty of reason, for Calvin, belonged to man's very essence, and was an integral aspect of the image of God in which man was created.

²*“Proinde hac voce notatur integritas qua praeditus fuit Adam quum recta intelligentia polleret, affectus haberet compositos ad rationem, sensus omnes recto ordine temperatos, vereque eximiis dotibus opificis sui excellentiam referret”* (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 3).

³*“His praeclaris dotibus excelluit prima hominis conditio, ut ratio, intelligentia, prudentia, iudicium, non modo ad terrenae vitae gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderent usque ad Deum et aeternam felicitatem. Deinde, ut accederet electio, quae appetitus dirigeret, motusque omnes organicos temperaret, atque ita voluntas rationis moderationi esset prorsus consentanea”* (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 8).

Let us now look at some other statements of Calvin, in which he elucidates the function of the intellect in a general way, without any specific reference to man's primitive state. While discussing the faculties of the soul, Calvin says:

Without perplexing ourselves with unnecessary questions, it should be sufficient for us to know that the understanding is, as it were, the guide and governor of the soul; that the will always respects its authority, and waits for its judgment in its desires.⁴

Here the *intellectus* is called the *gubernatorem animae*, which shows that for Calvin the intellect is the sovereign power in the soul of man. This same view is expressed in Calvin's comment on Ephesians 4:17, "He asserts that their mind [180] is vain. And this it is which holds the primacy in the life of man, which is the seat of reason, which precedes the will, and restrains evil desires."⁵ Another passage which makes it abundantly plain that Calvin held this view is quoted by Talma: "We teach that it is the duty of the mind to precede the will and to govern it; whence also it bears the name *heegemonikon* [that is, the ruling principle]."⁶ Another student of Calvin, Allard Pierson, confirms this point when he says, in discussing Calvin's anthropology, "The intellect is the leading principle, the *heegemonikon*."⁷

All of this sounds very much like the Greek view of man. In the chapter on Thomas Aquinas the point was made that Thomas derived his view of the primacy of the intellect from Greek philosophy, since for the Greeks the intellect was the most godlike and sovereign power in man. Now it looks very much as

⁴"*Ne superfluis questionibus intricemur, satis sit nobis intellectum esse quasi animae ducem et gubernatorem; voluntatem in illius nutum semper respicere, et iudicium in suis desideriis exspectare*" (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 7).

⁵"*Mentem eorum vanam esse pronuntiat. Atqui ea est, quae primas tenet in hominis vita, quae sedes est rationis, quae voluntati praeit, quae vitiosus appetitus coerces*" (Calvin, *Commentary on Ephesians*, chapter 4:17) [translation mine]. Quotations from Calvin's commentaries are also from the *Calvini opera* set (footnote 1 above).

⁶"*Mentis officium esse docemus, praeire voluntati, eamque gubernare: unde et nomen habet heegemonikon*" (*Corpus Reformatorum*, XXXIV, p. 285; quoted in Talma, *De anthropologie van Calvijn*, 45, footnote 2).

⁷Allard Pierson, *Studien over Johannes Kalvijn* (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1881), 151. For other references in Calvin bearing on this point, see *Institutes*, I, 15, 6–8; II, 2, 2 and 3; *Commentary on Phil.1:27*; *Commentary on 1 Thess. 5:23*. See also below, footnotes 10, 11, 12, and 71.

though we have fundamentally the same view in Calvin, who likewise ascribed sovereignty to the intellect. [181]

However, it ought to be stated at once that Calvin vigorously repudiated the Greek view of the *integrity of the intellect*. The Greeks said that the intellect is perfectly able to see the good and to choose it, and that if a man but follow the promptings of his reason instead of the incitements of his passions, he will do the good. For the Greeks, man has in his reason a sufficiently reliable guide to enable him to do good at any time. And we have seen that the scholastics virtually took over this view of the reason, although they admitted that reason had been weakened by man's fall into sin. Against this view of the moral soundness or near-soundness of the human reason, Calvin hurled some of his most vitriolic invectives.

Calvin accused the Greek philosophers⁸ of failing to distinguish the two different states of man: namely, the state of rectitude and the state of sin. "The philosophers, being ignorant of the corruption of nature proceeding from the punishment of the Fall, improperly confound two very different states of mankind."⁹ He further makes clear that what he has been saying about man being endowed with a *right* understanding, by which he can at all times discern good from evil, pertains to man's original state, the state of rectitude. Now that man [182] has fallen into sin, however, all is changed. Though reason still rules, it has become so corrupted by sin that its government is now misrule. The trouble with the Greek philosophers is that, failing to recognize man's present corrupt condition, they describe man as though he had never fallen into sin, as though he were still in Paradise.¹⁰

Calvin taught in no uncertain terms that the human intellect has been corrupted by sin. Let us note a few representative passages, all of which have been

⁸When Calvin uses the term "philosophers" without further delineation, as in the quotation here referred to, he generally means the Greek philosophers. In the immediately preceding context here (*Institutes*, I, 15, 6) he has been talking about Plato and Aristotle.

⁹"*Philosophi, quibus incognita erat naturae corruptio quae ex defectionis poena provenit, duos hominis status valde diversos perperam confundunt*" (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 7).

¹⁰Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 8. Note that even in this discussion there lurks an implicit admission of the sovereignty of the intellect: i.e., in man's original state.

taken from the *Institutes*: “Although we retain some portion of understanding and judgment together with the will, yet we cannot say that our mind is perfect and sound, which is oppressed with debility and immersed in profound darkness” (*Institutes*, II, 2, 12). “The horrible blindness of the human mind sufficiently appears from such a multiplicity of corruptions” (*Institutes*, I, 5, 12). “But from the general confession, that there is no subject productive of so many dissensions among the learned as well as the unlearned, it is inferred, that the minds of men, which err so much in investigations concerning God, are extremely blind and stupid in celestial mysteries” (*Institutes*, I, 5, 12). “For man has not only been ensnared by the inferior appetites, but abominable impiety has seized the very citadel of his mind” (*Institutes*, II, 1, 9). “Our reason is overwhelmed with deceptions in so many forms, is obnoxious to so many errors, stumbles at so many impediments, and is embarrassed in so many difficulties, that it is very far from being a certain [183] guide” (*Institutes*, II, 2, 25). “Let us hold this, then, as an undoubted truth, which no opposition can ever shake — that the mind of man is so completely alienated from the righteousness of God, that it conceives, desires, and undertakes every thing that is impious, perverse, base, impure, and flagitious” (*Institutes*, II, 5, 19).

This same truth can also be approached from a different direction. The fact that the Scriptures teach the need for a renewal of man’s mind is for Calvin indubitable proof that the human intellect is thoroughly depraved.

And in another place he [Paul] directs us to be transformed by the renewing of our mind. Whence it follows, that that part, which principally displays the excellence and dignity of the soul, is not only wounded, but so corrupted, that it requires not merely to be healed, but to receive a new nature.¹¹

On the same Scripture passage (Rom. 12:2) Calvin remarks in his commentary:

Here note what kind of renewal is required of us: namely, not of the flesh only . . . but of the mind, which is our most excellent

¹¹ “Unde sequitur, partem illam, in quo maxime refulget animae praestantia et nobilitas, non modo vulneratam esse, sed it corruptam, ut non modo sanari, sed novam prope naturam induere opus habeat” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 1, 9). Note how, according to this passage, the mind is the most excellent and noblest part of the soul, according to Calvin.

part, and to which the philosophers attribute sovereignty. For they call it *heegemonikon*. And reason is conceived to be a most wise queen. But Paul dislodges her from her throne, and reduces her to nothing, when he teaches that we must be renewed in our mind.¹² [184]

It would almost seem from this last-quoted passage that Calvin would deny the primacy of the intellect because of the corruption of the reason by sin, since he says that Paul dislodges reason from her throne. The passages quoted at the beginning of this chapter, however, show that that was not the case. By proving the corruption of the human reason Calvin did not mean to deny that it had the ruling power in man — nowhere does he take issue with “the philosophers” on this point. He accepts their view of the primacy of the intellect, deeming it to be the correct one. But what Calvin opposed with might and main was the alleged moral integrity of reason in fallen man. Calvin would say that reason still rules in fallen man; but, because reason is so corrupt, it has become a very uncertain and untrustworthy guide. Therefore it must be renewed by God’s Spirit.

Calvin also repudiated the antithesis between reason and sense in man which, as has been shown in the chapter on Thomas, was one of the consequences of the Greek view of the soul. The opposition which some maintain to exist between reason and the passions, Calvin explains, is really an opposition within reason itself.

They say that there is a great repugnancy between the organic motions and the rational part of the soul; as though reason were not also at variance with itself and [185] some of its counsels were not in opposition to others, like hostile armies.¹³

¹²“*Hic autem attende, quae innovatio a nobis requiratur: nempe non carnis tantum . . . sed mentis, quae pars est nostri excellentissima, et cui prinipatum attribuunt philosophi. Vocant enim haegemonikon. Et ratio fingitur esse sapientissima regina. Verum eam Paulus ex solio deturgat, adeoque in nihilum redigit, dum nos mente renovandos docet*” (Calvin, *Commentary on Romans*, chapter 12:2 [translation mine]). To the same effect is Calvin’s comment on Eph. 4:23.

¹³“*Magnam repugnantiam esse dicunt inter organicos motus et rationalem animae partem. Quasi non ipsa quoque ratio secum dissideat, et eius consilia alia cum aliis non secus ac hostiles exercitus configant*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 6).

Furthermore, as has already become evident from the passages in which corruption is ascribed to the mind, Calvin opposed the view of those who would limit the corruption of man only to the passions or the senses:¹⁴

Succeeding writers, being everyone for himself ambitious of the praise of subtlety in the defense of human nature, gradually and successively fell into opinions more and more erroneous; till at length man was commonly supposed to be corrupted only in his sensual part, but to have his will in a great measure, and his reason entirely unimpaired.¹⁵

On the contrary, Calvin taught, as we have seen, that not just the senses, but man's reason and will as well have become thoroughly corrupted by sin. That man's reason is corrupt, according to Calvin, we have already seen. As for the will, Calvin says, "The will, therefore, is so bound by the slavery of sin, that it cannot excite itself, much less devote itself to any thing good."¹⁶ Consequently, Calvin had his own interpretation of what should properly be understood by concupiscence (which by the scholastics was restricted to the [186] unruliness of the passions):

Those who have called it [that is, original sin] concupiscence have used an expression not improper, if it were only added, which is far from being conceded by most persons, that everything in man, the understanding and will, the soul and body, is polluted and engrossed by this concupiscence; or, to express it more briefly, that man is of himself nothing else but concupiscence.¹⁷

¹⁴ See esp. Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 1, 9; and Calvin, *Commentary on Romans*, chapter 12:2.

¹⁵ "Donec eo ventum est ut vulgo putaretur, homo sensuali tantum parte corruptus, habere prorsus incolumem rationem, voluntatem etiam maiori ex parte" (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 2, 4).

¹⁶ "Qua igitur peccati servitute vincita detinetur voluntas, ad bonum commovere se non potest, nedum applicare" (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 5).

¹⁷ "Qui dixerunt esse concupiscentiam, non nimis alieno verbo usi sunt, si modo adderetur (quod minima conceditur a plerisque) quidquid in homine est, ab intellectu ad voluntatem, ab anima ad carnem usque, hac concupiscentia inquinatum refertum esse; aut, ut brevius absolvatur, totum hominem non aliud ex se ipso esse quam concupiscentiam" (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 1, 8). Note that the original is even more expressive than the translation: "whatever is in man, from intellect to will, from the soul even to the body, is polluted and stuffed full of this concupiscence."

Although Calvin did hold to the view that the intellect is the sovereign power in man, he rejected the implications of this view which were characteristic of Greek thought and, to a lesser degree, also of scholastic theology: namely, that the reason was wholly or largely unimpaired by sin, that the will was still free to choose the good, and that the passions were wholly evil and consequently the real seat of sin in man.

The Primacy of the Heart

Having seen that Calvin did teach the primacy of the intellect, let us proceed to ask whether Calvin also taught a certain primacy of the heart, as Bavinck did. In a certain sense, he does seem to hold that the heart is the deepest “thing” in man. Let us examine some passages which show this. In general, the passages dealing with this “primacy” of the heart can be divided into two classes: those that show the [187] relation of the heart to sin, and those revealing the relation between the heart and faith.

In discussing sin, Calvin frequently makes statements which seem to make the heart the seat of sin in man. So, for instance, he may call the heart the fountain of sin, “after having condemned impurity in the very fountain at the heart.”¹⁸

Both these ideas are briefly expressed in these words of James — “Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye doubleminded”; where there is indeed an addition made to the first clause; but the fountain or original (*principium*) is next discovered, showing the necessity of cleansing the secret pollution, that an altar may be erected to God even in the heart.¹⁹

¹⁸ “*Postquam immunditiam damnavit in ipso fonte cordis*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 16). The translation sometimes has *heart* where Calvin’s Latin has *mens* or *animus*. In each of the following quotations, however, care has been taken to choose only passages where Calvin uses *cor*, as will be evident from the Latin.

¹⁹ “*Utrumque etiam breviter expressum est his Iacobi verbis (4, 8): mundate scelerati manus, purgate corda duplices. Ubi priori quidem membro accessio ponitur, fons tamen et principium deinde monstratur, nempe abstergendas esse occultas sordes, ut altare in ipso corde erigatur Deo*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 16).

In these passages the heart is called the fountain and origin of sin, which certainly seems to indicate that for Calvin the heart was the deepest aspect of man.

Unbelief, which in a way is the chief sin of man, is also said to root in the heart. “For unbelief is so deeply rooted in our hearts, and such is our propensity to it, that though all men confess with the tongue, that God is faithful, no man can persuade himself of the truth of it, without the [188] most arduous exertions.”²⁰ In another section of the same chapter, Calvin makes this interesting statement: “But if it be true that the right apprehension of the mind proceeds from the illumination of the Spirit, his energy is far more conspicuous in such a confirmation of the heart; the diffidence [distrust] of the heart being greater than the blindness of the mind.”²¹ Here he says, not only that distrust roots in the heart, but that it is actually greater than the blindness of the mind — so that the power of the Spirit is more evident in the strengthening of the heart than in the illumination of the mind. According to this passage, then, sin would seem to be more deeply rooted in the heart than in the mind.²²

Calvin also makes plain that, in his opinion, the deeds of the unregenerate are evil because of the impurity of their hearts:

The greatest sinner, as soon as he has performed two or three duties of the law, doubts not but they are accepted of him for righteousness; but the Lord positively denies that any sanctification is acquired by such actions, unless the heart be previously well purified; and not content with this, he asserts that all the works of sinners are contaminated by the impurity of their hearts.²³

²⁰ “*Tam alte et radicitus haeret in cordibus nostris incredulitas*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 15).

²¹ “*Quod si veram mentis intelligentiam eius illuminationem esse verum est, in tali cordis confirmatione multo evidentius eius virtus apparet: quo scilicet et maior est cordis diffidentia quam mentis caecitas*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 36).

²² If this is so, then it would seem that, for Calvin, the heart is more primary or determinative in human nature than the mind.

²³ “*Neque eo contentus, contaminari cordis impuritate, quaecunque a peccatoribus prodeunt opera, asseverat*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 14, 7).

[189] In fact, in another passage Calvin specifically states that the deeds of sinners are polluted at their very source (*origine*) by the depravity of their hearts:

These actions, therefore, being corrupted in their very source by the impurity of their hearts, are no more entitled to be classed among virtues, than those vices which commonly deceive mankind by their affinity and similitude to virtues.²⁴

These citations would also seem to teach that the heart of man is the real origin of sin, and hence the deepest center of his personal life.

Of similar import are the passages where Calvin speaks of sin as having penetrated into the “inmost recesses” of the heart. “Abominable impiety has seized the very citadel of his mind, and pride has penetrated into the inmost recesses of his heart.”²⁵ “Observe how he denounces that they shall labour in vain in the pursuit of righteousness, unless impiety be previously eradicated from the bottom of their hearts” [*ex penitissimo corde*: literally, “from the inmost heart”].²⁶ And again, “The heart of man has so many recesses of vanity, and so many retreats of falsehood, and is so enveloped with fraudulent hypocrisy, that it frequently deceives even himself.”²⁷ [190] It is obvious that sin for Calvin is deeply rooted within man’s heart.

That for Calvin the heart is the deepest aspect of man is also evident from his treatment of faith. Faith, for him, is much more than a mere illumination of the mind; it also includes confidence and assurance of heart. It was, in fact, one of the errors of the Schoolmen that they ignored this latter aspect of faith:

Nor is it enough for the mind to be illuminated by the Spirit of God, unless the heart also be strengthened and supported by his power. On this point, the Schoolmen are altogether erroneous, who in the discussion of faith, regard it as a simple assent

²⁴ “*Quum ergo ab ipsa cordis impuritate, velut a sua origine, corrupta sint, non magis inter virtutes ponenda erunt quam vitia*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 14, 3).

²⁵ “*Ad cor intimum penetravit superbia*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 1, 9).

²⁶ “*Vide quomodo nihil effecturos denuntiet in studio iustitiae capessendo nisi revulsa in primis ex penitissimo corde impietas fuerit*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 6).

²⁷ “*Tot vanitas recessus habet, tot mendacii latebris scatet cor humanum, tam fraudulenta hypocrisi obtectum est, ut se ipsum saepe fallat*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 10).

of the understanding, entirely neglecting the confidence and assurance of the heart.²⁸

To the same effect is the following statement: “For the word of God is not received by faith, if it floats on the surface of the brain; but when it has taken deep root in the heart, so as to become an impregnable fortress to sustain and repel all the assaults of temptation.”²⁹ According to this passage, the Word of God becomes an impregnable fortress only when it has driven its roots deep into the heart. The assent, further, which forms an essential part of faith, is rooted chiefly in the heart. “The assent which we give to the Divine word, as I have partly suggested before, and shall again more largely [191] repeat, is from the heart more than from the head, and from the affections more than from the understanding.”³⁰

In fact, in another passage faith is even ascribed to the heart as its organ: “But as the human heart is not excited to faith by every word of God.”³¹ The steadfastness of the heart is, moreover, called the chief part of faith: “That firm and steadfast constancy of heart, which is the principal branch of faith.”³² Not only are the assent of faith and the assurance of faith chiefly matters of the heart, but even the knowledge of faith must find its seat in the heart:

For it [the knowledge of Christ] is a doctrine not of the tongue, but of the life; and is not apprehended merely with

²⁸ “*Nec satis fuerit mentem esse Dei spiritu illuminatam, nisi et eius virtute cor obfirmetur ac fulciatur. In quo tota terra Scholastici aberrant, qui in fidei consideratione nudum ac simplicem ex notitia assensum arripiunt, praeterita cordis fiducia et securitate*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 33).

²⁹ “*Neque enim si in summo cerebro volutatur Dei verbum, fide perceptum est; sed ubi in imo corde radices egit, ut ad sustinendas repellendasque omnes tentationum machinas invictum sit propugnaculum*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 36).

³⁰ “*Assensionem scilicet ipsam, sicuti ex parte attingi, et fusius iterum repetam, cordis esse magis quam cerebri, et affectus magis quam intelligentiae*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 8). Allen’s translation renders *magis* by *rather*, which gives the erroneous impression that the assent is of faith to the exclusion of the head; hence I have rendered *magis* by *more*. Note that here again the heart seems to be more basic than the mind.

³¹ “*Sed quoniam nec ad vocem Dei quamlibet cor hominis in fidem erigitur*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 7).

³² “*Firmam illam stabilemque cordis constantiam, hoc est, praecipuam fidei partem*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 2, 33).

the understanding and memory, like other sciences, but is then only received when it possesses the whole soul, and finds a seat and residence in the inmost affection of the heart.³³

In short, summing it all up, Calvin says, in his comment on Rom. 10:10, “But let us observe that the seat of faith is not in the brain, but in the heart.”³⁴ [192]

From all these passages, taken in conjunction with those previously cited, it is very evident that the heart was, for Calvin, in some sense the deepest aspect of man. Sin is said to have its origin and fountain in the heart, and faith, in similar fashion, is said to have its seat in the heart. Since sin and faith denote two of man’s most basic activities, it follows that man’s heart is, in one sense, the most basic center of his personal life.

The Meaning of Heart in Calvin

This stress on the heart looks very similar to the position held by Bavinck. In fact, it almost looks as though we have here in Calvin a serious attempt to set forth the Biblical view of the centrality of the heart. However, the all-important question to which we must next address ourselves is this: What did Calvin mean by the heart? Did he mean the same thing that Bavinck did: namely, the heart as the core of man’s total personality, the center of all his thinking, feeling, and willing? Or did Calvin mean by heart a partial aspect of human personality? The only way to find the answer is to go to Calvin himself.

There are two passages where Calvin seems to use the heart as equivalent to the whole man. The first is found in the *Institutes*:

When we call repentance “a conversion of the life to God,” we require a transformation, not only in the external actions, but in the soul [anima] itself . . . The prophet, intending to express

³³ “*Non enim linguae est doctrina, sed vitae; nec intellectu memoriaque duntaxat apprehenditur, ut reliquae disciplinae, sed tum recipitur demum ubi animam totam possidet, sedemque et receptaculum invenit in intimo cordis affectu*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 6, 4).

³⁴ “*Verum observemus, fidei sedem non in cerebro esse, sed in corde*” (Calvin, *Commentary on Romans*, chapter 10:10).

this idea, commands those whom he calls to repentance, to make themselves a new [193] heart [*cor*].³⁵

This passage would seem to indicate that the heart is equivalent to the entire soul. However, as will become evident from the footnote, in the very next sentence Calvin restricts the meaning of heart to the affections. The other passage is taken from his *Commentary on Ephesians*, chapter 4:18, where the Vulgate speaks of the “blindness of their heart” (*propter caecitatem cordis earum*): “And lest it should be thought that ignorance of this kind is a superficial evil . . . Paul teaches that it has its root in the blindness of the heart, whereby he signifies that it resides in [human] nature itself.”³⁶ Calvin seems in this reference to identify the heart with human nature in its entirety; a careful reading of the passage, however, will show that all he meant to say was that the heart is an integral, rather than a superficial, aspect of man’s nature. So these two passages prove very little. As will be evident as we proceed, Calvin’s prevailing use of the term heart was not that of Bavinck: as standing for the whole man or for the central organ of the whole man. [194]

There are also passages where Calvin seems to use heart as equivalent to mind. In Section I, 4, 4 of the *Institutes* he says that “an idea of God is naturally engraved on the hearts [*cordibus*] of men”;³⁷ but in I, 5, 1, the very next section, he speaks of God as having sown the seed of religion in the minds [*mentibus*] of men.³⁸ Here he seems to use heart and mind in parallel fashion. Again, in III, 20, 32 he quotes 1 Cor. 14:15, “I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding [*mente*] also,” interpreting this text as follows: “For in the

³⁵ “*Quum vitae ad Deum conversionem nuncupamus, transformationem requirimus non in operibus tantum externis, sed in anima ipsa . . . Quod dum vult exprimere propheta (Ezek. 18:31), iubet ut cor novum sibi faciant quos ad poenitentiam vocat. Unde Moses saepius, ostensurus quomodo rite ad Dominum converterentur Israelitae poenitentia ducti, docet ut id fiat ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et cordis circumcisionem nominans interiores affectus excutit*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 6).

³⁶ “*Ac ne eiusmodi ignorantia adventitium malum esse crederetur . . . Paulus radicem esse docet in caecitate cordis. Quo significat residere in ipsa natura*” [translation mine].

³⁷ “*Naturaliter insculptum esse deitatis sensum humanis cordibus.*”

³⁸ “*Non solum hominum mentibus indidit illud quod diximus religionis semen.*”

former passage he inculcates singing with the voice and with the heart [*corde*].”³⁹ Here also Calvin seems to identify heart with mind. Still another reference bearing on this point is taken from his *Commentary on John*. With reference to the passage, “He hath blinded their eyes, and he hardened their heart; lest they should see with their eyes, and perceive with their heart,” Calvin remarks: “The heart in Scripture sometimes stands for the seat of the affections, but here, as in many other places, the intellectual part of the soul, as they call it, is denoted by this word.”⁴⁰ So Calvin did recognize that the heart was often [195] used in Scripture to signify mind or intellect. Yet it must immediately be added that neither is this the prevailing meaning which Calvin attaches to the word heart.

After considerable reading and studying in Calvin, it has become clear to me that for Calvin the heart [*cor*] generally stands for what we would call *the will and the emotions*. For proof of this, let us look first of all at a passage from the *Commentary on 1 Thessalonians*. In connection with chapter 5:23, “And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,” Calvin says:

Because there are two principal faculties of the soul, the intellect and the will, Scripture sometimes speaks of these two separately, when it wishes to express the power and nature of the soul; but then the soul [*anima*] is taken for the seat of the affections, that it may be distinguished from the spirit [*spiritus*]. When, therefore, we hear the word spirit [*spiritus*], we may know that it denotes the reason, or the understanding; as by the word soul [*anima*] is designated the will and all the affections. . . . For then only is man pure and entire when he thinks nothing with his mind [*mens*], desires nothing with his heart [*cor*], and executes nothing with his body except what is approved by God.⁴¹

³⁹ “*Canam spiritu, canam et mente. . . . Priore enim loco voce et corde canendum esse praecipit.*”

⁴⁰ “*Cor aliquando pro sede affectuum ponitur in scriptura; sed hic, ut in pluribus aliis locis, pars animae intellectiva quam vocant notatur hac voce*” (Calvin, *Commentary on John*, chapter 12:40).

⁴¹ “1 Thess. 5:23: ‘*Et integer spiritus vester, et anima, et corpus . . . custodiat.*’ . . . *Quoniam autem duae praecipuae sunt animae facultates, intellectus et voluntas: scriptura interdum distincte haec duo ponere solet, quum exprimere vult animae vim ac naturam: sed tunc anima pro sede affectuum capitur, ut sit pars spiritui opposita. Ergo quum hic audimus*

Note that in this passage Calvin makes the words *spiritus* and *anima* stand for the two faculties of the soul, intellect [196] and will. *Spiritus* stands for intellect, and *anima* stands for “the will and all the affections.” Then, in the last sentence of the quotation, Calvin uses *mens* as a synonym of *spiritus*, and *cor* as a synonym for *anima*. *Cor* therefore means, in this passage, the same as *anima*: namely, “the will and all the affections.” This use of *cor*, I am convinced, represents what is Calvin’s typical use of the term.

It must be remembered that in those days the will and the emotions were generally taken together, as being one faculty. This was noted in connection with both Augustine and Thomas; it was also Luther’s conception.⁴² Hence it is not surprising that Calvin also shared this view. It should be remembered, therefore, that *voluntas* in Calvin generally stands for the will *with* the emotions, and that *affectus* in Calvin usually means the emotions *plus* the will.

Calvin taught that there were two faculties in the soul: the intellect and the will. “Let us, therefore, submit the following division — that the human soul has two faculties which relate to our present design, the understanding [*intellectus*] and the will [*voluntas*].”⁴³ From what has been said in the preceding paragraph, and from the quotation [197] from 1 Thess. 5:23, in which the intellect, as one faculty, was placed opposite to the will *and the affections* as the other faculty, it is obvious that under *voluntas* Calvin would include all the emotions and affections of the soul.⁴⁴

nomen spiritus, sciamus notari rationem, vel intelligentiam: sicut animae nomine designatur voluntas et omnes affectus. . . . Tunc enim purus et integer est homo, si nihil mente cogitat, nihil corde appetit, nihil corpore exsequitur, nisi quod probatur Deo [translation mine].

⁴² “Bedeutsam ist hier, dass die nominalistische Psychologie, der Luther nach Holl folgte, Wille und Gefühl als ‘affectus’ zusammenfasste und dem Intellekt gegenüberstellte” (Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen*, 57). According to this statement, *affectus* often stood for will and emotions together; we shall find a similar use of *affectus* in Calvin.

⁴³ “*Sic ergo habeamus: subesse duas humanae animae partes, quae quidem praesenti instituto convenient, intellectum et voluntatem*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 7). Note also the first part of footnote 41, above.

⁴⁴ This is substantiated by the following statement, also taken from Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 7: “Here we only intend to show that no power can be found in the soul, which may not properly be referred to one or the other of those two members.” The two members

After having clearly stated, as we have seen, that the faculties of the soul consist of the intellect [*intellectus*] and will [*voluntas*], Calvin goes on to say: “As we have just before said that the faculties of the soul consist in the mind [*mens*] and the heart [*cor*], let us now consider the ability of each.”⁴⁵ Here *mens* is made parallel with *intellectus*, and *cor* is made parallel with *voluntas*. In the light of this passage, the second faculty of the soul may be called either *will* or *heart*; the two terms may be used interchangeably.

This thought is confirmed when we note a number of passages in the *Institutes* in which heart is mentioned alongside of mind, as being the second main power of the soul, and therefore constituting, together with mind, the entire soul. “The principal seat of the Divine image was in the mind and [198] heart, or in the soul and its faculties” (*Institutes*, I, 15, 3).⁴⁶ “In the beginning the image of God was conspicuous in the light of the mind, in the rectitude of the heart, and in the soundness of all the parts of our nature” (*Institutes*, I, 15, 4). “Abominable impiety has seized the very citadel of his mind, and pride has penetrated into the inmost recesses of his heart” (*Institutes*, II, 1, 9). “Let us hold this, then, as an undoubted truth . . . that the mind of man is . . . completely alienated from the righteousness of God . . . that his heart is thoroughly infected by the poison of sin” (*Institutes*, II, 5, 19). “Now we shall have a complete definition of faith, if we say, that it is a steady and certain knowledge of the Divine benevolence toward us, which . . . is both revealed to our minds, and confirmed to our hearts, by the Holy Spirit” (*Institutes*, III, 2, 7).⁴⁷

In all these passages heart and mind stand side by side. It is obvious, then, that here heart does not include mind, but is a faculty or power alongside of mind. The only faculty which Calvin recognizes alongside of mind, as has been shown, is the will. Hence, the will. Hence, clearly, the heart stands for the will.

alluded to are intellect and will. Since, obviously, the emotions and affections do not belong to the intellect, they must therefore be included under the will.

⁴⁵ “*Nunc consideremus, quum paulo ante dixerimus in mente et corde sitas esse animae facultates, quid pars utraque polleat*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 2, 2).

⁴⁶ The passages in this paragraph are not quoted in the original, since their meaning is clear as they stand. In these passages, the word *heart* is in each case a translation of *cor*.

⁴⁷ Cf. also the quotations given in footnotes 21, 28, 29, and 30, above.

This thought is confirmed by an abundance of passages in which Calvin uses the terms heart and will interchangeably. [199]

I should like first to call attention to a passage from the *Institutes* in which heart and will are alternated as being perfectly synonymous with each other:

When the Apostle tells the Philippians, that he is “confident that he which hath begun a good work in them will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ”; by the beginning of a good work he undoubtedly designs the commencement of conversion, which takes place in the *will*. Therefore God begins the good work in us by exciting in our *hearts* a love, desire, and ardent pursuit of righteousness; or, to speak more properly, by bending, forming, and directing our *hearts* towards righteousness; but he completes it, by confirming us to perseverance. That no one may cavil, that the good work is begun by the Lord, inasmuch as the *will*, which is weak of itself, is assisted by him, the Spirit declares in another place how far the ability of the *will* reaches, when left to itself. “A new *heart* also,” says he, “will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a *heart* of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes.” Who will assert that the infirmity of the human *will* is only strengthened by assistance, to enable it efficaciously to aspire to the choice of that which is good, when it actually needs a total transformation and renovation?⁴⁸

Surely a passage of this sort leaves no doubt that Calvin identified heart and will! Passages which make a similar identification could be quoted almost at random. I shall give just a few: “Again, soundness of mind and rectitude of heart were also destroyed. . . . For, although we retain some portion of understanding and judgment together with the *will*, yet we cannot say that our mind is perfect and sound . . . and the [200] depravity of our *will* is sufficiently known.”⁴⁹ “He [God] could not more evidently claim to himself and take from us all that is good and upright in our *will*, than when he declares our conversion to be the creation

⁴⁸ *Institutes*, II, 3, 6 [italics mine]. In the original, the words used interchangeably are *cor* and *voluntas*. Cf. a similar passage in the latter part of Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 8.

⁴⁹ “*Rursum sanitas mentis et cordis rectitude simul fuerunt ablata. . . . Nam etsi aliquid intelligentiae et iudicii residuum manet una cum voluntate, neque tamen mentem integram et sanam dicemus . . . et pravitas voluntatis plus satis nota est*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 2, 12). Note: In all the quotations in this paragraph, the italics are mine.

of a new spirit and of a new *heart*.⁵⁰ “For the Apostle does not teach that the grace of a good will is offered to us for our acceptance, but that he ‘worketh in us to *will*’; which is equivalent to saying, that the Lord, by his Spirit, directs, inclines, and governs our *heart*, and reigns in it as in his own possession.”⁵¹ “It is grace which produces both the choice and the *will* in the *heart*”⁵² (here heart seems to be the “place” where choice and will are located). “When he observes that the *will* is not taken away by grace, but only changed from a bad one into a good one, and when it is good, assisted; he only intends that a man is not drawn in such a manner as to be carried away by an external impulse, without any inclination of his *heart* [here [201] Allen has *mind*, but the original has *motu cordis*]; but that he is internally so disposed as to obey from his very *heart*.”⁵³ “When he says, that ‘the king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord; as the rivers of water, he turneth it whithersoever he will’; under one species he clearly comprehends the whole genus. For if the *will* of any man be free from all subjection, that privilege belongs eminently to the *will* of the king . . . but if the *will* of the king be subject to the power of God, ours cannot be exempted from the same authority.”⁵⁴

These citations make it very clear that for Calvin heart generally stood for will. They are not isolated instances, but are typical of the way Calvin usually uses the term heart. We observed previously, however, that for Calvin the will included

⁵⁰ “*Non posset evidentius sibi vindicare, nobis adimere, quidquid est in voluntate nostra boni et recti, quam dum conversionem nostram, creationem novi spiritus et novi cordis esse testatur*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 8).

⁵¹ “*Non enim docet apostolus, offerri nobis bonae voluntatis gratiam si acceptemus, sed ipsum velle in nobis efficere: quod non aliud est nisi Dominum suo spiritu cor nostrum dirigere, flectere, moderari, et in eo, tanquam in possessione sua, regnare*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 10).

⁵² “*Non offerri tantum a Domino gratiam . . . sed ipsam esse, quae in corde et electionem et voluntatem formet*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 13).

⁵³ “*Quod autem alibi dicit, non tolli gratia voluntatem, sed ex mala mutari in bonam, et quum bona fuerit adiuvare, significat tantum, hominem non non ita trahi ut sine motu cordis, quasi extraneo impulsu feratur; sed intus sic affici ut ex corde obsequatur*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 3, 14).

⁵⁴ “*Quum vero scribit (Prov. 21:1), Dominum cor regis, quasi rives aquarum in manu sua tenere et inclinare quocunque voluerit, sub una profecto specie totum genus comprehendit. Si cuius enim voluntas omni subiectione soluta est, id iuris regiae voluntati maxime competit . . . quod si illa Dei manu flectitur, neque nostra eximetur ea conditione*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 4, 7). Note that in Allen’s translation, the passage from Proverbs is incorrectly punctuated.

the emotions. Where we read *will* in Calvin, therefore, we are to think not just of the will alone, but of the will with the emotions. For in those days these two, now generally considered distinct functions, were not separated.

Accordingly, we should expect to find in Calvin places where the heart is made equivalent to the emotions or the affections. And there are a great number of such passages. [202]

Some of these have already been quoted in this chapter. For instance, the passage from *Institutes*, III, 2, 8: “The assent which we give to the Divine word . . . is from the heart more than from the head, and from the affections more than from the understanding.”⁵⁵ Here heart is made parallel with the affections. However, the very next sentence which follows this quotation in the *Institutes* reads, “For which reason it is called ‘the obedience of faith’.”⁵⁶ The reference to obedience suggests that the will is not excluded from the affections. We must therefore remember that whenever we read the word *affections* in Calvin, we should understand it as including the activity of the will.⁵⁷

Reference has also been made to a passage in which Calvin says, “By speaking of the circumcision of the heart, he [Moses] enters into the inmost affections.”⁵⁸ Here again heart is made parallel with the affections. And we quoted the passage from the *Commentary on John*, chapter 12:40, where Calvin asserts: “The heart in Scripture sometimes stands for the seat of the affections.”⁵⁹ As the heart was previously found to stand for the seat of the will in Calvin,⁶⁰ [203] so here the heart is designated as the seat of the affections.

Let us now look at a few other passages, where the heart is similarly identified with the affections. In Calvin’s comment on Rom. 10:10, part of which has already been quoted (see footnote 34), he says in full:

⁵⁵ See footnote 30, above.

⁵⁶ “*Qua ratione obedientia vocatur fidei (Rom. 1:5).*”

⁵⁷ Cf. above, footnotes 42 and 44.

⁵⁸ Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 6. Allen has, “inmost affections of the mind,” but the word mind does not occur in the original. See footnote 35, above.

⁵⁹ See footnote 40, above.

⁶⁰ See esp. footnote 52 above.

But let us observe that the seat of faith is not in the brain, but in the heart. Not that I wish to contend about the part of the body in which faith is situated — but, because the word *heart* is generally taken to mean an earnest and sincere affection, I say that faith is a steadfast and effective confidence, and not mere intellectual knowledge.⁶¹

Here heart is again made parallel with affection. Notice, however, that the aspect of faith which Calvin here associated with the heart is that of confidence or trust (*fiducia*), which certainly includes volitional elements also. The following citations similarly equate heart and affections: “In our concerns with God, we advance not a single step unless we begin with the internal affection of the heart.”⁶² “Resigning ourselves and all that we have to the will of God, we should surrender to him the affections of our heart, to be conquered and reduced to subjection.”⁶³ “As the attention of the mind [204] ought to be fixed on God, so it is necessary that it should be followed by the affection of the heart.”⁶⁴ “Neither voice nor singing, if used in prayer, has any validity, or produces the least benefit with God, unless it proceed from the inmost desire [*affectu*] of the heart.”⁶⁵

From these passages, which could be multiplied almost at random, it is evident that Calvin used the term heart as parallel with the affections. We have seen that Calvin used will as including the emotions; we have also noted that he used affection as including will. Summing it all up, then, we may say that the term heart (*cor*) in Calvin usually stands for *voluntas* and *affectus*, or the will and the emotions.

⁶¹ “*Verum observemus, fidei sedem non in cerebro esse, sed in corde: neque vero de eo contenderim, qua in parte corporis sita sit fides: sed quoniam cordis nomen pro serio et sincero affectu fere capitur, dico firmam esse et efficacem fiduciam, non nudam tantum notiones*” [translation mine; italics mine].

⁶² “*Ubi cum Deo negotium est, nihil agi nisi ab interiore cordis affectu incipimus*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 3, 16).

⁶³ “*Huc nos scriptura vocat, ut Domini arbitri nos nostraque omnia resignantes, domandos ac subiugandos cordis nostri affectus illi tradamus*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 7, 8).

⁶⁴ “*Quemadmodum mentis aciem in Deum intendere convenit, ita cordis affectum eodem sequi necesse est*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 20, 5).

⁶⁵ “*Hinc praeterea plus quam clarum est, neque vocem neque cantum, si in oratione intercedant, habere quidquam momenti, aut hilum proficere apud Deum, nisi ex alto cordis affectu profecta*” (Calvin, *Institutes*, III, 20, 31).

From this study it is now clear that Calvin did not use heart as standing for the whole man, but for a partial aspect of man. Heart, for Calvin, does not include the mind or intellect, but is used alongside of mind to indicate the volitional and emotional aspect of man. Calvin did recognize, as we have shown, that in Scripture the heart may frequently stand for the intellect, but he did not generally use the term in that sense. Those very few instances in which he does are the exceptions which prove the rule. For Calvin, the heart was distinct from man's reflective, thinking capacity; it stood for the passions, drives, feelings, desires, and [205] volitions of man — but not for his reason.

Now this conception of the heart Calvin did not get from Scripture, but from Greek psychology. The Greeks separated the emotional life of man from his reflective life; in fact, they assigned the emotional-volitional aspect of man to a distinct soul, the *appetitive* soul, whereas reason was centered in the *rational* soul. The heart for the Greeks stood for the appetitive soul, but not for the rational soul. In the Scriptures, however, as I hope to show in my next chapter, the heart stands for the central organ of the whole personality, the center and root of the rational functions as well as the volitional and emotional. The heart in Scripture is the organ of thinking as well as of willing and feeling. Hermann Cremer, in his *Biblich-theologisches Wörterbuch*, confirms the point we have been making. Speaking of the fact that the Old Testament word לֵב is often rendered by $\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ in the Septuagint, Cremer says:

Doch wird es sich mit dieser Übersetzung verhalten, wie oben mit der Wiedergabe durch $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$: dass es nämlich im ganzen des griechischen Denken und Sprechen geläufiger war, das Reflexionsvermögen vom Herzen zu trennen, wogegen es gerade eine Eigentümlichkeit der biblische Vorstellung ist, dem Herzen dies beizulegen.⁶⁶

So, although Calvin did to a certain extent stress the primacy of the heart, as we have seen, he did not generally maintain the Biblical conception of the

⁶⁶ Hermann Cremer, *Biblich-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräzität*, ed. Julius Kögel, 10th ed. (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1915), 582; ET: "But it is with this translation as it was with that through $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ — it was more natural, on the whole, for a Greek, in thinking and speaking, to separate the reflective power from the heart." *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, trans. William Urwick, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1892), 345.

heart. He seems to have recognized that heart frequently stands for the intellect in Scripture,⁶⁷ but his conception of the heart was not fundamentally modified by this discovery — at [206] least not in the 1559 edition of the *Institutes*. Despite the fact that in Scripture the heart is often used for the intellectual aspect of man, Calvin continued to use the term as standing for that faculty which is distinct from the rational: the volitional-affective.

Two Strains in Calvin's Anthropology

Needless to say, it is extremely unfortunate that Calvin did not consistently maintain the Biblical view of the heart. Had he done so, his anthropology would have been much more satisfactory. For it will be obvious by now that there are two strains in Calvin's anthropology: one derived from the Greeks, and another derived from Scripture. On the one hand, Calvin teaches the primacy of the intellect as the ruling, or sovereign power in man — although he admits that the intellect has been thoroughly corrupted by sin. On the other hand, he teaches a certain primacy of the heart, in the sense that the heart is the deepest aspect of man, the seat of sin and of faith. However, heart is taken not as the central organ of the whole man, but as distinct from the mind and standing for the will and the affections. Thus actually Calvin teaches a sort of primacy of the will alongside of the primacy of the intellect, since heart is for him equivalent to the will and its affections. In fact, there are places where Calvin makes the will the seat of sin: "Now, if the whole man be subject to the dominion of sin, the will, which is the principal seat of [207] it, must necessarily be bound with the firmest bonds."⁶⁸ "The blinding of the wicked, and all those enormities which attend it, are called the work of Satan; the cause of which must nevertheless be sought only in the human will, from which proceeds the root of evil, and in which rests the foundation of the kingdom of Satan, that is, sin."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See footnote 40, above.

⁶⁸ "*Quod si totus homo peccati imperio subiacet, ipsam certe voluntatem, quae praecipua est eius sedes, arctissimis vinculis constringi necesse est*" (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 2, 27).

⁶⁹ "*Excaecatio impiorum, et quaecunq̄e inde sequuntur flagitia, opera satanae nuncupantur; quorum tamen causa extra humanam voluntatem quaerenda non est, ex qua radix mali*

If, however, we take this view, that the will or the heart is the seat of sin, along with the view that the intellect is the highest aspect of man, “the guide and governor of the soul,” we find that Calvin did not get away from the old Greek dualism of lower versus higher after all. For then sin really roots in the will,⁷⁰ which is lower than the intellect; sin then has its roots in the “lower” aspect of man rather than in the “higher”—which was essentially the error of the Greek view, and of the scholastics. If Calvin had said that the seat of sin is in the heart, *and had meant by heart the central core of the whole man*, including his “highest” rational functions, this dualism would have been avoided, and the leaven of Greek rationalism would have been wholly overcome. Unfortunately, however, this was not the case. [208] Calvin’s anthropology is therefore not a consistently Biblical view of man, but a mixture of Greek and Biblical elements. His stress on the primacy of the intellect was derived from Greek thought,⁷¹ whereas his insistence that the intellect has been corrupted by sin stems from the Scriptures. Conversely, Calvin’s emphasis on the primacy of the heart comes from the Bible, while his use of the term heart as standing for the will plus the affections rather than for the central core of the whole man is, as Cremer has pointed out, derived from Greek thought.

Calvin does not really harmonize these two strains. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to harmonize them, since they are obviously antithetical. On the one hand, Calvin speaks of a primacy of the intellect, not merely in the sense of pre-eminence, but in the sense of sovereignty. On the other hand, he holds that the heart, that is, the will and the emotions, are the seat of sin and faith in man. Now, obviously, these cannot both be true at the same time. Either the intellect is

surgit; in qua fundamentum regni satanae (hoc est, peccatum) residet” (Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 4, 1).

⁷⁰ See above, p. 137.

⁷¹ In the Latin text of the *Institutes*, the section dealing with Calvin’s view of the soul and its faculties (I, 15, 6 and 7) contains four footnote references to Plato and Aristotle. In fact, the following sentence, in which the primacy of the intellect is explicitly stated, Calvin admits to have been inspired by Plato’s *Phaedrus*: “Now, let it be the office of the understanding to discriminate between objects, as they shall respectively appear deserving of approbation or disapprobation; but of the will, to choose and follow what the understanding shall have pronounced to be good; to abhor and avoid what it shall have condemned” (Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 15, 7).

actually the governor of the soul, or else the heart is the center which controls and directs all of man's activities. But if the intellect is really supreme, then obviously [209] the heart, that is, the will and the affections, will not be the deepest aspect of man, or the final seat of sin or faith, but will be subordinate to the intellect.⁷² On the other hand, if the heart (the will and the affections) is really the deepest "thing" in man, then the intellect ought to be subordinate to it.

Calvin does not attempt to solve this apparent contradiction. The two strains are simply there side by side in his writings. Apparently Calvin did not see that these two stresses of his were mutually contradictory. He was apparently willing to accede to the primacy of the intellect as the Greeks had taught it, without realizing that this view was fundamentally at variance with the Biblical conception of man, which he also tried to maintain.⁷³ It is unfortunate that Calvin did not go a little more deeply into these anthropological questions.

There is therefore no real unity of the soul in Calvin's anthropology. For Calvin, the soul of man is chiefly divided into two parts or faculties, the understanding on the one hand, and the will plus the affections on the other. Of these two parts or faculties, one is called the "governor" of the soul, while the other is called the "seat" of faith and the "fountain" of sin. Hence we have really two "ruling centers" in man: the [210] intellect on the one hand, and the heart (meaning the will and the affections) on the other. There is here no true unity, but a soul more or less divided against itself.

It will now be apparent that the question with which this investigation began, What is primary in man according to Calvin? does not admit of a simple, unequivocal answer. We might paraphrase Calvin's position as follows: for Calvin, what is highest in man is the intellect, but what is deepest in man is the heart (meaning the will and the affections). As to what is really primary, really sovereign in man according to Calvin, it is hard to say. Sometimes he gives the impression that it is the intellect; at other times, that it is the heart.⁷⁴ We shall have to conclude that,

⁷² As, indeed, it is in the passage quoted in footnote 71.

⁷³ This point, that the primacy of the intellect, as the Greeks taught it, is at variance with the Biblical view of man, will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

⁷⁴ There are places in Calvin where the heart seems to be more determinative in human nature than the intellect (see, e.g., pp. 137 and 138, above, and footnote 22).

as in the case of Luther, Calvin was less interested in the abstract question of what is primary in man than in the concrete question of what is man's relationship toward the living God.

Calvin's Anthropology Evaluated

We conclude this chapter with a few words of evaluation. Calvin's positive contribution to Christian anthropology include the following: (1) His thoroughgoing emphasis on man's [211] depravity, as extending to every part of his being, including his reason; (2) his insistence, like Luther, that the all-important thing about man is his relation to God; and (3) his stress on the great importance of the heart. Though Calvin's view of the heart was one-sided and partial, as we have seen, still we must give him credit for laying so much stress on the heart alongside of the intellect, and thus at least to that extent overcoming Greek and scholastic intellectualism.⁷⁵

The contributions mentioned above Calvin derived from Scripture. When we look at those elements in Calvin which he derived from Greek thought, however, we see his anthropological weaknesses. These, as we have already indicated, were chiefly two: (1) His stress on the primacy of the intellect; and (2) his customary use of the term heart, after the manner of Greek thought, as standing for only the will and the affections, and not for the whole man.

What was Calvin's relation to Luther, as far as his anthropology was concerned? Both were agreed in opposing the scholastic conceptions of the free will of man, the meritoriousness of good works, the opposition between reason

From a general reading of Calvin, one also gets the impression that Calvin would lay more stress on the heart as the real determinative center in man than on the intellect. However, the fact remains that Calvin does also speak of a primacy and sovereignty of the intellect. The passages where he speaks of this may be fewer in number than those in which he speaks about the centrality of the heart, but they are there just the same.

⁷⁵ We should also add, in fairness to Calvin, that, although he improperly separated the heart from the mind, still the fact that he so constantly mentions the two together indicates a commendable concern for the wholeness of human personality. Calvin would agree, I am sure, that the whole man is active in all major decisions and activities of man; particularly in the act of faith.

and sense, and so on. Calvin also agreed with Luther that the will (including the emotions) is the deepest aspect of man; both frequently used the term heart to denote this deepest aspect. [212] It must further be said, however, that Calvin retained more of the concepts of Greek thought than Luther did. This is especially true of the primacy of the intellect which, as we have seen, Luther repudiated.

What is the relation between Calvin and Bavinck? On the great fundamentals of sin and grace, depravity and redemption, Calvin and Bavinck were in perfect agreement. Both repudiated the scholastic doctrines mentioned in the previous paragraph. Both shared an essentially religious view of man, as to be seen primarily in his relation to God.

As far as the question of the primacy of the intellect is concerned, Bavinck did speak rather frequently, especially in his early works, in language which would suggest this view. However, in his very latest volume he repudiated the conception that the intellect is primary or sovereign over the will. So he would differ from Calvin on this point.

The major difference between Calvin's anthropology and that of Bavinck, however, concerns the question of the heart. Bavinck understood and maintained the Scriptural teaching on this subject better than Calvin: in fact, Bavinck corrects Calvin on this point. Bavinck rightly saw that the term heart may not be restricted to the will and the emotions, but includes man's intellectual functions as well. For Bavinck, therefore, the heart was the true center and core of human personality; all the activities of the intellect, important as they are, have their roots in the heart and are therefore ultimately determined by the heart. Although Bavinck, like [213] Calvin, taught that there are only two chief faculties of the soul, similarly grouping the emotions with the will, yet Bavinck did not repeat Calvin's mistake: namely, that of making the heart stand for only one of man's faculties. The heart for Bavinck stands for the central core of man, out of which the activities of both faculties issue. Hence there is in Bavinck a real unity of the soul, as centered in the heart, which is lacking in Calvin. [214]

Chapter 7

The Scriptural Conception of the Heart

We come now to a different phase of our study. We began by studying the position of Herman Bavinck on the question of what is primary or basic in human nature, following this with a brief summarization of the position of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd on this problem. Then we made an historical survey, studying four representative Christian theologians, to see what they taught on this subject. Now we shall go to the Scriptures themselves, our ultimate, infallible guide in matters of faith and life, to investigate what they tell us about this basic anthropological question.

The central concern of this thesis is the concept of the “primacy of the heart” as taught by Herman Bavinck. Hence we wish to go into the Scriptural material only insofar as it is related to this central question, and specifically to Bavinck’s teachings on this question. Now it has already been noted that Bavinck himself made a study of the Biblical data on this subject, primarily in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* of 1920, though, also, to a lesser extent, in other works. Since our main task is to evaluate Bavinck, we shall, accordingly, begin with his conception of the teachings of Scripture on this matter, and then go on to inquire whether other investigators corroborate Bavinck’s views. [215]

Bavinck’s View of the Heart Restated

Beginning, then, with Bavinck, we shall briefly summarize what he held to be the teaching of Scripture on what is primary or central in man. Since this has been gone into quite thoroughly in the first chapter of this thesis, a mere summary will here suffice. Bavinck, as we have seen, considered the heart to be the source and fountain of all physical and mental life, the core of man’s personality. He did, to be sure, recognize that the terms *soul*, *spirit*, and *flesh* are also used in Scripture to designate man as a totality; he discussed each of these terms, and defined them

in accordance with the best traditions of Biblical scholarship.¹ However, he chose to use the concept *heart* to signify what is central in man. The relation between heart and soul he indicated as follows: The soul is the subject of life, whereas the heart is the central and innermost organ of the soul. Quite often Bavinck uses the terms *ego* or *self* as synonymous with the soul; hence we may say that for him the heart is the central and primary organ of the self.

As such the heart is the organ of thinking, the organ of willing, and the seat of the emotions.² All these functions of the soul have their origin and source in the heart, deriving [216] their peculiar quality from the disposition of the heart. In fact, in the heart is found the domain of what modern psychology chooses to call “the unconscious” or “the subconscious self.” The heart is the source of all the drives, impulses, inclinations, capacities, and tendencies which underlie our conscious activity.

The heart therefore determines the direction of man’s life. Religion therefore has its seat in the heart. According to Bavinck the heart is the seat of sin.³ Regeneration, faith, and conversion are, however, also matters of the heart. In other words, it is in the heart that sin has its deepest roots; but it is also in the heart that the renewing operations of the Holy Spirit take place.

So much for Bavinck.⁴ Now let us see whether his view really accords with Scripture or not. We have found similarities and parallels to Bavinck’s conception of the centrality of the heart in other theologians. But, after all, the Bible is the final court of appeals. What does it teach about this matter?

Fortunately, to find the Scriptural answer to the question of what is central in human nature it will not be necessary to conduct an independent, original

¹ Bavinck discusses the terms *soul* and *spirit* in sections 2–6 of his “Bijbelsche Psychologie” (Part I of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*); he takes up the term *flesh* in section 4 of his “Religieuze Psychologie” (Part II of the same volume).

² The Scriptural proofs which Bavinck adduces for these various functions of the heart will be found on pp. 63 and 64 of his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*.

³ It will be remembered, however, that he also occasionally speaks of the will as the seat of sin. See above, p. 44 f.

⁴ A more complete and detailed description of Bavinck’s view on this point, together with the necessary references, will be found in chapter 1 of this thesis. See especially pp. 9–50.

investigation. This task has already been done by not one but several competent [217] investigators. And the amazing thing is that all, without exception, have found in the Scriptures the same stress on the heart as the central organ of man, and have similarly ascribed to the heart the same range of functions that Bavinck distinguished: intellectual, emotional, and volitional! Surely when so many investigators agree, there must be some objective ground for their agreement. So we shall not conduct an independent research into the question of what the Scriptures teach about the heart, since that is wholly unnecessary, but shall simply give a brief resume of what other students of Biblical psychology besides Bavinck have found to be the Scriptural teaching on this question.

Summary of Various Studies on the Scriptural Conception of the Heart

The earliest work on Biblical psychology which demands our attention in this connection is J. T. Beck's *Umriss der Biblischen Seelenlehre*, originally published in 1843, and translated into English in 1877 under the title, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*. Although there were earlier studies, including the work of Roos,⁵ Beck's book was, in the words of Franz Delitzsch, "the first attempt to reduce Biblical psychology into a scientific form."⁶ Unfortunately, Beck's treatise is not too carefully organized. However, by culling statements from various places, we shall be able to establish his general [218] conception of the heart.

"The heart," says Beck, "is to be regarded as the kernel in which the deepest and most central vitality is concentrated, the 'inward parts' in the strict sense of the word, or as the most inward part of all."⁷ "Out of the heart proceed all inward and outward acts of the soul's life."⁸ "The heart is the first and last element that

⁵ Magnus Friedrich Roos, *Fundamenta psychologiae ex Sacra Scriptura sic collecta* (Tübingen: Fues, 1769).

⁶ Franz Delitzsch, *A System of Biblical Psychology*, trans. Robert E. Wallis (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1867), 9.

⁷ Johann Tobias Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, trans. James Bonar (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1877), 79.

⁸ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 81.

determines the moral value of a person, both in his general character and in his particular acts. . . . Taken by itself, however, the heart is a self-contained secret workshop, a hidden deep, in which even falsehood confides.”⁹ Beck finds a close relationship between conscience and the heart: “Take conscience in and by itself, it is nothing but a conscious power of testimony belonging to the moral sense and impulse which are at work in the heart.”¹⁰

As far as the functions ascribed to the heart are concerned, it is evident from the following quotations that Beck, like Bavinck, would attribute thinking, willing, and feeling to the heart. “The heart combines sense and desire with morality and reason, by not only uniting their inward features in one common consciousness, but propagating them abroad in the form of thought and will.”¹¹ “The heart is holder of the personal consciousness . . . it is at work in moral will and moral reason.”¹² “The evolution of thoughts is ever going on in the workshop of the heart.”¹³ “Wisdom and Folly, with the [219] corresponding adjectives, are expressly predicated of the heart.”¹⁴ “The workings of emotion are also traced to the heart.”¹⁵

That the operations of the Spirit of God likewise take place in the heart, according to Beck, is evident from the following quotations: “Revelation, when it is giving to man a new organization through the New Birth, works the New Law of God into the organic structure of his heart.”¹⁶ “To this end the Word, as the seed of this new growth of life, must not only be sown in the heart, but preserved there.”¹⁷ “Faith was wrought into the structure of the heart from the very first, but is now presented explicitly as an act and state of the heart.”¹⁸ From

⁹ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 84.

¹⁰ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 92.

¹¹ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 99.

¹² Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 102.

¹³ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 105.

¹⁴ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 111.

¹⁵ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 121–24.

¹⁶ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 142.

¹⁷ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 143.

¹⁸ Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 143.

all of these citations it is clear that Beck would agree fundamentally with Bavinck as to the centrality of the heart in Scripture.

The next work of importance in this field was Franz Delitzsch's *System of Biblical Psychology*, originally published in 1855 in German, and translated from the second German edition of 1861 into English, the English edition appearing in 1867. This work is still in many a classic in the field of Biblical psychology. Marked by thoroughness and showing great erudition, it takes into account distinctions of age and authorship in Scripture which Beck failed to note. What does Delitzsch say about the Scriptural teaching [220] on the heart?¹⁹ The heart is the internal center of man's natural condition.²⁰ The heart is, first, the center of the bodily life; but it is also the center of the spiritual-psychical life.²¹ The latter fact implies three things: The heart is the center of the life of will and desire; of the life of thought and conception; and of the life of feelings and affections.²² Heart therefore is the conscious unity of the spiritual-psychical life in all its directions; and therefore to be of one heart is the conscious perfect agreement of will, thought, and feeling.²³ Since, however, will, thought, and feeling are always conceived by Scripture from an ethical point of view, the heart is, further, the center of the moral life; all moral conditions are concentrated in the heart. The heart is therefore the laboratory of all that is good and evil in thoughts, words, and deeds. It is the seat of conscience. Both faith and unbelief are matters of the heart.²⁴ Both Christ and the Holy Spirit are said to dwell in the heart.²⁵ The heart is a mysterious depth, which only God can fathom. Hence the heart is the center of the entire man, the "training-place of all independent actions and conditions

¹⁹ Since we are concerned in this chapter only with a brief resume of what has been done in the Biblical field, I have not deemed it necessary to give direct quotations in every instance. For the most part, the thoughts of the authors referred to here will be given in paraphrase, or in the form of brief summaries. Scripture references will not be given, except in special cases; they will be found on the pages referred to in the footnotes.

²⁰ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 292.

²¹ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 292.

²² Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 293–94.

²³ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 295.

²⁴ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 295.

²⁵ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 296.

. . . the agent of [221] all relations and conducts, as well on the spiritual as on the bodily side."²⁶ Summarizing, according to Scripture teaching, it is the heart and not the head which is the central agency of the psychico-spiritual activities and affections of man.²⁷

This brief review of Delitzsch's position on the Biblical doctrine of the heart shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that he, like Bavinck, considered the heart in Scripture to stand for the source and center of all man's thoughts, volitions, feelings, and actions. The next important contribution to this subject came from the pen of H. H. Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im Biblischen Sprachgebrauch*, published in 1878.²⁸ Wendt first takes up the Old Testament concept, לֵב (lebb). In the Old Testament Scriptures, he finds, לֵב is the seat of all conscious mental activities, especially of thoughts, plans, and resolutions.²⁹ It stands in opposition to the words of the mouth or the deeds of the hands; in all such external actions the inner plans and thoughts of the heart find their expression. Desires, wishes, and especially feelings of all sorts have their roots in the heart. [222] The word לֵב, he continues, is more comprehensive than the German word *Herz*, since *Herz* generally means only the seat of the feelings; hence he feels that the best German equivalent for לֵב is *Sinn* [mind, or disposition].³⁰ Both good and evil thoughts and plans proceed from the heart.³¹ The heart, according to its disposition, furnishes the direction in which all of man's thoughts, decisions, and actions move.³²

²⁶ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 296.

²⁷ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 302.

²⁸ It will be noticed that these various studies are taken up here in chronological order. In this way, both the fundamental agreement of the investigators and the gradual enrichment of the concept *heart* will be evident. The former, however, as will be seen, far outweighs the latter. Delitzsch's exposition of the meaning of heart in Scripture, written originally in 1855, contains the seeds of all that has been written on the subject subsequently. In fact, his position is basically identical with that of Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, published in 1938.

²⁹ Hans Hinrich Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im Biblischen Sprachgebrauch* (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1878), 30.

³⁰ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 30.

³¹ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 31.

³² Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 31.

Later in the same volume, Wendt takes up the meaning of the New Testament word, καρδία. Καρδία, like לב, indicates the inner side of man.³³ It stands for the mental life of man, particularly for the seat of the reflective consciousness.³⁴ The Spirit of God is said in the New Testament to work not only in the πνευμα of man, but also in his καρδία.³⁵ In general, καρδία in Paul, just as לב in the Old Testament, means *Sinn* — that is, the fundamental disposition of man's soul, which is of determinative significance for all of his conscious expressions and utterance, as well as for the moral and religious direction of his will. Not only feelings, but also thoughts, plans, and desires proceed from the heart, in a good as well as in an evil direction. A peculiar attribute of the heart is its hiddenness, so that the knowledge of the [223] heart belongs to God alone. The Scriptural antithesis to καρδία is not the body as such but the appearance (προσωπον; see 2 Cor. 5:12) or the mouth (στομα; see Rom. 10:9), since these are the organs for the outward expression of what come from within.³⁶ We see, then, that Wendt's view of לב and καρδία is basically in agreement with that of Bavinck.

The next work which demands our attention in this respect is the *Old Testament Theology* of G. F. Oehler, published in this country in 1883, the American translation being based on the second German edition of a year or two previous. Oehler, as will be understood from the title, deals only with the Old Testament conception of the heart. What does he find it to be? The soul according to his interpretation of the Old Testament view, centers in the heart.³⁷ The heart forms the focus of the life of the body; it is, however, also the center of all spiritual functions. Everything spiritual, whether belonging to the intellectual, moral, or pathological realm, is appropriated and assimilated in the heart. The heart

³³ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 133.

³⁴ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 133. The German has: “*dass hingegen der Begriff καρδία das geistige Leben im Besonderen als Sitz des denkenden Bewusstseins bezeichnet.*” This would seem to indicate that Wendt has a somewhat one-sided view of καρδία, which is generally acknowledged to be the seat of feelings and volitions as well as thoughts.

³⁵ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 134.

³⁶ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 134.

³⁷ Gustav Friedrich Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, trans. George E. Day (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1883), 153.

is the seat of all self-consciousness — “in which the soul is at home with itself, and is conscious of all its doing and suffering as its own.” The heart is therefore also the organ of the conscience. Designs, plans, and resolutions are attributed to the heart. The heart is similarly the organ of knowing, so that *בִּלְבָב* often means intellect or insight.

Further, the moral and religious condition of man lies [224] in the heart. “Only what enters the heart possesses moral worth, and only what comes from the heart is a moral product.” A man’s whole life and all his separate personal acts derive their character and moral value from the quality of the heart. Hence the heart may be called wise, pure, honest, perverse, stubborn, haughty, and so on. Man is decidedly not a morally indifferent being, who is free to be either good or bad at any particular moment; sin, on the contrary has entered his heart, thus perverting the very center of his life and consequently corrupting his entire existence.³⁸ Hence it follows that the heart of man is deceitful and mortally diseased; only God is able to fathom its depths.³⁹

Because of this, all divine revelation addresses itself to the heart, and aims to renew man from the heart. Faith, in which man’s personal life takes a new direction, belongs entirely to the sphere of the heart. Emotions may be predicated of both the soul and the heart. But “the impulse by which man allows himself to be determined, the controlling purpose which rules him, the view which he cherishes, the desire which he inwardly cherishes, are matters of the heart.”⁴⁰ It is very clear from this brief survey that Oehler, too, has virtually the same view of the heart which we have attributed to Bavinck.

We turn our attention next to a study by a Scotch writer, William P. Dickson, of the University of Glasgow, titled *St. Paul’s Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, and published in 1883. In his preface, Professor Dickson freely acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Wendt, whose contribution [225] to this question we have already summarized. Accordingly, we shall find many similarities between Dickson and Wendt; often the former quotes entire passages from the German work to elucidate his point. One difference between the two will at once be

³⁸ Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 153.

³⁹ Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 154.

⁴⁰ Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 154.

evident, however, from the title; whereas Wendt goes into both כֶּלֶב and καρδία, Dickson restricts himself to the New Testaments term, and then particularly to Paul's use of it. Let us see whether Paul's use of καρδία, according to Dickson, is in line with the use of the term in the rest of Scripture.

Dickson points out that Paul used the term καρδία fifty-two times, more than ψυχή or πνεῦμα.⁴¹ It stands for the central seat and organ of the personal life of man.⁴² The heart in Paul is “the inner organ to which all the functions of the mind are referred — the seat of all mental action, feeling, thinking, willing.”⁴³ In a few passages, to be sure, heart does seem to mean for Paul the seat of feelings and emotions.⁴⁴ But in the great majority of cases, the term must be given the wider meaning of Proverbs 4:23, “Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life.” The heart is for Paul not just the receptacle of impressions and the seat of emotions, but the laboratory of thought and the fountainhead of purpose.⁴⁵ Sometimes the heart appears as pre-eminently the organ of intelligence, and sometimes as the seat of moral choice and volition.⁴⁶ Actions take their character from the heart.⁴⁷

The heart in this wider sense is, accordingly, frequently [226] spoken of in Paul as the recipient of the divine Spirit. The heart is in his writings also the seat of faith. The heart is equivalent to the inward man.⁴⁸ The knowledge of the heart is therefore a special attribute of God, who shall make all the counsels of the heart manifest on the Day of Judgment.⁴⁹ Summarizing, Dickson says: “It is evident that the Apostle proceeds on the lines of traditional usage, and employs the term ‘heart’ in all the compass of its Old Testament significance as embracing the

⁴¹ William P. Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1883), 198.

⁴² Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 199.

⁴³ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 199.

⁴⁴ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 200.

⁴⁵ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 200.

⁴⁶ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 201.

⁴⁷ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 201.

⁴⁸ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 202.

⁴⁹ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 203.

whole region of man's inner life, and especially the domain of conscious thought and purpose."⁵⁰ It is clear, then, from this study, that Paul's view of the heart was fundamentally the same as that of the Old Testament and the rest of the New.

Another investigation on this general question was published in Germany in 1887: *Biblische Anthropologie*, by Ernest Wörner. The book consists of lectures published after the author's death. Wörner does not restrict himself to either Testament, but uses Old and New Testament texts side by side. What is his view of the heart? The heart, says Wörner, is "*Innerstes des Inneren*."⁵¹ In the heart the sense-impressions find their deepest intensity (*Verinnerlichung*) and their mightiest influence on life.⁵² The heart is the center (*Mittelpunkt*) of the life of the body and the life of the soul; the center (*Lebensmitte*) of the whole man.⁵³ The heart is the [227] hearth of all spiritual and mental activity.⁵⁴

Joy and sorrow are conditions of the heart.⁵⁵ The Word of God goes into the heart.⁵⁶ Thoughts and counsels belong to the heart.⁵⁷ Wisdom and foolishness are matters of the heart, since wisdom in the Scriptural sense is morally determined.⁵⁸ The heart is the carrier of the inner direction of the will, the basic disposition which determines the character of the moods of the soul.⁵⁹ The heart is the carrier of feeling, willing, and also of thinking and knowing.⁶⁰ In the heart the conditions of the soul come to self-consciousness. The heart is the place of decision for good or evil, the fountain of all action, for which man is morally responsible.

Therefore as the heart is, so is the whole man. The moral worth of a man is determined by the disposition of the heart. Hence God weighs and tries the

⁵⁰ Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 203.

⁵¹ Ernst Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: W. Kitzinger, 1887), 95.

⁵² Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 97.

⁵³ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 97.

⁵⁴ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 98.

⁵⁵ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 98.

⁵⁶ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 99.

⁵⁷ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 99.

⁵⁸ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 100.

⁵⁹ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 103.

⁶⁰ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 104.

hearts. Summarizing, Wörner says that the heart is the human personality with self-consciousness and self-determination, especially with moral predisposition.⁶¹ Here again we find fundamentally the same view which has previously been elaborated,

We come next to a rather thorough work on Biblical anthropology by John Laidlaw, titled, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*. This book, originally published in Edinburgh in 1879, was issued in a second edition in 1895. It is this second edition from which we quote.⁶² Laidlaw, leaning on the studies [228] which preceded his, uses both the Old and the New Testament to establish his views. It has already been noticed, on the basis of Dickson's investigation, that the *heart* in Paul had fundamentally the same meaning as its Hebrew equivalent in the Old Testament. Laidlaw, confirming this, points out that of all the leading terms in Biblical psychology, *heart* is the one least disputed in its meaning, and undergoing the least change within the cycle of its Scriptural use. In fact, he adds that this term "may be held to be common to all parts of the Bible in the same sense."⁶³ This is indeed a significant fact. It adds much weight to Bavinck's contention that the heart is the Scriptural center of man.

Continuing now with Laidlaw, what does he say further about the meaning of the heart? The heart, he asserts, is the seat of man's collective energies, the focus of his personal life. From the heart of the human soul goes forth all mental and moral activity.⁶⁴ The heart is, therefore, the organ of conscience, of self-knowledge, and of all knowledge.⁶⁵ Because the heart is "the focus of the personal life, the work-place for the personal appropriation and assimilation of every influence, in the 'heart' lies the moral and religious condition of the man." On the one hand, the Bible places human depravity in the heart, thus indicating that sin has penetrated to the very center of man's personal existence. On the other hand, Scripture regards the heart as the sphere of divine influences, the [229] starting-point of all

⁶¹ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 104.

⁶² Ed. note: John Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1905).

⁶³ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 121.

⁶⁴ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 121.

⁶⁵ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 122.

moral renovation. The heart, lying deep within, contains the “hidden man,” the real man. It both represents and conceals the proper character of the personality; hence it is an index of character only to Him who “searches the heart.”⁶⁶

In another section of his book, Laidlaw indicates the relation between the heart and sin. The heart, according to Scripture, is the seat of sin in man’s constitution.⁶⁷ The heart is the home of every inward phenomenon, mental, emotional, and moral; hence the heart is that which constitutes character and determines the whole moral being.⁶⁸ So, when the heart is spoken of in Scripture as the seat of sin, this shows the radical nature of human corruption. The ascription of sin to the heart means that sin has tainted the roots of life, the formative sources of character.⁶⁹ Sin sits where God alone ought to dwell: at the source of our moral and spiritual being.⁷⁰ Hence a radical change is needed to remove sin; a change which can be effected only by divine energy.⁷¹

This relation of sin to the heart has important implications:

The Scripture doctrine of corruption, therefore, in accordance with its own simple psychology, is this, that the heart, i.e. the fountain of man’s being, is corrupt, and therefore all its actings, or, as we should say, the whole soul in all its powers and faculties, is perverted. A proper application of this principle will deliver us from the question whether the power of depravity lies mainly in the evil affections or in the darkened understanding; as also from the correlative question, whether saving faith is an emotion of the heart or an assent of the understanding. Much more will it keep us from the error of supposing that [230] man’s corruption is only a practical bias, leaving the judgment pure and uncontaminated by evil. Scripture gives no countenance to such distinctions, both because it recognizes the whole soul under the name “heart” as the seat of depravity, and because it proceeds upon a different psychology from those which afford play for such controversies.⁷²

⁶⁶ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 122.

⁶⁷ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 224.

⁶⁸ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 225.

⁶⁹ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 225.

⁷⁰ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 226.

⁷¹ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 226.

⁷² Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 227.

Depravity, therefore, is not restricted to any one faculty or power in man, or is even a matter “primarily” of one faculty rather than another, but is a matter of the heart — that is, of the whole soul of man. Scripture, according to Laidlaw, countenances no psychology which would pit one faculty against another, or separate one faculty from the other; it stresses constantly the activity of the whole man. It will be seen from this that Laidlaw not only shares the view of the heart which has thus far been developed, but that he also draws from this Scriptural conception of the heart some extremely significant psychological implications.

Brief notice may further be taken of Hermann Schultz’s *Old Testament Theology*, originally published in Germany in 1860, the English translation of which was published in 1892. He touches very briefly on the meaning of the Old Testament concept, saying that the heart is the center of the soul’s activity.⁷³ The heart is the center of feelings, wishes, plans and counsels of the understanding, and of the conscience. The Hebrews considered not the head but the heart the seat of thought, counsel, and moral guidance. To have a new heart [231] means accordingly, to have a complete change of thoughts, views, and aims.⁷⁴

The next investigation which compels our attention is that of Theodor Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, published in 1897.⁷⁵ Here, as in the case of Dickson’s study, the field of investigation is narrowed down to the view of the Apostle Paul. What, according to Simon, did Paul mean by καρδιά? Paul, so says Simon, includes in the καρδιά the sum of the activities of the soul.⁷⁶ The heart is the place or organ in which all the activities of the soul take place. The heart is the region of the inner life, hid from the eyes of men. The heart is the seat of the purely fleshly life, which is in opposition to God. But the heart is also the

⁷³ Hermann Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, trans. J. A. Paterson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1892), 2:248.

⁷⁴ Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, 2:248.

⁷⁵ Bavinck must have been acquainted with Simon’s study, since he mentions it in footnote 5 of his *Beginnselen der psychologie* (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1897).

⁷⁶ Theodor Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897), 24.

seat of the “pneumatic” or spiritual life, the life which has been renewed by the Holy Spirit.⁷⁷

All the functions or faculties of the soul (*Seelenvermögen*) are placed in the heart.⁷⁸ The heart is therefore the seat of feeling, called by Simon “*der Grundfunktion des inneren Lebens*.”⁷⁹ The will, closely connected with the feelings, is [232] likewise localized in the heart.⁸⁰ Finally, the intellect also is placed in the heart.⁸¹ It will be evident by now that Simon’s view of the heart in Paul is basically identical with that of Dickson, and with that of the other investigators we have studied.

Another study which should be noticed is that of H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, published in Edinburgh in 1911. He gives some interesting figures about the frequency with which the various meanings of the term heart occur in Scripture. In the Old Testament the word heart, which occurs 851 times in all, is used 29 times in a physical or figurative sense; 257 times to denote personality, inner life, or character in general; 166 times to denote emotional states of consciousness; 204 times to denote intellectual activities; and 195 times to denote volition or purpose.⁸² It will be seen that, according to Robinson’s analysis, the meaning “personality, inner life, or character in general” is the most frequent in the Old Testament Scriptures; and that the term heart is used a little less frequently to denote emotional states than intellectual or volitional activities, both of which are about equally numerous.

⁷⁷ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 24.

⁷⁸ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 25.

⁷⁹ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 25. This statement, plus the assertion that the heart is for Paul “vor allen Dingen” the seat of feeling, would seem to suggest a sort of primacy of feeling in Simon. But this is as one-sided as the view of Wendt, to which attention was called in footnote 34. A proper understanding of the range and totality of the concept heart whether in Paul or in the entire Bible, forbids making any one function of it primary.

⁸⁰ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 25.

⁸¹ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 26.

⁸² H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911), 22.

Robinson also makes a similar analysis of Paul's use of the term. Paul, he asserts, used καρδία 52 times. Of these, he used heart 15 times to designate the personality, character, or inner life in general; 13 times as the seat of the emotional life; 11 times as the seat of intellectual activities; and 13 [233] times as the seat of the volitions.⁸³ These usages, Robinson continues, are basically the same as those of the Old Testament, with this difference that there is a slight proportional increase in the volitional use of the term, and a slight decrease in the intellectual use. He explains the latter by saying that Paul uses the term νοῦς and συνείδησις to represent especially the intellectual aspects of the usage of לֵב.⁸⁴

One of the most suggestive and interesting of all the books studied in this connection was M. Scott Fletcher's *Psychology of the New Testament*, published in 1912. As is evident from the title, he restricts himself to the New Testament usage of the terms he discusses. He points out that the heart is regarded in the New Testament as the one organ of the mental life and all its manifold activities.⁸⁵ The Hebrews regarded the heart as the focus and center of man's conscious life, of man's intellectual and moral life.⁸⁶ The heart for them was the organ of the personality.⁸⁷ The soul functioned through the heart and thereby came to itself in thought and purpose. For the Biblical writers the heart, not the mind, was the organ of consciousness; hence all states of consciousness were ascribed to the heart.

The heart is, accordingly, in the New Testament the organ of thought and reflection.⁸⁸ It is the seat of understanding, reason, and belief; the storehouse of memory and the [234] source of imagination.⁸⁹ The heart is also the organ of willing or conation. We read in the New Testament of purpose of heart (Acts 11:23),

⁸³ Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, 106.

⁸⁴ Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, 106.

⁸⁵ M. Scott Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 2nd ed. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), 74.

⁸⁶ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 76–77.

⁸⁷ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 77.

⁸⁸ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 77.

⁸⁹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 78.

and of singleness of heart (Acts 2:46);⁹⁰ willfulness is called a hardening of heart (Heb. 3:8, 15).⁹¹ Further, the heart is also the seat of various kinds of feelings.⁹² It is the seat of fear, remorse, love, jealousy, faction, and covetousness; of lust, sorrow, penitence, desire, love, and peace.⁹³ In fact, Fletcher says, “More than any other Biblical writer Paul regards the heart as the seat of feeling.”⁹⁴

Because the heart is in Biblical psychology the organ of all possible states of consciousness, it is pre-eminently the seat of the moral consciousness or conscience; in it lies the fountainhead of the moral life of man.⁹⁵ “Hence in the New Testament the ‘heart’ is the metaphorical term for the whole inner character and its ethical significance cannot be overrated.”⁹⁶ The changed moral nature from which conduct should spring Ezekiel calls the heart.⁹⁷ The heart is therefore especially the region of moral choice and purpose; in the inner man of the heart is found the inner moral nature [235] of a man.⁹⁸

Fletcher goes on to show that this view of the heart was common to all the New Testament writers, singling out Jesus, James, and Paul. Jesus showed that all sinful acts and dispositions arise out of an evil heart (Mark 7:21).⁹⁹ James

⁹⁰ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 78.

⁹¹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 79.

⁹² Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 79.

⁹³ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 79–80.

⁹⁴ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 79. Fletcher explains that, since Paul took over from the Greeks certain psychological terms to express the mental and moral aspects of man’s inner life, he was free to develop the emotional meaning of the term heart. According to Robinson’s figures, however (see above, p. 168), there does not seem to be any such predominance of the emotional use of the heart in Paul.

⁹⁵ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 80.

⁹⁶ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 80.

⁹⁷ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 81.

⁹⁸ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 81. This apparent identification of the heart with man’s moral nature would seem to suggest a sort of primacy of the will in Fletcher. Cf. the following statement from p. 315: “The New Testament teaches also the immanence of God and the dependence of man. The two views of God and man respectively can never be harmonized in thought unless the will is recognized as the essential factor, though not the only factor, in personality.” But is it such a primacy of will in harmony with the centrality of the heart which he has been expounding?

⁹⁹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 82.

speaks about the need for purifying the heart (James 4:8). For Paul the heart is only another name for what he calls the “inward man,” meaning thereby the true character of the man.¹⁰⁰ God is said to prove our hearts and to establish our hearts.¹⁰¹

The heart is also said in the New Testament to be the sphere of divine and saving influence.¹⁰² It is the organ, not only of a physical, mental, and moral life, but also of the mysterious spiritual life which comes from God’s indwelling.¹⁰³ Fletcher calls faith an act of moral self-surrender, a giving of the heart to God.¹⁰⁴ For Paul the heart was the sphere of divine operation in man.¹⁰⁵ The Word of God finds lodgment in the heart and meets with a response from the heart.¹⁰⁶ Summarizing, Fletcher says: “The ‘heart,’ then, means the inmost and essential part of man whereby the human spirit functions in response to the [236] presence of the Divine Spirit. . . . The ‘heart’ is the meeting-place of the human spirit and the Holy Spirit.”¹⁰⁷ It is obvious from this brief summary of Fletcher’s book that he, too, is fundamentally agreed with Bavinck in construing the heart as the “inmost and essential part of man.”

A very suggestive and stimulating book appeared in Copenhagen in 1920, and was translated in 1926: Johannes Pedersen’s *Israel: Its Life and Culture*. Pedersen, whose work is marked by great originality of insight, asserts that the heart in the Old Testament designates the whole of the essence and the character of a man.¹⁰⁸ The soul [which term, he states, is largely identical with the term heart] is an entirety with a definite stamp, and this is transmuted into a definite will: “The Israelite has no independent term for will as we understand the word.

¹⁰⁰ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 82.

¹⁰¹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 83.

¹⁰² Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 83.

¹⁰³ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 84.

¹⁰⁴ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 84.

¹⁰⁵ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 86.

¹⁰⁶ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 86.

¹⁰⁷ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 87.

¹⁰⁸ Johannes Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture* (London: Milford, 1926), 102.

He does not recognize the will as an independent feature or force of the soul. The soul is a totality . . . the will is the whole of the tendency of the soul.”¹⁰⁹ “With the Israelites the heart is the soul, being the organ which at the same time feels and acts.”¹¹⁰ “The heart is the totality of the soul as a character and operating power . . . the heart is the soul in its inner value.”¹¹¹ The heart is the entirety of the soul as a power.¹¹² “The Israelite cannot think of the heart without at the same time considering the entirety: all life connected with its activity.”¹¹³ All of these statements [237] reveal that Pedersen, though expressing himself somewhat differently from the other investigators we have studied, likewise understands heart in Scripture as standing for the entire inner man, for the totality of the soul as a functioning unit.

One more study demands our attention in this connection. It is the *Theologie des Alten Testaments* by Walther Eichrodt, published in Leipzig in 1935.¹¹⁴ In volume two of this work Eichrodt discusses the concept לֵב in the Old Testament. He acknowledges, in agreement with Delitzsch, to whom he refers, that there is hardly a mental process which is not ascribed to the heart: “*Gefühle ebenso wie intellektuelle Tätigkeiten und Willensvorgänge finden hier ihr Organ.*”¹¹⁵ Although affections are frequently associated with the heart, Eichrodt does not believe that the heart is most characteristically the seat of the emotions for the Hebrews: “*Vielmehr ist es die überwiegende Verwendung des Wortes für intellektuelle*

¹⁰⁹ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 103.

¹¹⁰ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 104.

¹¹¹ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 104.

¹¹² Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 150.

¹¹³ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 172.

¹¹⁴ Walther Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1935).

¹¹⁵ Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, 2:72. Ed. note: ET: “[The heart] is made the organ, equally of feelings, intellectual activities, and the working of the will.” In *Theology of the Old Testament*, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), 2:143. Eichrodt’s discussion of “Heart (*lēb*)” can be found on pp. 142–45; translations provided in this and subsequent notes are from this volume.

und Willensvorgänge, die seine eigentümliche Prägung im hebräischen Denken erkennen lässt.”¹¹⁶

Eichrodt further indicates that לֵב may often be used for the personality as a whole, and for its inner life and character; in such cases, however, what is meant by heart is “die willentlich bewusste geistige Tätigkeit des in sich geschlossenen menschlichen Ich.”¹¹⁷ He adds that moral responsibility is especially associated with the heart, since what [238] proceeds from the heart is a matter of the inner man. He also makes the observation that what is really determinative for the use of לֵב is the inner direction of the will. “Und so geschieht auch die intellektuelle Betätigung des Herzens in starker Verbindung von Verstand und Willen, kraft deren das Erkennen nicht zuschauerhaft-objektiv, sondern von energischer innerer Beteiligung und Entscheidung getragen ist.”¹¹⁸ We may conclude that Eichrodt, too, shares the view of the heart which has been developed in this chapter.

Having now examined the principal investigations into the Scriptural meaning of the term heart from 1843 until the present day, let us now also look briefly at the outstanding lexicons, to see whether they similarly confirm the point we have been making. The first important lexicon which comes into consideration here is Thayer’s *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, first published in 1886. What does Thayer say about καρδιά in the New Testament? His treatment of this word lists the following meanings: (1) seat of physical life; (2) seat and center of all physical and spiritual life.¹¹⁹ He further elaborates the meaning of (2) by calling the heart “the center and seat of spiritual life, the *soul* or *mind*, as it is the fountain and seat of the thoughts, passions, desires, appetites, affections,

¹¹⁶ Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, 2:72; ET: “The great majority of instances of the word refer to the intellectual and volitional processes, and it is this which gives it its distinctive stamp in Hebrew thought.”

¹¹⁷ Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, 2:73; ET: “the conscious and deliberate spiritual activity of the self-contained human ego.”

¹¹⁸ Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, 2:73; ET: “Thus, too, the intellectual activity of the heart occurs in close association with understanding and will; and because of this, knowledge is never simply that of the disinterested spectator, but is conveyed by energetic inner participation and decision.”

¹¹⁹ Joseph Henry Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (New York: American Book Company, 1889), 325.

purposes, and endeavors.”¹²⁰ Under this general definition Thayer distinguishes the following shades of meaning: the heart as the seat of the understanding and the intelligence; [239] as the seat of the will and character; as the seat of affections, emotions, desires, appetites, and passions; and as the seat of what we call the conscience.¹²¹ This range of meaning, it will be seen, is virtually identical with that of the other investigators we have studied.

The next important lexicon which bears on our subject is the *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek* written by Hermann Cremer. This important work went through several editions and translations; I quote here from the fourth English edition, which was published in 1892. What does Cremer say about the heart? Καρδία denotes the heart first as the organ of the body and as the seat of life.¹²² It is also “the seat and center [German: *Sitz* und *Herd*] of man’s personal life . . . which, on the one hand, concentrates the personal life of man in all its relations — the unconscious¹²³ and the conscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, the physical and the spiritual impulses [*Triebe*], sensations, and states; and, on the other hand, is the immediate organ by which man lives his personal life.”¹²⁴ The heart, consequently, is the place where the entire personal life, in respect both of its states and utterances, concentrates itself,¹²⁵ and is therefore [240] especially the point of concentration [*Sammelpunkt und Quellort*] of man’s religious life.¹²⁶ Further, the heart is also the starting-point whence the particular developments and manifestations of personal life proceed. Finally, the heart is the organ which takes upon itself the mediations [*Vermittlungen*] of all the states and expressions of the personal life, especially of the religious life.¹²⁷ Under this last

¹²⁰ Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 325.

¹²¹ Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 325 f.

¹²² Hermann Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, trans. William Urwick, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1892), 345.

¹²³ It is interesting to note that this is the first time in this chapter that we find unconscious phenomena ascribed to the heart — as they are also in Bavinck.

¹²⁴ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 346.

¹²⁵ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 348.

¹²⁶ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 349.

¹²⁷ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 349.

heading texts are mentioned which ascribe emotions, resolves, thoughts, faith, and the religious walk to the heart.¹²⁸ So, although expressing himself in a somewhat more involved manner than the other investigators we have considered, Cremer would fundamentally agree with them in making the heart the central organ of man, the concentration-point of his personal life.

We turn next to the Hebrew-English lexicon of Brown, Driver, and Briggs, published in 1907, and probably the outstanding Old Testament lexicon in the English language today. What does it say about the Old Testament words לֵב and לִבָּב? Ten meanings are distinguished, as follows: (1) the inner man, in contrast to the outer; (2) the inner man as soul, comprehending mind, affections, and will; (3) mind, including references to knowledge, thinking, reflection, and memory; (4) inclinations, resolutions, and determinations of the will; (5) conscience; (6) moral character; (7) the man himself; (8) seat of the appetites; (9) seat of the emotions and passions; and (10) seat of courage.¹²⁹ It will be seen that this range of meaning [241] accords very well with what we have found in the other studies.

There remains to be considered what is the most recent New Testament lexicon in existence, the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* by Gerhard Kittel, the publication of which was begun in 1938 and is still in process of completion.¹³⁰ Fortunately, the word καρδία has been treated in this lexicon, which will probably be the most thorough work of its kind in existence when it has finally been completed. The Old Testament meaning of the concept לֵב is first taken up. The chief meaning of heart in the Old Testament, according to this lexicon, is the metaphorical one, as standing for “*das Innerste des Menschen*.”¹³¹

¹²⁸ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 349–50.

¹²⁹ F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1907), 523–25.

¹³⁰ Ed. note: ET: *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, c1964–c1976). The article “καρδία, καρδιογνωστῆς, σκληροκαρδία,” including “לֵב, לִבָּב in the Old Testament” by Friedrich Baumgärtel and “καρδία in the New Testament” by Johannes Behm can be found, respectively, in 3:605–07, and 3:611–13. We will supply the English translation from *TDNT* (with its own punctuation) in the citations that follow.

¹³¹ Friedrich Baumgärtel, “Lebh im Alten Testament,” in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938), 3:609; ET: “innermost part of man.”

As such the heart is called the seat of psychical-spiritual powers and capacities. Four meanings are further distinguished under this general classification: (1) the heart as the seat of the emotions; (2) as the seat of the intellectual functions; (3) as the seat of volitional functions; and (4) as the seat of man's religious-moral disposition.¹³² In connection with (3), the following statements are significant: *“Die Willenshaltung, der Charakter, wurzelt im Herzen. Soll das Willensleben in die rechte Richtung gelenkt werden, so gilt es die Erneuerung des Herzens, Ezechiel 18:31. Der ganze Mensch mit seinem inneren Sein und Wollen ist in לֵב begriffen.”*¹³³ In connection with (4), note the following: *“Mit dem Herzen dient man Gott; in ihm wohnt die Furcht vor Gott; das [242] Herz nimmt die Lehren Gottes auf; das Herz der Frommen vertraut auf Got.”*¹³⁴

The article proceeds to point out that among the Greeks there is, generally speaking, no conception of καρδιά as the seat of mental functions, particularly not of intellectual processes.¹³⁵ It continues to show that in the Septuagint καρδιά is the most common rendering for the Hebrew לֵב, and that καρδιά therefore retains in the Greek version of the Bible the wide range of meaning of its Hebrew counterpart.¹³⁶ Καρδιά is therefore in the Septuagint the organ of man's personal life, the concentration-point of man's spiritual personality, and hence also the source and seat of his religious and moral life. Καρδιά always refers to the wholeness and the unity of the inner life, which expresses itself in a wide diversity of psychical-spiritual functions.¹³⁷

Going on now to the New Testament, what does καρδιά mean there? First it is pointed out that the New Testament use of the term aligns itself not with

¹³² Baumgärtel, “Lebh im Alten Testament,” 3:610–11.

¹³³ Baumgärtel, “Lebh im Alten Testament,” 3:610; ET: “Attitude of will, or character, is rooted in the heart. If the will is inclined in the right direction this is renewal of heart (Ez. 18:31). The whole man with his inner being and willing is comprised in לֵב.”

¹³⁴ Baumgärtel, “Lebh im Alten Testament,” 3:611; “With the heart one serves God. In it dwells the fear of God. The heart accepts the divine teachings. The heart of the righteous trusts in God.”

¹³⁵ Johannes Behm, “Kardia,” in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938), 3:612.

¹³⁶ Behm, “Kardia,” 3:612.

¹³⁷ Behm, “Kardia,” 3:613.

the Greek interpretation but with the Old Testament conception. Even more strongly than the Septuagint does the New Testament emphasize that the heart is the chief organ of the psychical-spiritual life, and the center of man to which God addresses Himself.¹³⁸ The first [243] meaning of καρδιά given is that of central organ of the body and seat of physical life-power. Then the article proceeds to the second, and main meaning:

*Dass das Herz der Mittelpunkt des inneren Lebens des Menschen ist, wo alle seelischen und geistigen Kräfte und Funktionen ihren Sitz oder Ursprung haben, wird auf mannigfache Weise vom NT bezeugt.*¹³⁹

(a) *Im Herzen wohnen die Empfindungen und Affekte, die Begierden und Leidenschaften.*¹⁴⁰ (b) *Das Herz ist der Sitz des Verstandes, der Quellort der Gedanken und Erwägungen.*¹⁴¹ (c) *Das Herz ist der Sitz des Willens, die Quelle der Entschlüsse.*¹⁴² (d) *So ist das Herz vor allen Dingen die eine zentrale Stelle im Menschen, an die Gott sich wendet, in der das religiöse Leben wurzelt, die die sittliche Haltung bestimmt.*¹⁴³

The treatment of heart in Kittel, therefore, abundantly confirms the point that the conception of the heart which Bavinck has worked out in his *Bijbelsche*

¹³⁸ Behm, "Kardia," 3:614. The German here, which is difficult to translate, has, "*Die Stelle im Menschen, an der Gott sich bezeugt.*" ET: "The place in man at which God bears witness to Himself."

¹³⁹ Behm, "Kardia," 3:614. ET: "That the heart is the centre of the inner life of man and the source or seat of all the forces and functions of soul and spirit is attested in many different ways in the NT."

¹⁴⁰ Behm, "Kardia," 3:614; ET: "In the heart dwell feelings and emotions, desires and passions."

¹⁴¹ Behm, "Kardia," 3:615; ET: "The heart is the seat of understanding, the source of thought and reflection."

¹⁴² Behm, "Kardia," 3:615; ET: "The heart is the seat of the will, the source of resolve." The following remarks, made under (c), are significant: "*Daher fasst sich in der καρδιά das ganze innere Wesen des Menschen zusammen im Gegensatz zur Außenseite. . . . Das Herz, das Innerste, repräsentiert das Ich, die Person.*" ET: "Thus καρδιά comes to stand for the whole of the inner being of man in contrast to his external side. . . . The heart, the innermost part of man, represents the ego, the person."

¹⁴³ Behm, "Kardia," 3:615; ET: "Thus the heart is supremely the one centre in man to which God turns, in which the religious life is rooted, which determines moral conduct." Selected Scripture references are cited under each point.

Psychologie is in all its basic emphases correct. As far as the main points are concerned, between Kittel and Bavinck there is complete agreement.

Bavinck's View Compared with the Results of These Studies

Summarizing, now, the findings recorded in this chapter, we may say that Bavinck's view of the heart has been overwhelmingly corroborated by not just several, but by all the investigators who have put their hand to this problem. It seems to be universally agreed that what the heart means in Scripture is [244] precisely what we have delineated early in the chapter, and more completely in chapter 1, as Bavinck's view. All the elements that he mentions as belonging to the heart are found again and again in these investigations, which cover a period of approximately a hundred years. Surely a remarkable testimony to the correctness of Bavinck's view, and to the unity and consistency of the Scriptural teaching on the heart! Certainly if anything at all has been established by these studies in Biblical psychology, it is that, according to Scripture, the heart is the center of human personality, the source of all man's mental functions, the determiner of his moral direction, and the seat of his religious life.

I shall not belabor the reader by summarizing these studies once more. Just a few matters deserve notice. First of all, it will perhaps have been observed that quite a number of the studies mentioned that the heart is called in Scripture the seat of the conscience.¹⁴⁴ As far as I know, however, this thought does not occur in Bavinck. In his *Beginselen der psychologie* Bavinck makes conscience an activity of the intellect, specifically of the practical intellect.¹⁴⁵ So here is one difference between Bavinck and these studies. Another point of interest concerns Bavinck's

¹⁴⁴ See above, footnotes 10, 24, 38, 65, 74, 95, 96, 121, and 129.

¹⁴⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 111–12. See also footnote 69 in the same volume. ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 160–61. Ed. note: The note reads: "According to Scotus, Bonaventure, Durand and others, conscience was a *habitus*; Perkins described it as a *potentia*. But Thomas, Mastricht, Ames, Witsius, and many others correctly judged it to be an activity of the understanding (Dutch: *verstand*)." Although Bavinck would not deny that the activity of the intellect is intimately related to the heart, still he nowhere directly connects the conscience with the heart.

statement that in the heart is [245] found the domain of the unconscious.¹⁴⁶ This point we have not found in the various studies consulted, except for a bare reference in Cremer to the fact that in the heart the unconscious impulses and drives are concentrated as well as the conscious ones.¹⁴⁷ However, in developing this point Bavinck points out, on the basis of Scripture, that the heart is the most secret part of man, hidden from others and even in part from ourselves, and therefore in the last analysis only God can search and know the heart.¹⁴⁸ This thought, that the heart is hidden and can be known only by God, does occur in the other studies;¹⁴⁹ and in this sense we can say that they would corroborate Bavinck's equation of the heart with the unconscious.

It will be remembered that attention was called, in passing, to certain one-sided views of the heart found in these investigations. Wendt, for instance, seems to make the heart *primarily* the seat of the reflective consciousness.¹⁵⁰ Simon, on the other hand, wants to make the heart *primarily* the seat of feeling.¹⁵¹ And Fletcher, as we have seen, appears to teach that the heart is *primarily* the center of willing.¹⁵² However, [246] as was pointed out above, these are all inadequate views. If according to Scripture, as these investigations have abundantly demonstrated, the heart is the seat of thinking *and* willing *and* feeling, then it would certainly seem to follow that one cannot make the heart *primarily* the seat of any one of these functions. In fact, the very point of the Biblical teaching about the heart, it seems to me, is that it is an error to ascribe primacy to any one of these functions, since the Scriptures so clearly indicate that the heart is basic to them all, and that therefore the only "primacy" that can be spoken of in human nature is the "primacy of the heart." And then we must understand by the heart precisely what Scripture understands by it: namely, the center and seat of all of

¹⁴⁶ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 61. For a more complete discussion of this point, see chapter 1 of this thesis, pp. 15–18.

¹⁴⁷ See above, footnote 123.

¹⁴⁸ See above, footnote 146.

¹⁴⁹ See above, footnotes 9, 25, 35, and 65.

¹⁵⁰ See above, footnote 34.

¹⁵¹ See above, footnote 79.

¹⁵² See above, footnote 98.

man's functions, but not of "primarily" this or that function. On this point, then, Bavinck, who understood the heart in its rich, full, Scriptural sense as including all of man's functions, has seen more clearly than some of these investigators.

To what extent was Bavinck dependent on these other studies? This is hard to say. His *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, in which he chiefly develops his view of the centrality of the heart, unfortunately contains no references to other literature. These chapters were written as popular articles for a magazine, and hence contain no footnotes whatever. Bavinck himself, in a brief preface to this volume, admits that these studies can lay no claim to completeness. It is unfortunate that Bavinck did not work over this material in a more scholarly way and in a more thorough manner: had he done so, the result would have been more consistent and more [247] satisfactory. From this book, then, it is impossible to determine on what sources Bavinck leaned; although his indebtedness to these previous investigations of Biblical psychology is evident on many a page. However, Bavinck also has a chapter on "The Psychology of Scripture" in his *Beginselen der psychologie*; to this chapter he appends a footnote in which he refers to Simon's *Psychologie des Apostels Paulus* as containing a good bibliography on Biblical psychology, mentioning specifically the following authors: Zeller, Delitzsch, Göschel, Beck, and Cremer.¹⁵³ He also refers in the same footnote to Volume Two of his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*. If we turn to page 566 of this volume (1918 edition),¹⁵⁴ we find that the following titles are referred to: Oehler's *Old Testament Theology*, Delitzsch's *System of Biblical Psychology*, Delitzsch's article, "Herz," in the third edition of the *Protestantische Real-Encyklopädie*, Laidlaw's *Bible Doctrine of Man*, and Van Leeuwen's *Bijbelsche Anthropologie*.¹⁵⁵ So we may conclude by saying that Bavinck was apparently acquainted with the chief contributions to Biblical

¹⁵³ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 15, footnote 5. Since this book was written in 1897, we can understand why Bavinck included only the earlier works. It is surprising, however, that no mention is made of Wendt or Dickson.

¹⁵⁴ Ed. note: There is no equivalent of this page in the ET *Reformed Dogmatics*, because the translation did not retain Bavinck's practice of providing particular bibliographies before each major section. The page Hoekema refers to begins section 284 (RD, 2:530, chapter 12, "Human Nature").

¹⁵⁵ This last-named book, published in Utrecht in 1906, I have not been able to obtain.

psychology available in his day, and probably used them. However, it is impossible to determine with certainty to what extent he leaned on these studies in his *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie* of 1920, and to what extent the latter volume represents an original investigation on his part. [248]

Does Scripture Leave Room for a Primacy of the Intellect?

There is one more question which deserves some further attention before we leave the subject of Biblical psychology, and that is the problem of the relation between the intellect and the heart. Some of the theologians we have studied, notably Thomas and Calvin, have spoken of a certain “primacy of the intellect,” giving the impression that it is the intellect which rules and determines man’s life. It has been shown, however, that according to Scripture, what really gives direction to man’s life is his heart. What, now, is the precise relation between these two? Does the intellect, according to Scripture, rule man’s life in any sense? If so, what is the relation between the intellect and the heart, out of which are the issues of man’s life?

We have already noted that, according to Bavinck, there is a very intimate connection between the heart and the intellect; that, in fact, the heart is the source for the activity of the intellect.¹⁵⁶ We found that, according to Bavinck, the word νοῦς in Scripture denotes the organ of thinking; but that this activity of thinking is not found loosely by itself in man, but hangs together with his entire personality. Man thinks as he is; the νοῦς always has a particular moral quality; it is no neutral faculty, but is intimately related to man’s character — and Bavinck adds several Scriptural passages to prove his point. The νοῦς always has a certain moral disposition; it may be fleshly, defiled, or vain. Hence the νοῦς, as also the rest of [249] man’s powers, must be renewed, in which case it becomes an organ of the Spirit, and serves the law of God.¹⁵⁷

Is this view, of the intimate connection between the νοῦς and man’s character, confirmed by the other Biblical studies? It ought to be noted first of all that the

¹⁵⁶ See above, pp. 12–13, 38.

¹⁵⁷ Bavinck, *Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie*, 69; see above, p. 13.

νοῦς, as Paul uses it, does not denote merely abstract, theoretical thinking. In fact, Pedersen points out that what we call objective thinking did not exist for the Israelites, but that their thinking was always practical, and directed to practical ends.¹⁵⁸ For this reason, too, the Hebrews never spoke of abstract knowledge as such but of *wisdom* as the highest intellectual attainment of man. What, then, did νοῦς mean in Paul? Dickson points out that it stood for not merely the functions of the reflective intelligence but also for those of moral judgment,¹⁵⁹ adding on a later page that the functions of the νοῦς in Paul bear especially on the moral life.¹⁶⁰ And Cremer similarly indicates that νοῦς in the New Testament is not so much the ability to think and reflect as the organ of moral thinking and knowing.¹⁶¹ So we may conclude that the νοῦς in Paul, although it would not exclude the activities of what we ordinarily call “thinking,” was broader and richer than our word “intellect,” including the functions of moral judgment and moral decision as well. [250]

Let us now go on to notice how, according to Scripture, the heart is most intimately related to the activity of the νοῦς. Wendt points out that the νοῦς in Paul is only a specialization of one of the powers of the heart, made necessary by the refinement of language, but that the heart in Paul nevertheless still continues to exercise the functions which are ascribed to the νοῦς, and therefore to retain its wide, general meaning.¹⁶² This is a very significant statement. It suggests that by νοῦς is meant, not a power separate and distinct from the heart, but one of the functions of the heart itself, singled out for purposes of specialization. There is then a very close connection between what is in the mind and what is in the heart, according to Scripture; in fact, the mind is simply the heart itself, seen from a particular point of view.

Wendt, in fact, says on another page that the heart, according to its basic disposition, furnishes the direction in which man’s thoughts move.¹⁶³ In similar

¹⁵⁸ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 106.

¹⁵⁹ Dickson, *St. Paul’s Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 204.

¹⁶⁰ Dickson, *St. Paul’s Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 210.

¹⁶¹ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 436.

¹⁶² Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 135.

¹⁶³ Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, 31.

vein, Delitzsch points out that the heart is the birthplace of the thoughts, quoting several passages from Scripture in substantiation; “Wise thoughts,” he continues, “as well as inventions and deceits originate from the heart: it is the heart which forms them, and devises them.”¹⁶⁴ Wörner asserts that wisdom, in the Scriptural sense, is morally determined, and that hence wisdom and foolishness are primarily matters of the heart.¹⁶⁵ Laidlaw makes this [251] statement:

“Mind” and “heart,” as these terms are used through the Bible generally, never do imply that distinction between the intellectual and the emotional nature which we denote by them even in popular language, much less the stricter division of man’s faculties into the understanding and the will, or into the intellectual and the active powers.¹⁶⁶

He adds that precisely because the heart of man is corrupt, therefore all the powers of man, including the understanding, are corrupt as well.¹⁶⁷ He further points out on another page that mind (νοῦς) in Scripture may be either a mind of the flesh (Col. 2:18) or a mind renewed in the Spirit (Rom. 12:2, Eph. 4:23).¹⁶⁸

Simon also makes remarks to the same effect. After pointing out that the Orientals “thought with their hearts,” and that therefore the Semites were by temperament keenly aware of the participation of the heart in all psychical and spiritual activities, specifically in the activities of the intellect, he goes on to state that even for us Occidentals the tendency of the heart determines the outcome of abstract thinking.¹⁶⁹ Fletcher points out that there is an intimate connection between heart and mind (διάνοια) in Heb. 8:10 and 10:16,¹⁷⁰ and between heart and γνώμη in Rev. 17:17,¹⁷¹ further showing that when the νοῦς rejects the knowledge of God, it becomes reprobate (Rom. 1:28) or defiled

¹⁶⁴ Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 294.

¹⁶⁵ Wörner, *Biblische Anthropologie*, 100.

¹⁶⁶ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 226 f.

¹⁶⁷ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 226 f.

¹⁶⁸ Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 125.

¹⁶⁹ Simon, *Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus*, 27.

¹⁷⁰ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 92.

¹⁷¹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 79.

(Titus 1:15).¹⁷² Pedersen asserts that, for the Hebrews, the soul is [252] wholly present in all its works,¹⁷³ and that therefore wisdom is the faculty of the whole of the soul, as will is the direction of the whole of the soul.¹⁷⁴ Cremer, similarly, shows that it is a peculiarity of Scripture to refer the activity denoted by νοεῖν to the heart (John 12:40), adding, “As the νοῦς is the organ of the spirit, it is at the same time a function of the heart.”¹⁷⁵ Νόημα, he continues, is a product of the action of the νοῦς, or of the καρδιά.¹⁷⁶ Διάνοια, another related word, is both a function and a product of the heart.¹⁷⁷ Summarizing, Cremer says, “It thus appears that the personal life of the man is concerned in the νοεῖν; that it is therefore of a moral character.”¹⁷⁸ Kittel’s *Wörterbuch*, under “Νοέω,” points out that in John 12:40 the New Testament conception of the heart is shown to be in complete agreement with the Old, namely as the center for the activity of thinking. Then follows this significant sentence: “*Das Erkennen trägt als Funktion des Zentralorgans des menschlichen Geisteslebens religiös-sittliches Gepräge.*”¹⁷⁹ In other words, since thinking is a function of the heart, which is the central organ of man’s moral and religious life, it will always necessarily bear a certain moral and religious stamp. [253]

All of these statements add up to just one thing; the functioning of the intellect is directly and immediately determined, according to Scripture, by what is in the heart. The heart is the mental, moral, and religious center of man. As the heart is, so is the whole man, and so is also the intellect. Thinking, in Scripture, is not an activity sundered from the rest of man, but one which comes up from and is determined by the heart. The Bible does not recognize the possibility of

¹⁷² Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 94.

¹⁷³ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 128.

¹⁷⁴ Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 127.

¹⁷⁵ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 437.

¹⁷⁶ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 438.

¹⁷⁷ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 439.

¹⁷⁸ Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, 437.

¹⁷⁹ Johannes Behm and Ernst Würthwein, “Νοέω,” in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938), 4:949; ET: “Knowledge has religious and moral significance as a function of the central organ of the life of the human spirit.” Cf. also Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, 2:73.

“*voraussetzungslos*” thinking, of purely “objective” thinking, of which we hear so much in scientific circles today. The study just completed has made this abundantly clear. All thinking is a product of the heart, and therefore reflects the dispositions, inclinations, prejudices, goals, desires, and drives which are in a man’s heart.

That being the case, it follows that the moral and religious condition of the heart will naturally color a man’s thinking. The thoughts of a man cannot be of a higher moral quality than the man himself is. Man expresses, in his thoughts, the specific disposition of his heart. Scripture teaches very plainly, however, that the heart is either fleshly or spiritual, either renewed or unrenewed, either regenerate or unregenerate. And hence, according to Scripture, the mind of man may be either fleshly, defiled, vain, or reprobate on the one hand; or renewed, spiritual, or pure on the other hand. The regenerate or unregenerate condition of the heart, in other words, is bound to express itself in the thoughts. And the all-important thing about man’s thoughts, according to the Bible, is whether they [254] are pure or fleshly; whether, in other words, they spring up out of a heart that is still enslaved to sin or one that has been renewed by the Spirit of God. Not the thoughts as such but the disposition of heart behind them is for Scripture of supreme importance.

It will be seen, therefore, that also as regards the relation between heart and intellect Bavinck’s position has been shown to be fundamentally correct and in harmony with Scriptural teaching. In the light, now, of this Scriptural teaching, what becomes of the “primacy of the intellect”? Is it the intellect which rules and determines man’s life? On the basis of the study just concluded we shall have to answer this question decidedly in the negative.¹⁸⁰ It is not the intellect which ultimately determines the direction of man’s life, according to Scripture, but the heart. In fact, the functioning of the intellect, in Scripture, is directed

¹⁸⁰That the Scriptures do not teach a primacy of the intellect is confirmed by the following quotation from one of the very earliest studies in Biblical psychology, written in 1769, the *Fundamenta Psychologiae ex Sacra Scriptura sic collecta*, by Magnus Friedrich Roos: “*Scriptura de cogitationibus non ita loquitur ut voluntatem vel volitiones sejungat, quemadmodum id in scholis philosophorum fit, qui discrimen inter intellectum ac voluntatem ingens constituerunt et intellectui regimen, voluntati obsequium attribuarunt.*” Quoted in Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 244.

and determined by the heart; the moral and religious disposition of the heart is reflected and mirrored in the activity of the intellect. What a man thinks in his νοῦς always has moral implications, which are dependent on what a man is in the totality of his being: that is, in his heart. [255]

It may still be admitted that the intellect performs a certain “guiding function” in the life of man; this point will be taken up in greater detail later. But, whatever that “guiding function” be, it can never be sundered from the centrality of the heart. That “guiding function,” too, must be directed by the heart. The intellect can “guide” only as the heart determines, since the intellect receives its content and its disposition from the heart. If the heart is regenerate, the intellect will “guide” in one way; but if the heart is unregenerate, the intellect will “guide” in an entirely different way. The “guiding function” of the intellect, therefore, must be subservient to the sovereignty of the heart in man; for “out of the heart are the issues of life,” also of the life of the intellect. Hence what ultimately rules in man is not his intellect but his heart.

I believe that this represents the teaching of Scripture as to what is sovereign in man. Any attempt to ascribe primacy (in the sense of sovereignty) to the intellect, as though it were the final ruler in the life of man, not only involves one in an unsound faculty psychology, but also utterly fails to do justice to the Scriptural teaching on the centrality of the heart. Such an attempt, therefore, can have no proper place in a truly Christian anthropology. [256]

Chapter 8

An Evaluation of Bavinck's Psychology

Having completed both our historical survey and our Biblical study, we are now ready to evaluate the position of Herman Bavinck in the light of all these investigations. Before proceeding to this evaluation, however, we must briefly consider one more question. From the review of Bavinck's position given in chapter 1 of this thesis, it becomes evident that Bavinck held to a certain type of faculty psychology. The faculty theory of psychology, however, has been severely criticized by competent scholars, especially in recent years. In order, therefore, to be able to evaluate Bavinck properly, we shall have to take a brief look at some of these criticisms.¹ Then, as we discuss Bavinck's psychology, we shall have to see whether these criticisms also apply, wholly or in part, to this position.

Some Criticisms of the Faculty Psychology

Probably one of the most famous criticisms of the faculty psychology was made by John Locke, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, originally published in 1690. Let us note, first of all, a paragraph in which he makes clear the dangers [257] inhering in the conception of "faculties":

These powers of the mind, viz., of perceiving and of preferring, are usually called by another name: and the ordinary way of speaking, is that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul, that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For when we say, the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul; that it is or is not free; that it determines the interior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, etc.; though these and the like expressions,

¹ Needless to say, no attempt shall be made to conduct an exhaustive review of the criticisms of the faculty psychology. We shall merely touch on some of the high spots.

by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense: yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.²

The criticism which Locke here levels against the faculty theory, it will be seen, is this: that the faculties are often construed as being distinct agents or beings, which perform the actions ascribed to them as if they were so many self-existent “persons.”³ He goes on to say that liberty or freedom is merely a power, which can therefore be attributed only to agents, but not to the will, which is also a power.⁴ To ask whether the will is free, is to assume that the will is a separate agent, and therefore to betray an unsound psychology. What is free is not the will but the man. [258]

In section 17 of the same chapter, Locke again reveals the absurdity of the language often used by faculty psychologists:

For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say, “The will orders,” and “The will is free,”) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which those actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion; as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking; and we may as properly say, that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the will chooses, or that the understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say, that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking.

² John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: Warwick House, [1881]), book 2, chapter 21, section 6.

³ It will be recalled that exactly the same criticism was made in this thesis of the faculty doctrine as propounded by Thomas Aquinas.

⁴ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book 2, chapter 21, sections 14–16.

According to this passage, it is wrong to say that the will chooses, since it is the whole self (Locke would say “the mind”) that chooses; it is equally wrong to say that the understanding conceives, since it is the whole self that conceives. Furthermore, as Locke continues to say, it is also wrong to assert that “the will directs the understanding,” since the will and the understanding are both only powers of the mind or soul, and not independent agencies. If Locke is correct here, and it is my conviction that he is, then the converse is equally true: it is then similarly wrong to say that the understanding directs the will, since both understanding and will are only powers, and since direction or sovereignty can only be ascribed to the self which exercises these powers. If this is so, *then there can of course be no primacy of the intellect* in the sense [259] that the intellect is sovereign over the other powers of man.⁵

Locke continues his attack on the traditional faculty doctrine by saying that the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action. “For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing, nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing, or the power of singing on the power of dancing.”⁶ Now it might be objected, Locke continues, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of a certain volition. “But in all these it is not one power that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do.”⁷ On this basis, then, it is not correct to say that the intellect directs the will, but only that man himself directs the will: [260]

⁵ It is important to note in this connection the close relation that exists between the type of faculty psychology which makes the faculties agents and the theory that one “faculty” is sovereign over another or over all the others. These two concepts hang together, as is evident from Locke’s criticism. Only when a faculty like the intellect, for instance, is construed as a sort of independent agent, does it make sense to say that the intellect has the primacy or rule over the rest of man’s functions. If, now, the view that the faculties are agents will have to be repudiated, in the interests of a sound psychology, naturally the theory of the primacy or sovereignty of the intellect will have to be repudiated as well. This is precisely what I propose to show, in the remainder of this thesis.

⁶ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book 2, chapter 21, section 18.

⁷ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book 2, chapter 21, section 19. It will be recalled that statements very similar to this were made in the chapter on Augustine.

The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction; to the question, "What determines the will?" the true and proper answer is, The mind.⁸ For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way.⁹

George F. Stout, in a volume published in 1899, similarly criticizes the traditional faculty psychology. He points out that to refer a mental state or process to a certain faculty does not explain anything:

To say that an individual mind possesses a certain faculty is merely to say that it is capable of certain states or processes. To assign the faculty as a cause, or as a real condition of the states or processes, is evidently to explain in a circle, or in other words it is a mere failure to explain at all. Thus, it is futile to say that a particular voluntary decision is due to will as a faculty. It is equally futile to say that extraordinary persistence in a voluntary decision is due to an extraordinary strength of Will, or of Will-power, or of the Faculty of Will.¹⁰

Here another fallacy of the faculty psychology is revealed: namely, the presumption that to assign a mental act to a faculty as its cause is a real explanation of that act. This is not to deny, however, that referring a process to a faculty may have some value for purposes of classification. Some kind of classification is, in fact, necessary for every psychologist.¹¹ But, Stout continues, many of the earlier faculty psychologists thought that to classify a mental experience was to explain it: [261]

They did not fully realize that they were only classifying and not explaining. They would probably have repudiated the charge that they treated faculties as real agencies if the charge had been distinctly formulated. But none the less, they frequently used

⁸ Locke seems to mean by mind what we would call the soul.

⁹ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book 2, chapter 21, section 29. Locke says in another connection (section 20) that he does not wish to deny that there are faculties; but only that the faculties are distinct agents.

¹⁰ George Frederick Stout, *A Manual of Psychology* (London: University Correspondence College Press, 1899), 104.

¹¹ Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, 105.

language which implied causal relation both between faculty and special process and between different faculties.¹²

In other words, the proponents of this faculty psychology did not deliberately set out to make the faculties distinct agencies in the soul; in fact, they probably did not even want to do so. But nevertheless, in spite of their good resolutions, when they came to describe the functioning of the faculties, they often used language which treated the faculties as if they were distinct agencies. We have seen this in Thomas Aquinas who, though he denied in his definition of faculty that the faculties were separate agents, yet frequently described them as though they were such agents. We shall have occasion to see the same thing in Bavinck.

Let us notice another statement of the error of the faculty psychology, found in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, published in 1901. In the article on "Faculty" the following statement is made: "We find in many of the earlier psychologists a tendency to treat faculties as if they were causes, or real conditions, of the states or processes in which they are manifested, and to speak of them as positive agencies interacting with each other."¹³ Here, then, we find summarized the two chief objections to the faculty theory: (1) that the faculties are treated as causes; [262] and (2) that they are treated as agencies. Both of these objections were made by Locke also. Basically, however, these two are only different aspects of the one fundamental objection, that the faculties are treated as distinct agencies. For to say that a faculty is a cause or a condition of some mental state is to imply that it is a sort of agency which has power to originate certain kinds of mental states.

Another very important and rather thorough criticism of the faculty psychology has been made by a Dutch author, J. Brederveld, in his book, *De leer der zielsvermogens (The Doctrine of the Faculties of the Soul)*.¹⁴ He defines faculty

¹² Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, 106.

¹³ George Frederick Stout and J. Mark Baldwin, "Faculty," in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. J. Mark Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

¹⁴ Unfortunately, there is no date in this book. The time of publication, however, must have been between 1923 and 1926. For Brederveld refers to the second edition of Herman Bavinck's *Beginselen der psychologie*, published in 1923; and J. H. Bavinck, in his *Inleiding in de zielkunde* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1926), refers to Brederveld's book.

(*vermogen*) as “the unknown ground for an irreducible function.”¹⁵ By irreducible he means one which is not further analyzable into parts. Faculties, however, may never be treated as independent entities.¹⁶ Because this has usually happened in the traditional faculty psychologies, Brederveld goes on to say that, although one can properly speak of faculties in the soul, one cannot properly maintain a faculty psychology.¹⁷

He goes on to point out several errors of the faculty psychology. One is that this psychology, instead of beginning with the unified soul which is basic and determinative for all [263] the separate functions, begins with the separate functions, building its system on them. The result is a very atomistic, pluralistic psychology.¹⁸ Another error is that the faculty psychology designates as simple faculties what are really very complex mental acts. Such so-called faculties as intellect and will, for instance, are not simple, elementary acts but extremely complex and involved mental occurrences. By treating such complex acts as faculties, these psychologists become guilty of oversimplification.¹⁹ They speak of exercising and developing the faculties, thus ascribing to the faculties what should properly be ascribed only to the soul itself.²⁰ Furthermore, what they thus call faculties are not really organic unities, since they never function in isolation. What is designated as the “cognitive faculty” (*het kenvermogen*), for instance, is supposed to refer to the intellectual functions. These intellectual functions, however, never occur in isolation, but are always accompanied by elements of feeling and will. Man can never begin to know or to learn anything unless striving or willing are operative. Further, many intellectual elements occur in contexts

¹⁵ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, [1925]), 133. The original reads: “onbekende grond van een onontleedbare functie.”

¹⁶ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 134.

¹⁷ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 134.

¹⁸ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 135.

¹⁹ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 135.

²⁰ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 136. Even Bavinck is quoted as exemplifying this error: “By means of training, permanent proficiencies for performing certain actions are drilled into the faculties.” Quoted from Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 2nd ed. (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1923), 54.

where we cannot really speak of *knowing* or *thinking* in the strict sense of the term: for example, in day-dreaming.²¹ [264]

Another basic error of the traditional faculty psychology is that it personifies the faculties.²² In fact, Brederveld specifically levels this charge against Bavinck on page 109 of his book, saying that Bavinck frequently falls into a personification of his faculties. Brederveld further points out that even the faculty psychologists, in their definitions, usually make the faculties only *attributes* of the soul; but, in actual practice, they fall into a *personification* of the faculties.²³ Such personification he calls “mythology.”²⁴ He illustrates his point by referring to Lange, who called the various faculties taught by Gall a parliament, in which each member pleaded for the special interests of his own district.²⁵

Still another error of the faculty psychology lies in its classification and discussion of the faculties.²⁶ There may be some value in the various classifications which faculty psychologists have made. But the manner in which this classification is made the basis for discussion is not sound. The various faculties are discussed separately, after each other; sometimes [265] first the “lower” powers and then the “higher.” But the trouble with this method of discussing the faculties is that what should be united is thus separated. So, for instance, it is impossible to discuss even so comparatively simple a psychological process as perception without referring to emotional and volitional phenomena.²⁷

²¹ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 136.

²² Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 137.

²³ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 137.

²⁴ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 139.

²⁵ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 139. Cf. a similar illustration from T. Hoekstra's *Paedagogische Psychologie* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1930), 43: “In the traditional faculty psychology the faculties became independent beings, which performed all kinds of actions. The Ego is a monarch so bound by the constitution of the land that he actually has nothing more to say. The faculties are the ministers who, in the name of the monarch, but otherwise in a wholly independent fashion, rule the land.” A similar statement was made on p. 96 of this thesis, in connection with Aquinas's psychology: “The soul reigns but does not rule.”

²⁶ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 140.

²⁷ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 140.

Finally, Brederveld also observes, as did Stout before him, that the faculty psychology uses an erroneous principle of explanation. The faculty psychology, he says, dissolves difficult psychological problems by simply referring the phenomena involved to various personified faculties — so, for example, a good memory is explained as being due to the exercise of a faculty of memory.²⁸ The trouble with “explaining” through faculties, he further remarks, is that by such “explanation” you invariably construe the faculty as a separate being, making it perform what is actually done by the soul.²⁹

Summarizing, now, we may note that two of Brederveld’s objections against the faculty psychology have occurred before: (1) that the faculties are personified, and (2) that the faculties are erroneously used as principles of explanation. In addition, Brederveld offers these new points of criticism: (3) the faculty psychology disrupts the unity of the soul by beginning with the separate faculties instead of with the soul; (4) the faculty psychology oversimplifies, treating as simple faculties what are really complex acts; and (5) the faculty psychology implies that the various “faculties” function separately, whereas they always function together. Let us keep in mind [266] these five points of criticism as we proceed to evaluate Bavinck, and see to what extent his psychology would be open to these same objections.

Bavinck’s Emphasis on the Primacy of the Heart

In this evaluation, we should like to begin with Bavinck’s emphasis on the “primacy of the heart.” We do not actually find this expression in Bavinck, but I have coined it to express the tact that in Bavinck the heart is made central and primary in man. What the heart stands for in Bavinck’s psychology has been clearly and fully worked out in chapter 1 of this thesis, and summarized in chapter 7; hence this material will not be repeated here. Suffice it to remind the reader of the very close connection Bavinck posits between the heart and the activities of the intellect, so that even the so-called rational functions of man take their rise from and

²⁸ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 141.

²⁹ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 145.

are directed by the heart.³⁰ But the same holds true for the will, which likewise has its source in the heart and is directed by the heart.³¹ Both of these points are summarized in a statement quoted on page 70 of this thesis: “Intellect and will have a common root in the heart of man.” What this means is that both the rational and the volitional functions of man, generally considered of supreme importance in his life, have their center and directive source in the heart. The same holds true for man’s emotional, aesthetic, moral, and religious life. [267]

In chapter 7, dealing with the Biblical teaching on this subject, Bavinck’s view of the heart was abundantly substantiated. Every single one of the studies summarized in that chapter, covering a period of almost a hundred years, revealed fundamentally the same view of the heart that Bavinck had. The terminology varied slightly with the different authors, as could be expected, but still the basic thrust of every investigation was the same: the heart is the core of man’s personality, the primary center of all his mental functions, and the seat of his religious life. A special investigation was made, it will be recalled, into the relation between the heart and the intellect; and it was found that, according to Scripture, the functioning of the intellect is directly and immediately determined by what is in the heart. So Bavinck was found to be correct also on this point.

This precise meaning of the term heart in Scripture Bavinck saw more clearly than any of the four great Christian theologians whom we studied. Augustine, we saw, did not make a great deal of the heart; at least, he did not give the heart a place of primary importance in his system; thus, in making the heart central in his psychology, Bavinck advanced beyond Augustine. In Thomas Aquinas, what is actually primary or sovereign is the intellect — a position directly derived, as we saw, from the Greeks; Bavinck, in making the heart primary, reflected the Biblical view of man in distinction from the Greek conception. Bavinck saw the centrality of the heart more clearly than Luther. As for Calvin, we noted that Calvin still retained the Greek primacy of the intellect, but that he also taught a certain [268] primacy of the heart. However, for him the term heart was predominantly used in the sense of will-plus-affections, to the virtual exclusion (except

³⁰ See above, pp. 12 f., 21, 26 f., 40, 181 f.

³¹ See above, pp. 14 f., 21.

for occasional instances) of man's rational functions. Hence Bavinck corrects Calvin on the meaning and use of the concept heart. For Bavinck the heart does not stand for merely one of man's faculties, as was the case with Calvin, but for the source of all of man's faculties.

All this does not mean, of course, that we should credit Bavinck with having been the first to advance the particular view of the heart which we found in him. Our Biblical investigation showed quite conclusively that many students of Biblical psychology had come to view the heart in the same way long before Bavinck arrived on the scene. But Bavinck did integrate the concept "heart" into his theology and specifically into his anthropology and psychology in a way which, as far as I can judge, was somewhat new. Being both a theologian and a psychologist (at least, let us say, a writer on psychology), Bavinck was able to use the concept "heart" in some unique settings. For example, he was familiar with what the comparatively recent "depth psychologists" had said about the unconscious as the source of the drives and dispositions which are basic to man's conscious life. Knowing what he did about the Scriptural understanding of the heart as the source of all the issues of life, Bavinck located the domain of the unconscious in the heart. The manner in which he worked out this point seems to have been original with him. In Bavinck we also find [269] the thought that in his heart man is able to transcend time³²—an observation which was later adopted by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, and accorded an important place in their system.

In reviewing the work of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, we found that they also made the heart central in their system, which they have called the "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee." They, too, view the heart as the source and center of man's physical and mental life, as the concentration-point of all temporal functions, and as the aspect of man in which he transcends time. For them, as for Bavinck, the heart is the center of man's religious life, the seat of sin, and

³² "Every man carries eternity in his heart; in the life of his spirit he stands above and outside of history; he lives in the past and the past lives in him, for, as Nietzsche says, man cannot forget; and he lives in the future and the future lives in him, for he carries hope eternally in his breast. Hence he can discover something of the interrelatedness of past, present, and future; hence he is at the same time maker and knower of history" (Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der openbaring*, 118; ET: *Philosophy of Revelation*, 114).

the place where spiritual renewal takes place. And they build on a foundation laid by Bavinck when they teach that the heart is the point of departure for all philosophies, and specifically for a Christian philosophy. So we may say that the work of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd also corroborates the correctness of Bavinck's teaching on the heart.

Bavinck's Religious View of Man

Let us notice, as a second point in our evaluation of Bavinck, his fundamentally religious view of man. In our study of Luther we observed that, for him, man must be seen essentially in his relation to God—that one can only know man [270] in his true significance and in his true unity when one sees him in relation to God. We have the same emphasis in Bavinck. In Bavinck we do not study man as an isolated being, but as a being in relationships. The first and foremost relationship of man is to God; the second is to other men.

As regards this first relationship, Bavinck, like Luther, regards man as a sinner by nature, thoroughly depraved in all parts of his being. This depravity does not extend merely to his sensual side, but to his reason and will as well; in fact, it roots in the heart, and from that central source corrupts all of man's nature. Like Luther, Bavinck traced sin back to the evil disposition of the heart which is behind the outward evil acts.

Because man's depravity is so deep and so universal, man needs nothing less than a renewal by the Spirit of God if he is to serve God aright. This renewal, for Bavinck, is wrought in the heart. Regeneration is an inward transformation of the heart of man, and conversion is the outward manifestation of that transformation in the whole life and in all the functions and activities of that life. When God speaks to man, He addresses man in his heart, calling on him to repent and believe. The all-important question, therefore, is the question of the disposition of man's heart with regard to God and the revelation of His grace in Jesus Christ.

It is only as man's heart is renewed by the Spirit that he realizes his essential unity. Only then are his scattered energies and powers united in an all-embracing loyalty; only [271] then is the disintegration of sin replaced by the integration of the service of God. Man is only truly one when he has been born again.

However, even after the believer has been renewed by God's Spirit, Bavinck would say (as did Luther), the old, sinful nature still remains active in him. It is not eradicated by regeneration, though it is in principle overcome. There remains in the believer as long as he is in this life a constant struggle between the new nature and the old. However, this is not a conflict between two parts or aspects of his nature, as Thomas said;³³ but between the whole man as "flesh" and the whole man as "spirit." In this, too, Bavinck agreed with Luther, as well as with Calvin, in opposition to the scholastics.

In all of this, Bavinck was in full accord with Scriptural teaching, and specifically with the Pauline anthropology. Bavinck, like the Reformers before him, rejected the speculative neutrality of the scholastics, expressed especially in their concept of the *liberum arbitrium*. He likewise rejected the intellectualistic, atomistic identification of "spirit" with reason and "flesh" with the passions.

All of this, however, also ties in with his teaching on the heart. In chapter 7, above, it was observed that there are four words in the Scriptures which are most commonly used to designate man as a totality: *soul*, *spirit*, *flesh*, and *heart*.³⁴ It was noted that, though Bavinck discusses all of these terms, [272] he chose to use the concept *heart* to signify what is central and primary in man. Why did he do this? Our Biblical study has helped us to formulate an answer to this question. The term *soul*, though it stands for the subject or all of man's mental and spiritual activities, is not the best one to use in this connection, since moral qualities are not attributed to the soul but to the heart. Man is said in Scripture to have a good heart or an evil heart, but not a good or evil soul. The term *spirit* is not appropriate because it is usually, though not exclusively, associated with the special working of the Divine Spirit; therefore it would admirably serve to indicate what is primary in the regenerate, but not what is primary in the unregenerate. The term *flesh*, on the contrary, when it has an ethical or religious significance, means the old, sinful, unregenerate nature of man; hence, though it

³³ See esp. pp. 99–100 above, and footnote 46 of that chapter.

³⁴ See above, p. 155.

could be used to designate what is primary in the unregenerate, it certainly could not be used with equal propriety in the case of the regenerate man.³⁵

But the term heart is admirably suited to express what is universally primary in man. For, according to Scripture, the heart is basic for both the regenerate and the unregenerate. In the unregenerate man, depravity is seated primarily in his heart, from whence it defiles the whole man. But in the regenerate man, the heart is the center of his renewed nature, so that from this center the renewal effected by the [273] Holy Spirit influences his whole life. And yet the old nature, which remains in believers, also still has its seat in the heart. The heart is both flesh and spirit for the believer; it is the center where the struggle between the old and the new nature primarily takes place. Thus we see the wisdom of taking *heart* to stand for the primary center of man, as Bavinck did, rather than *soul*, *spirit*, or *flesh*. For the heart stands for all the basic aspects of man which Bavinck wishes to emphasize; it can be applied with equal propriety to the regenerate and the unregenerate; and it can even be designated as the area where the great moral struggle of the believer takes place — something which cannot be said of either flesh or spirit, each of which designates only one aspect of that struggle.

The use of the term *heart*, therefore, made it possible for Bavinck fully to integrate his religious view of man with his psychological conception of man. By means of it he was enabled to stress that we deal always with man as a living whole.³⁶ By means of this term, he emphasized that what is primary in man is not a partial aspect of his personality, such as intellect or will, but the core of his entire personality, which is the center and source of all his functions. Through his stress on the primacy of the heart Bavinck also showed that the moral and religious quality of all of man's thoughts and deeds is basically dependent on his inner relationship to God — in other words, on the fundamental disposition of his heart. So we may certainly appreciate the centrality of the heart in Bavinck's [274] anthropology as a psychologically wholesome and thoroughly Scriptural contribution to our understanding of man.

³⁵ Bavinck's discussion of these terms will be found in the references indicated in footnote 1 of chapter 7, p. 156.

³⁶ We have noted Bavinck's emphasis on the whole man on pp. 7–9 of this thesis.

Bavinck's Teaching on the Faculties of the Soul

There is, however, another important aspect of Bavinck's anthropological teaching which we must also consider in order properly to evaluate him. I refer to his doctrine of the faculties in man. Bavinck, as we have seen, held to only two faculties or *vermogens* in man: the knowing-faculty (*het kenvermogen*) and the desiring-faculty (*het begeervermogen*).³⁷ Under these two faculties, Bavinck classified all psychological phenomena. Bavinck himself indicates that this particular division of the faculties was derived from scholastic psychology, and ultimately from Aristotle.³⁸ As we have noted in our historical study, this view, that man has only two faculties, was common to Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin. In Bavinck's day, however, the more modern tripartite division of the faculties into intellect, [275] feeling, and will, had become common.³⁹ In opposition to Tetens, Kant, Schleiermacher, and most moderns, however, Bavinck rejected the doctrine of a separate faculty of feeling.

³⁷ In the second edition of his *Beginselen der psychologie*, published in 1923 after his death, Bavinck did distinguish a third faculty, which he called *het beweegvermogen*, the "faculty of movement" (p. 75; cf. p. 171 of the 1897 edition). ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 99–100. He does nothing with this third faculty, however, continuing his discussion on the basis of two faculties. Also in his "Primaat van verstand of wil" of 1921, he speaks of only two "vermogens." Hence we may conclude that, for all practical purposes, Bavinck recognized only the two faculties mentioned. Ed. note: See the editor's comment in *Foundations of Psychology*, 100, footnote 108: "Bavinck introduces a new term here, *beweegvermogen* (lit. 'faculty of locomotion'), instead of the expected 'faculty of willing.' The idea is this: The phenomena of our experience are distinguishable according to our threefold capacity to know, to desire and to will. But here Bavinck wants to underscore the point that our willing leads to action (movement). Hence, the new triad of knowing, desiring and acting, with the third term capturing Bavinck's choice of *beweegvermogen*."

³⁸ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie* (1897), 19; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 23. Cf. also this statement by T. Hoekstra: "For centuries many psychologists retained the division [of the faculties] into two, classifying the emotions under the conative faculty. Of this mistaken conception Aristotle is the father" (Hoekstra, *Paedagogische Psychologie*, 41).

³⁹ Bavinck himself credits J. N. Tetens with having been the first to co-ordinate the feeling with intellect and will in his Johann Nikolaus Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1777), in Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie* (1897), 51; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 75.

Now our primary concern in this thesis is not the question of the number of “faculties” in man. We may, however, observe in passing that, by speaking of only two faculties in man and attempting to classify all mental phenomena under one or the other of those two, Bavinck made himself guilty of oversimplification. Note, for example, that under the knowing faculty Bavinck subsumes, not only intellect and reason, but also sensation, perception, memory, and imagination.⁴⁰ But surely to say that these are all functions of one faculty is to ignore both the differences between these functions, and the interplay of other mental factors outside the province of Bavinck’s *kenvermogen*! The same thing must be said about the desiring-faculty, which, in Bavinck’s own words, includes not only desire and will, but also “inclination and instinct, pleasure and displeasure, emotion and passion.”⁴¹ But may all of these varied activities be called functions of the same faculty? Surely there are differences here too important to be overlooked! Bavinck himself admits in one place: “Willing is not a form of wishing and desiring, but a unique power of the soul which, on the basis of rational motives, wills an [276] actual or supposed good.”⁴² But if willing is such a unique power of the soul, why should it be classified with wishing and desiring as a function of the same faculty?

Another point may also be made here. To divide the life of the soul, as Bavinck does, between these two faculties, classifying every mental function as belonging *either* to the one *or* to the other *vermogen*, splits up the unity of the soul. We have then two “compartments” in the soul; a specific mental process belongs either to one “compartment” or to the other. But this is not sound psychology. This view does not do justice either to the basic oneness of the soul or to the interrelatedness of *all* its functions. Brederveld makes this point very clear when he says:

The writer [Bavinck] does full justice to this organization of the soul, but he makes an organization of faculties out of it. Not only does he thereby repeatedly fall into a personification of the faculties . . . but also in this manner two separate organizations are located in the soul: one for knowing and one for desiring.

⁴⁰ See above, p. 39.

⁴¹ See above, p. 41.

⁴² Bavinck, *De overwinning der ziel*, 24.

But hereby the unity of the soul is endangered. One's desires, for instance, involve many intellectual aspects, and sometimes fixed associations. Do these, now, belong to the organization of the *kenvermogen* or to that of the *begeervermogen*? No separation should here be made.⁴³

What we are chiefly concerned with in this study, however, is the relation between the faculties and the soul or heart in Bavinck. Did his treatment of the faculties maintain the unity and centrality of the heart or soul,⁴⁴ as taught [277] elsewhere in Bavinck, or did the faculties disrupt this unity?

On the whole, we may say that Bavinck tried very hard to maintain the unity and sovereignty of the soul behind the operation of the two faculties. He was careful to define a faculty as “nothing else than a natural capability of the soul for a certain type of mental activity.”⁴⁵ And he followed this statement by the remark that “it is always the same soul which functions in the various activities.”⁴⁶ It is the soul which perceives, thinks, feels, desires, and wills.⁴⁷ Pleasure and displeasure are functions which the soul exercises through the desiring-faculty.⁴⁸ The soul of man is the subject of all of man's mental and physical functions.⁴⁹ Not the brain but the hidden essence of man, the ego, is the subject, and cause of thinking.⁵⁰ Ideas and images are products of the soul, and must therefore be attributed to the working of the soul.⁵¹ The real cause of the emotions is not the outward circumstances, but the soul itself.⁵² By the soul Bavinck does not mean

⁴³ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 109.

⁴⁴ We may use the term *soul* as generally synonymous with *heart* in Bavinck, since the heart is designated by him as the chief and central organ of the soul. For all practical purposes we may think of the heart as standing for the soul in operation. Hence what is observed about the unity, or lack of unity, of the soul in Bavinck would apply likewise to the heart.

⁴⁵ See above, p. 24.

⁴⁶ See above, p. 24.

⁴⁷ See above, p. 24.

⁴⁸ See above, p. 24.

⁴⁹ See above, p. 5.

⁵⁰ See above, p. 6.

⁵¹ See above, p. 6.

⁵² See above, p. 6.

merely the immaterial aspect of man, but the material-spiritual subject which is the cause of all physical and mental changes.⁵³ Freedom, for Bavinck, is not to be attributed either to the intellect or to the will: “Freedom is . . . an attribute of man, who judges with his intellect, and rules with his will . . . he himself is the subject of this freedom.”⁵⁴ Obviously, Bavinck did not intend to have the faculties take the place of the soul or [278] operate as independent agencies; his intention was to preserve the unity of the soul as the single, permanent subject of all the activities attributed to the faculties.

This same thought we find clearly expressed in the revised edition of Bavinck’s *Beginselen der psychologie*, published in 1923, two years after his death. Dr. V. Hepp, the editor of this volume, explains that the additional material included in this edition has been taken from notes written by Bavinck himself with a view to a future revision of this book — a revision, however, which he was prevented from carrying out. Hence, Dr. Hepp has reconstructed the first edition on the basis of Bavinck’s notes. Among the additional material which we find in this second edition, there is some which bears on our present discussion. In connection with a discussion of the “primacy of the will” as found in Wundt, Bavinck there remarks that, although the will may have much influence on sensations, ideas, and thoughts, it is not identical with these. The unity of consciousness, he continues, is not a product of the will:

Not in the will but in the ego, in the subject, consciousness finds its ground and its unity. In fact, the will itself would fall apart into a number of loose, unconnected volitions, unless it also possessed its unity in the ego. Like the ideas, it also is carried by the subject, by the ego; it similarly always points back to the ego. . . . Behind intellectual, emotional, and volitional phenomena, therefore, there exists a subject which possesses them all and, to a certain extent, governs them all.⁵⁵

According to this passage, it is the ego or soul itself which is behind all mental phenomena, functions through them, and rules over them. Of similar import

⁵³ See above, p. 6.

⁵⁴ See above, p. 7.

⁵⁵ Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 2nd ed. (1923), 73; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 97–98.

is a statement on page 76 [279] of this new edition: “It is always the same subject, the one, undivided man, which, through soul and body with their faculties and powers, lives, knows, desires, and moves.” We may conclude, however, that, though Bavinck expresses himself very clearly on this point in the revised edition, there is really nothing new on the subject here, since he has said these same things in the old edition.⁵⁶

Tying all this in with what Bavinck said about the heart, or chief organ of the soul, as the center and source of all of man’s activities, we may conclude that Bavinck saw very clearly the necessity for maintaining the unity of the soul and the ultimate agency of the soul in all physical, mental, and spiritual phenomena. He knew very well that the faculties must not be made independent agencies in the soul, but must be viewed as mere functions of the soul or heart. His understanding of all this was sound and clear, and agrees with his teaching on the heart. We may and should give him credit for this.

However, what is said in theory is not always maintained in practice. We had occasion to notice this very vividly in the case of Thomas Aquinas. Though in theory he maintained that the faculties are not agents but principles through which the soul acts, still, in his actual treatment of the faculties, passage after passage was found in which the faculties were treated as if they were separate entities or agents. And we find the [280] same phenomenon in Bavinck. His practice did not accord with his definitions. Though his intentions were otherwise, the doctrine of faculties which he promulgated betrayed him against his will into frequent personifications of the faculties.⁵⁷

⁵⁶The statements in the paragraph before this one have all been taken from the old edition (1897) of the *Beginselen der psychologie*.

⁵⁷This is not to imply, of course, that Bavinck’s anthropology was more Greek than Christian, which we found to be true in the case of Aquinas. The leading motives of Bavinck’s anthropology, as we have previously shown, were Scriptural. But his system was not free from unscriptural elements.

Inadequacies of Bavinck's Faculty Doctrine

We may briefly note a few examples of these. Earlier, Bavinck was quoted as saying that the will is “the higher desiring-faculty which, after rational deliberation, chooses the true or apparent good and directs the soul thereto.”⁵⁸ But here we have precisely the error to which Locke called attention. The will is said to choose and to direct the soul. But choosing and directing are actions of an agent or person. To make them actions of the will is equivalent to personifying the will. Again, the emotions, affections, passions, inclinations, impulses, desires and decisions which originate in the heart are said to be directed by the mind.⁵⁹ But here again a directing function, which properly belongs only to an agent, is ascribed to a faculty — this time to the mind. It is significant to note that here the old Greek idea that the passions must be governed by the *reason* recurs. But this idea, also as expressed by Bavinck, implies a personification of the reason. Further, the will is described as choosing an actual or surmised good on the basis of [281] rational motives.⁶⁰ But who can choose on the basis of motives except a person? Again, according to Bavinck, reason precedes the will, presents it with various motives, and advises it how to choose.⁶¹ So now we have two personalized agents within the soul: reason, which advises the will how to choose; and will, which, on the basis of rational motives, makes a choice. All such language not only confuses but also misleads. It obscures what Bavinck elsewhere states with such strong conviction: that it is only the self which functions through the faculties. In the final analysis, only man himself can present others or himself with motives for making a choice; and only man can make a choice.

Did Bavinck teach a primacy of the intellect? We have answered that question in the negative, by showing that though Bavinck did teach this in the 1897 edition of the *Beginselen der psychologie*, he repudiated this position in his “Primaat

⁵⁸ See above, p. 30.

⁵⁹ See above, p. 30.

⁶⁰ See above, p. 30.

⁶¹ See above, p. 31.

van verstand of wil,” published in 1921.⁶² However, let us note very carefully *how* he repudiates this primacy. There is a certain priority of intellect over the will, he says, but this priority is not to be identified with sovereignty. Intellect and reason do present various ideas and thoughts to the will, and advises it how to choose. But they can have no other power than that of rational and moral persuasion, since the freedom of the will excludes all force.⁶³ But what do we have here? The old personification business again. The intellect advises [282] the will how to choose — so the intellect is personified. The will is supposed to choose — so the will is personified. But the power of the intellect is only that of rational and moral persuasion. Thus Bavinck tries to get away from the sovereignty and dominance of reason. But he gets away from it only by making intellect and will both personified agents in the soul, which advise each other, but do not dominate each other. In other words, instead of an absolute monarchy of reason in the soul, we have a sort of democracy in which both intellect and will have something to say. Now, that Bavinck wished to get away from the primacy of the intellect in man was fine and showed good insight. But that he got away from it in this manner is unfortunate. For he does not get away from the personification of the faculties after all. In fact, by making intellect and will two independent agencies in the soul, one of which “advises” the other but has no absolute control over the other, he separates these two functions in such a way as seriously to impair the unity of the soul. For now we have not one, but two centers of control in the soul: the intellect which “advises,” and the will which “chooses” in a wholly arbitrary fashion. And thus we have here finally a Pelagian will, separated from the intellect, and utterly capricious in its functionings — the very conception of the will which Bavinck so strenuously criticizes elsewhere.⁶⁴ [283]

⁶² See above, pp. 29–40.

⁶³ See above, p. 35.

⁶⁴ In the first edition of the *Beginselen der psychologie*, Bavinck says that indeterminism is often presented in a form which makes it psychologically untenable: namely, that after the intellect has weighed all the factors and made a judgment, the will can yet lay all these motives aside, and act simply according to impulse. But such a will, continues Bavinck, is personified caprice; is no will in the real sense of the term. If the will be conceived in this manner, human life becomes simply an aggregation of fortuitous, isolated volitions. Then facts and happenings will hang together only as loose sand; unity, connection, and

Had Bavinck here only applied his teaching of the primacy of the heart, he would have been able to get away from the sovereignty of the intellect without falling into the absurd position described in the preceding paragraph. He would then have been able to show that, since the heart is the center and source of all of man's activities, including those of his intellect, the heart is determinative for the intellect, as it is also for the will. Neither intellect nor will can be sovereign in man since both are only functions of the heart; real sovereignty must therefore be ascribed to the heart. Had Bavinck said this in his "Primaat van verstand of wil," he would have taken a position both psychologically tenable and Scripturally sound. Unfortunately, however, Bavinck did not bring in the function of the heart in this essay; and hence we must conclude that the primacy of the heart, though elsewhere clearly taught by him, did not permeate his thinking as thoroughly as it might have and should have done.⁶⁵ [284]

We have thus found a number of instances in which Bavinck, against his better knowledge, and in spite of his careful definitions, personifies the faculties. Needless to say, all such personifications disrupt the unity of the soul, and imperil the interrelatedness of all the functions of the soul. We have also observed that his classification of all mental phenomena under just two supposedly elementary faculties oversimplifies complex phenomena. We may further note instances in which Bavinck specifically uses the faculty doctrine as a principle of explanation. Bavinck himself realized that merely to refer mental phenomena to faculties is no explanation; on page 74 of the revised edition of his *Beginselen der psychologie* he says: "The doctrine of the soul with its faculties only opens the possibility of explaining mental phenomena, but does not in itself give such an explanation."⁶⁶

plan then become impossible; education, character-forming, and rational development similarly become impossible (pp. 180–82); ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 233–34. Yet it is precisely this "psychologically untenable" view of the will which Bavinck advances in his "Primaat van verstand of wil"; ET: "Primacy of the Intellect or the Will," *Essays on Religion, Science, and Society*, 199–204.

⁶⁵ Bavinck does elsewhere clearly indicate this relation between the heart and the intellect. See footnote 30, above. But, somehow, this relation did not seem to have occurred to him when he wrote the essay alluded to.

⁶⁶ Ed. note: ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 98–99.

Yet, on page 53 of the same volume,⁶⁷ he plainly asserts: “The doctrine of the faculties, however, enables us to explain the rich and manifold diversity of the life of the soul in a wholly satisfactory manner.”⁶⁸ Furthermore, the very way in which Bavinck repeatedly refers various complex mental phenomena to one or the other faculty exemplifies this fallacy of “explaining” a thing [285] by ascribing it to a certain faculty.⁶⁹

So we see that every single one of the errors ascribed to the “faculty psychology” by Brederveld and others do actually occur in Bavinck. And the strange thing is that Bavinck himself was keenly aware of the fallacies involved in these errors. We have found him frequently condemning on one page what he practiced on another. The doctrine of faculties, in other words, seemed to hinder Bavinck from working out a thoroughly consistent Christian anthropology. In spite of the many fine thrusts in him, including especially that of the centrality of the heart, we also find in him many unscriptural and even anti-scriptural elements.

We have already indicated that Bavinck was closer to Scripture than Calvin, especially in his conception of the heart. Yet, as was the case with Calvin, so in Bavinck: there is still too much of the leaven of Greek thought. We may note in passing that Bavinck derived several elements of his anthropology from Aristotle: his division of the faculties into the cognitive and the appetitive faculty;⁷⁰ his distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason; the view that obedience to the reason is the virtue of the appetites; [286] and the distinction between “lower” and “higher” functions, the lower being thought necessary to the

⁶⁷ Ed. note: ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 65.

⁶⁸ A moment’s thought will reveal the fallacy of this statement. There is a “rich and manifold diversity” in the life of the soul. Why? Because the soul has different faculties. But what are these faculties? They are “natural capabilities of the soul for certain types of mental activity.” So then there is diversity in the life of the soul because the soul has diverse capabilities — which is just saying the same thing in different words. But does this “explain” anything?

⁶⁹ So, e.g., Bavinck says that conscience belongs to the knowing-faculty, not to the lower but to the higher aspect of it, and specifically not to the theoretical but to the practical reason. Leaving aside the question of the rightness of this conception, notice how referring conscience to a specific aspect of one of the faculties is considered to be a sort of “explanation” of its functioning (Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 111).

⁷⁰ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 23, and see footnote 38, above.

higher. Incidentally, what determines for Bavinck whether a function is “lower” or “higher” seems to be the proximity of that particular function to reason — so we have, in that sense, throughout Bavinck’s psychology a kind of pre-eminence of reason in man, even though, in the essay, “Primaat van verstand of wil,” it is expressly denied that reason or intellect has any such pre-eminence.⁷¹

It is also significant to note that, although Bavinck repeatedly repudiates the Greek dualism between reason and sense as false and unscriptural, he nevertheless posits such a dualism in man in the latest edition of his *Beginselen der psychologie*:

The struggle between sensuality and reason (conscience) is in greater or lesser measure present in all men. It is not waged against sin as such; neither against all but only against some sins. It is not carried on from the only true motive of love to God and hatred of sin, but from all kinds of other considerations, such as fear of punishment, shame, or self-esteem. It is a struggle between two parts in the one man, the higher and the lower part, and can, though frequently with difficulty, be won by reason and will.⁷²

[287] But this conception of the ethical struggle of man is fundamentally the same as the Greek view which Bavinck so frequently opposes, and is subject to the same strictures Bavinck himself made against that view. Notice how this conception divides man into “parts,” and makes his moral conflict consist of the opposition of one “part” to another. Notice, too, how, according to this view, reason, even in fallen man, is still relatively good, whereas the passions are wholly depraved. This view has been criticized above in the chapter on Aquinas, where we noted both its Greek origin and its ascetic consequences. So Bavinck certainly did not wholly get away from both the leaven of Greek thought and that of the scholastic psychology.

In this connection it is interesting to review Professor Hepp’s criticism of Bavinck’s psychology. The revised version of the *Beginselen der psychologie*, as

⁷¹ It will be recalled that this conception, that the “higher” aspect of man is his reason, is expressly repudiated by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd (see above, p. 83). In this respect these men are more loyal to Scripture in their anthropology than was Bavinck. Scripture does not recognize any such distinction between rational and non-rational activities as “higher” and “lower.”

⁷² Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 2nd ed., 146; ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, 197.

has been mentioned, was edited by Dr. V. Hepp,⁷³ after Bavinck's death. In the preface, Dr. Hepp mentions his reluctance to perform this task, since, for one thing, he himself had always esteemed Bavinck's *Beginselen der psychologie* the least satisfactory of all the latter's works. Then Hepp expresses his criticism of the basic tenets of Bavinck's psychology in these words:

In the course of the years I have arrived at the conviction that the scheme of the scholastic psychology, particularly of the doctrine of the faculties, which forms the basis of this book [*Beginselen der psychologie*], must be abandoned. . . . As I see it, it is impossible to fit the psychological facts and insights of recent times, however much they may have to be modified by criticism from the Reformed standpoint, into the framework of the scholastic psychology. And I have the impression that no Reformed [288] scholar who is well versed in psychology will think otherwise about this matter.⁷⁴

Of similar import is the comment made by Brederveld. Speaking of Bavinck's *Beginselen der psychologie*, he observed: "This book is based on the standpoint of the faculty psychology, but the question is, in how far this standpoint is to be justified. Certain it is, that in Reformed circles a decided change has taken place in this respect."⁷⁵

According to these men, the trouble with Bavinck's psychology was that he tried to construct it on the basis of the doctrine of the faculties which he had derived from the scholastics, without realizing that the very doctrine itself, no matter how much it may be modified or circumscribed, cannot be harmonized with either a Scripturally sound or psychologically satisfactory view of man. Having seen how the doctrine of the faculties worked out in Aquinas into a very unsatisfactory and unscriptural anthropology, and having in a measure observed the same thing in Bavinck, I would be inclined to agree with this criticism.

At least it is certain that to speak of the faculties as Bavinck did, and to make them basic to one's psychology, involves one in many perils. In spite of Bavinck's firm intention to maintain the unity of the soul and the functional character of

⁷³ Dr. Hepp is professor of systematic theology at the Free University of Amsterdam.

⁷⁴ V. Hepp in Bavinck, *Beginselen der psychologie*, 2nd ed., 5–6. Ed. note: See ET: *Foundations of Psychology*, ix–x.

⁷⁵ Brederveld, *De leer der zielsvermogens*, 103.

the faculties, it seems that he was unable to avoid personifying the faculties after all, and thus disrupting the actual unity of the soul. And thus we may say that his faculty [289] doctrine was a positive hindrance to him in working out a truly Biblical anthropology. For what Bavinck does with the faculties does not square with what he teaches about the heart.

It is for this reason, I suppose, that the term “faculties” has passed into disrepute, not only among psychologists generally, but also among Reformed writers on psychology. So, for instance, T. Hoekstra says, in his *Paedagogische Psychologie*:

To avoid the one-sidedness and inaccuracy of the extreme faculty psychology, we prefer to speak of the functions rather than faculties . . . in order thereby to stress the basic fact that the Ego, the man himself, is operative in all the phenomena, and that the functions possess no independence next to the soul itself.⁷⁶

For reasons somewhat different J. H. Bavinck also prefers the term *functions* to *faculties*.⁷⁷ And Professor Dooyeweerd similarly rejects the term *faculties*: “The active life of man reveals itself in the three basic directions of knowing, imagining, and willing, which, however, may not be isolated as separate ‘faculties,’ since they completely overlap each other.”⁷⁸

So we may say in conclusion that, while appreciative of the good in Bavinck, we must not close our eyes to his weaknesses. Although we may acknowledge his fine insights into the [290] Biblical conception of man, especially as worked out in his doctrine of the heart, we must at the same time be aware of the inadequacies of his teaching on the faculties of man, which somewhat conflict with what he asserts about the heart. We may, therefore, adopt what Bavinck says about the centrality of the heart without necessarily adopting his doctrine of the faculties. Precisely how we must then conceive of what is primary in man, and how this conception must be related to the various functionings of man, will be taken up in the following chapter. [291]

⁷⁶ Hoekstra, *Paedagogische Psychologie*, 44.

⁷⁷ J. H. Bavinck, *Inleiding in de zielkunde*, 321 f. J. H. Bavinck is a nephew of Herman Bavinck.

⁷⁸ Herman Dooyeweerd, “De leer van de mensch in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” *Correspondentie-Bladen van de Vereeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte*, 7 (December, 1942): 137.

Chapter 9

Conclusion: What is Primary in Human Nature?

Having now completed our historical and Biblical review of this question, and having subjected the position of Herman Bavinck to a rather thorough criticism, I should like, on the basis of all this previous material, to formulate my own position on the question of what is primary in human nature.

Some Difficulties Considered

This is not an easy matter. It is extremely difficult for us to form proper conceptions of a purely immaterial substance like the soul. Since all our knowledge begins with sensations of material things, we naturally tend to think of the soul also as something material. The only way we can form clear conceptions of it is to compare it with something material. Hence, when speaking of the soul, we are always using figurative language derived from material things. So, for example, we speak of the “center” and the “periphery” of the soul, of the various “sides” or “aspects” of the soul, of the “organs” of the soul, and so on.¹ [292]

Now it is impossible to avoid using language of this sort. In order to speak of the soul at all, we have to use words. But words are always based on figures of speech. Hence we cannot get away from figurative language in speaking of the soul—language in which the soul is somehow compared with something material. As long as we remember that such language is only figurative, and that the soul is really not material, no damage is done. But there is great danger that we take such figures of speech too literally.

¹Thomas Aquinas realized this difficulty too. Charles A. Hart points out that, according to Thomas, “our knowledge of a spiritual substance such as the soul and of its faculties is for the most part indirect. Even when positive, the information is based on comparisons we make between the soul and the activities of material substances of which we have more direct knowledge” (Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, 25).

This danger is especially real in connection with the functions of the soul. The soul is one, and yet has many functions — how shall we explain this? Sometimes, as we have seen, recourse is had to the theory that the soul has different “parts.” Sometimes the impression is given that there are different “compartments” in the soul, each of which is concerned with one of the main functions. Quite often, as we have also noted, the various functions are assigned to separate, personified “agencies” in the soul. All of these views, needless to say, are incorrect, being due to a too literal interpretation of figurative language. We must be on our guard against this danger.

To form a proper conception of the human soul is therefore very hard. The limitations of human thought and language are very much apparent here. Perhaps, in developing my own formulation, I shall fall into some of the very same errors [293] which have been criticized in this paper. I shall do my best to avoid them; but it may not be possible to avoid them completely.

At any rate, this must be said: though we must talk about the soul in terms of figures borrowed from the material world, the soul actually is not material but spiritual. If the reader will remember this, much confusion will be avoided. So, for example, when we speak of the “center” of the soul, we must not think of an actual spatial center in the soul, but of its innermost aspect. Even the expression “innermost,” for example, must not be understood in a grossly material way, but in a figurative, metaphorical way. All language about the soul must necessarily be metaphorical, and hence the discussion which follows must be understood metaphorically, and not literally.

Another point should be observed. When we speak about the soul or heart of man as active in all of man’s functions, we do not intend to set up a dualism between soul and body. The Scriptural teaching about man makes abundantly plain that soul and body are most intimately related. Similarly, the most recent psychological investigations have established that there is not a single mental state or process which is not accompanied by bodily changes of some sort. Even abstract thought, for instance, which Aristotle and Aquinas imagined to be possible without any participation of the body, modern psychology has found to be closely connected with bodily functions — not only those of the neurons of the cerebrum, but also of the organs of speech. A prominent psychological school of recent date has [294] even gone so far as to define thought as “subvocal

speech.”² All so-called mental processes involve physiological concomitants; in fact, there are no “purely” mental functions. All the functions of man involve both soul and body.

So to speak of “mental functions” is an abstraction, and to speak of the “soul” is an abstraction, since the soul as we know it always occurs in a body and is most intimately related to that body. These facts I would not deny. But, at the same time, it is legitimate for the purposes of clarification to abstract some one aspect from a complex whole — in fact, no scientific investigation, least of all psychological investigation, would be possible without abstraction.

Now if there is anything which the Scriptures, as well as common-sense reflection, make clear, it is that when we are attempting to find what is the “ruling center” of man, we must look, not at the physical or bodily aspect of his existence, but at the “inner” or immaterial aspect, called the soul or the heart. Hence I believe that to abstract this immaterial aspect from the totality which is man is legitimate, since we are trying to find out what is primary in man. For this reason we shall discuss, in the remainder of this chapter, the soul or heart and its functions, without, however, forgetting for a moment that body and soul are most intimately united in all of man’s activities.

This suggests another thought: What is the distinction between the soul and the heart? On the basis of the Biblical [295] position, I assume that there is such a thing as a “substantial” soul — that is, the soul as the bearer of the various mental and physical phenomena, the agent of all man’s actions, the subject of all his states.³ By the soul, therefore, I understand the subject of man’s actions. Though the soul is immaterial, still, as indicated above, it is most intimately united to the body, and can therefore be taken as standing for the whole man, as the subject or agent of all his actions. As such the soul may be considered synonymous with the self, or the ego.

What, now, must we understand by the heart? I shall follow Bavinck by defining the heart as the core of man’s personality, the source and center of all his

² I.e., behaviorism. See Edna Heidbreder, *Seven Psychologies* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1933), 251.

³ For the reasons why this position is taken, the reader is referred to chapter 1, pp. 5–8.

physical, mental, and spiritual life.⁴ What, then, is the exact distinction between the soul and the heart? It is this: the heart is the “central and innermost . . . organ of the soul”; the most important organ, through which the soul functions; the inner aspect of the soul.⁵ In other words, the heart is the inner core of the soul; when we speak of the heart we are to think of what is inmost in the soul of man. It is in this sense that Scripture uses the term, as we have seen in chapter 7. The distinction between the two terms, then, is somewhat analogous (although in an immaterial sense) to that between “center” and “totality”; the heart is the center of the soul. [296]

Often in Scripture, however, the two terms are used synonymously. And so we shall frequently use the terms as synonymous also. Both terms may be taken as standing for the inner aspect of man in distinction from the outer, or bodily, aspect. Where a distinction is intended between the two terms, however, either in Scripture, or in this chapter, the difference is as indicated above.

I shall in general use the term heart as standing for what is the primary center of man, in harmony with Biblical usage. The reasons for this will be found both in chapter 1 and in chapter 7, above. But, since the heart is the core of the soul, I take the liberty of assuming that whatever is said about the soul (by psychologists who usually use the term *soul* where a Biblical theologian would use *heart*) may with equal propriety be applied to the heart. For what is said of the whole may with equal propriety be said of the core — at least, as regards its total functioning. Similarly, what is said of the core may also be ascribed to the whole; hence what the Bible ascribes to the heart may also be understood as applying to what psychologists call the soul. In other words, for all practical purposes, the terms soul and heart are synonymous, and I shall use them as such.

Brief Summary of Previous Studies

Before proceeding to develop my own view of what is primary in man, it will be helpful to make a brief summary of the significant points that have been

⁴ See above, p. 21.

⁵ See above, p. 20.

established so far in this study. These significant points may be summarized under [297] two main headings: the question of the heart, and the question of the faculties. With respect to the question of the heart, we noted in Luther a prominent emphasis on the importance of seeing man in relation to God, and on the disposition of his heart as basic to and coming to expression in all his activities.⁶ In Bavinck, we noted a stress on the heart of man as basic to all of his physical, mental, moral, and spiritual functions, and as the seat of the unconscious predispositions, tendencies, and drives which are determinative for man's conscious life. In Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd we observed that the heart was understood as the concentration-point of all of man's temporal functions, as the center of his religious life, and specifically as the starting-point for his philosophy, and thus as determinative for the functioning of his "intellect." And in the Biblical chapter we found that, according to all the investigators studied, the heart in Scripture is basic and primary for all of man's activities; a special point was made of the determinative influence of the heart on man's intellectual functions. Bearing in mind this material, we shall certainly want to incorporate the centrality of the heart into our final formulation.

As regards the question of the faculties, it was shown that Augustine's view of the relation between the "faculties" and the soul leaves no room for a "primacy" (in the sense of sovereignty) of either the will or the intellect or the memory [298]—since these three are one mind, one substance, and one essence; since they are equal to each other and indispensable to each other; since each function always involves the other two, so that whatever is done by man is done by all three together; and since, therefore, it is the whole soul or the whole self which is active in each of these three functions, and not just an isolated "part" of the soul. In the chapter on Thomas Aquinas, it was shown that the primacy of the intellect as found in him was derived not from Scripture, but from Greek philosophy; further, it was demonstrated that such a primacy of the intellect leads to an untenable and unscriptural anthropology. With respect to Calvin, it was pointed out that he, likewise, derived his stress on the primacy of the intellect from Greek philosophy, and that this primacy of the intellect in Calvin hindered him from developing

⁶ For the further elaboration of these points, the reader is referred to the various preceding chapters of this thesis.

a truly Biblical view of the heart. In Calvin's anthropology the impossibility of combining the primacy of the intellect with the primacy of the heart was historically demonstrated.⁷ In chapter 8, dealing with the evaluation of Bavinck, it was first of all shown, by an appeal to Locke, Brederveld, and others, that the concept of the "primacy" of the intellect or will is based on a psychologically unsound view of the mind. It was further pointed out that Bavinck's emphasis on the centrality of the heart was spoiled by his doctrine of the faculties which imperiled the unity of the soul, and thus hindered him from [299] working out a consistently Biblical anthropology. On the basis of these studies, we shall, therefore, certainly want to avoid the errors of the "faculty psychology," and specifically the error of making one of the aspects or functions of man primary.

Proceeding now to the formulation of my own view on the problem which has concerned us in this thesis, I should like to repeat that that problem is this: What in man is most fundamental, primary, or determinative? This question I would answer, in the light of the foregoing material, as follows: What is primary and determinative in man is the heart. By "primary" or "primacy" sovereignty is specifically meant here: the heart as the ruling center of man. Bavinck has pointed out that the word "primary" may mean one of three things: priority, pre-eminence, or sovereignty.⁸ When the expression, "primacy of the heart," is used in this chapter, however, the word primacy is used specifically in the last-mentioned sense. That expression must therefore be understood to mean that the heart is determinative for all of man's activities.

It is very important, further, to remember that by "the heart" more is understood here than just the emotions or the will, or both of them together. Heart is taken here in the full Scriptural sense developed in chapter 7; as the center of all of man's physical and mental activities — the organ of thinking, feeling, and willing; and the seat of sin, regeneration, and faith. In other words, as in Bavinck, so [300] here: the heart is understood to be the central core of man's personality. It is the heart in this sense which is primary and determinative for all that a man does. Nothing can be more basic or more fundamental in man than his heart.

⁷ At the same time, however, it was pointed out that Calvin's stress on the importance of the heart was a significant step ahead in the development of a Christian anthropology.

⁸ See above, p. 33.

That this is the plain teaching of Scripture has been amply demonstrated in chapter 7. That this is the only view which guarantees the unity of personality has been indirectly demonstrated by our historical study. Wherever, as, for example, in Thomas, only one aspect or function of man was made primary, the soul itself was divided into higher and lower elements which were considered more or less antithetical to each other, and the unity of the soul was disrupted. It stands to reason that to maintain the unity and undividedness of the soul, the whole soul or the whole heart, and nothing less, must be made primary. This, to my mind, is the essential thrust of the Biblical view; this is the reason why the Bible lays so much stress on the heart.⁹

Psychological Confirmation for the Primacy of the Heart

This view, that what is fundamental in man is the heart or soul,¹⁰ is also confirmed by the history of modern psychology. [301] Although it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to go into an exhaustive study of recent psychology in order to establish this point, it may be helpful to give a brief survey of important recent trends in psychology, to see whether they confirm the viewpoint advanced in this thesis. In making this survey, I shall use a recent German publication, translated into English by W. Beran Wolfe: *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, by Richard Müller-Freienfels. In this remarkable volume, the author shows, by a painstaking and thorough study of all the major trends in psychology from 1880 to the present day, that, one after the other, all the chief phases of this development have ended with the admission that there must be some kind of psychological totality (in the author's own words, some kind of soul) behind all the various

⁹This opinion is shared by Emil Brunner. After reviewing the various meanings attached to the word heart in Scripture, he summarizes as follows: "In a word, in the Bible the 'heart' is that which we have described as the unity of personality; the incomparable significance ascribed to it in the Bible as a whole is the clearest proof of the importance of the idea of personal unity within *The Christian Doctrine of Man*" (Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, trans. Olive Wyon (New York: Scribner, 1939), 225).

¹⁰It will be understood, of course, that psychologists will use the term soul rather than heart. However, as we have indicated above, what they say about the soul we may apply to the heart.

phenomena of mental and physical life which have been studied! This point is clearly stated already in the opening paragraph of the book:

It is a significant fact, and by no means a fortuitous circumstance, that at the very time that science, using every refinement of modern research methods, undertook to investigate what we call the “soul,” religious studies of the human soul were beginning to decline. Many of the new investigators did not even believe in the existence of the human soul in the earlier sense of the word. They pursued a “soulless psychology,” and while utilizing the concept of the old-fashioned soul they sought to demonstrate that such a thing did not really exist. But the most amazing result of these trends is the fact that in the course of the investigations the formerly ostracized soul won readmission, and with full honors, to the halls of science. Today, indeed, there are again psychologists who not only believe in a real soul but even openly grace their conviction with a metaphysical and religious coloring.¹¹

How, now, does the author propose to prove this point, that the soul has re-emerged in modern psychology? By means of [302] a distinctive approach to the history of psychology. Instead of merely enumerating the various psychologists chronologically, Müller-Freienfels proposes “to arrange the material about the dominant problems and points of view, that is, about the different and successive conceptions of the character and essence of the soul that were investigated.”¹² These different “conceptions of the essence of the soul” developed somewhat simultaneously, but for the most part successively, so that we have, in a general way, a chronological sequence of different types of psychological investigation.

The first phase of psychological study which Müller-Freienfels distinguishes is that of the study of consciousness. At this stage of the psychological conquest of the soul, he points out, the chief concern was to isolate, measure, and arrange the various conscious experiences:

The early investigators were convinced that they would understand the essence of the soul if they succeeded in untangling the Gordian knot of the stream of consciousness into its individual threads, and if they could discover the laws of their association. In the course of these investigations the psychologists shifted

¹¹ Richard Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, trans. W. Beran Wolfe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), 3.

¹² Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 27.

their interest more and more to the problem of the totality of consciousness.¹³

In developing this section, Müller-Freienfels shows that the problem of sensation, for instance, advanced from the atomistic analysis of sensations into their elements, to the conviction that there is no such thing as an isolated sensation, but that sensations are always part and parcel of the whole ego.¹⁴ Similar discoveries were made with respect to other “elements of [303] consciousness.” In 1890, for instance, three outstanding scholars uttered their criticisms of the so-called “psychology of consciousness”: Henri Bergson, William James, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Müller-Freienfels points out that, though differing in many ways, the criticisms of these three men were fundamentally agreed:

Their missiles . . . struck those very targets of modern psychology which were considered most solidly entrenched: the distinction and classification of states of consciousness. All three agreed that this impossible and unjustifiable atomization of a fundamentally indivisible consciousness was worthless. Everything in the way of “elements” and “combinations” which had been elaborated in the laborious anatomy of consciousness, was unmasked in the light of their criticism as an artificial and defacing theoretical construction. And while no one disputed that the primary task of psychology was the study of consciousness, all three agreed that this study should not degenerate into an “anatomizing” dissection of it.

The result of this criticism was the positive demand for a new conception of consciousness as a primary totality.¹⁵

In other words, the net result of this entire phase of psychological research was the conviction that no “element of consciousness” occurs in isolation, but that every such “element” is always borne by the totality of the mental life, taking its character and meaning from that totality. Translating this into different words, we may say that we have here the psychological confirmation or the point which has been advanced throughout this thesis: namely, that what is determinative in the mental life of man is not any separate function or aspect of consciousness, but is the totality which some psychologists might call the soul, and which the

¹³ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 28.

¹⁴ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 56.

¹⁵ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 101 f.

Bible would call the heart. [304] The second trend in psychological research which Müller-Freienfels distinguishes is the study of the connection between consciousness and physiological organs. Here we observe a similar progression toward a totalitarian conception.

At first the research was directed toward the discovery of distinct brain areas which corresponded to and controlled the different states of consciousness. This was the problem of cerebral localization. As in the study of consciousness, a deviation from the technique of isolation gradually occurred with regard to cerebral localization. Here, too, the problem of totality entered inevitably into the picture.¹⁶

In the conclusion of this section of his book, Müller-Freienfels repeats this point in somewhat different words:

These paths [the paths of physiology and biology], in both instances, led away from atomizing mechanism toward a totalitarian point of view. Atomic psychology certainly found no corroboration in the fact that all its attempts at finding physiological parallels to match its “elements of consciousness” proved invalid and impossible. Instead of a circumscribed localization, a highly complicated co-operation of numerous cerebral processes and of other physical organs were discovered, all of which could be understood only from totalitarian viewpoint. . . . The problem of a “soul” organically governing consciousness and physical life, which at first had been set aside almost disdainfully, now came into its own.¹⁷

In this phase of psychology, in other words, it was found that there were no discrete physiological parallels to the supposed separate states or elements of consciousness. The brain, it was discovered, did not operate in parts or segments, but as a whole; and this tied in with what had been found with respect to consciousness: namely, that there is a totality which dominates all the separate parts. The latter was seen to hold true, in other words, not only for the mind but also for the brain. All of this similarly gives physiological confirmation [305] for the primacy of the heart. Notice that Müller-Freienfels speaks of the soul as “organically governing consciousness and physical life”—just as the Bible

¹⁶ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 29.

¹⁷ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 222.

repeatedly describes the heart as the directive center of both man's physical and spiritual activities.

The third phase of psychological research Müller-Freienfels names "the psychology of action and conduct." In this phase movement, not consciousness, was made the essence of the soul; under this phase were included such schools as Russian psycho-reflexology and American behaviorism.¹⁸ About this particular trend of investigation, the following comment is made:

In reviewing the development of motor and conduct psychology as a whole, we are struck by its remarkable parallel to the development of the study of consciousness and of psycho-physiology. Just as these had commenced with the investigation of isolated states of consciousness or isolated cerebral processes, and had been subjected to the increasing constraint of a totalitarian view, motor psychology, too, began with the description of separate types of conduct, and was increasingly impelled to study conduct in its totality.¹⁹

Try as they would to pursue their researches "without soul," the psychology of consciousness and psychomotor psychology were compelled to capitulate in the long run.²⁰

So here, also, we have the same phenomenon. This "psychology of action and conduct" began by studying separate acts (reflexes, for example), but found that, to understand separate acts, it had to study "conduct in its totality." This, as the author indicates, compelled the psychologists engaged in this phase of research to return to the assumption of a soul, even though such an assumption was very much against their wishes. All this is [306] highly significant. It shows that even action or conduct cannot be studied except in reference to the total man, who, in Biblical language, concentrates his personal existence in his heart; and thus again demonstrates the correctness of the Biblical emphasis on the primacy of that heart in all of man's actions.

Next there arose a school of psychology, Müller-Freienfels indicates, which set itself to the very problem of finding out what the "soul" was; this phase he

¹⁸ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 29.

¹⁹ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 283.

²⁰ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 284.

calls “the psychology with ‘soul’.”²¹ The point of view of this school he defines as follows:

It comprehended the task of psychology not as analysis of consciousness, but as the probing of the inner totalitarian structure of mental life. . . . The psychologists penetrated into this inner structure of the soul and uncovered its dynamics, its capacities, and its instincts. . . . The great battle cry of these investigators become “Totality” or “Structure” and by structure they meant more than the mere totality of the consciousness. And presently, quite in contrast to the soulless psychology of earlier days, there emerged a psychology with a soul!²²

What now, about the findings of this school? These the author summarizes in the conclusion of this section of his book:

The importance of the experimental method with regard to the determination of certain data in the spheres of sensation and imagery is not disputed, but the belief that the essential nature of perceptions and ideas can ever be fathomed experimentally, is denied. These phenomena occur only as functions of the “I,” of the soul. Consequently, it is necessary to know the soul first before one can understand subsequent details. The soul is not a sum or conglomeration of its experiences. By no means. The soul is a whole which exists before its parts; and it is only when the whole is known that the parts can be understood.

Many modern psychologists agree in their usage of fundamental concepts such as totality, structure, and conation or purposive tendency. To be sure, the category of consciousness is still employed but in an entirely different [307] sense; it no longer denotes the known, passive consciousness but the knowing, active consciousness that in itself is “known” but is the “carrier” or “substratum” of known consciousness. In consequence, the very word is frequently avoided and instead of consciousness, psychologists prefer to use the word “personality,” or “soul.” In short, the soul, once pronounced dead, has proven its immortality, although not in a religious, transcendental sense.²³

According to this fourth school, then, perceptions and ideas occur only as functions of the soul or of the “I,” and can be understood only when the totality, the soul, or the “I” is understood. It will be noted that this has been precisely

²¹ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 284.

²² Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 29 f.

²³ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 341 f.

the point of view maintained in this thesis: namely, that ideas do not occur in isolation but as functions of a totality, and that therefore the heart, which stands for this totality, is prior to the intellect.²⁴ Notice, too, that the conception of consciousness as the “carrier” or “substratum” of conscious acts accords very well with what Bavinck has said about the “substantial soul,” and with what Scripture teaches about the heart as the organ of all thinking, willing, and feeling. So we have here, once again, psychological validation for the primacy of the heart. For this school of psychology, what is determinative in human experience is not any one aspect or function of the mind, but the totality which it calls the soul or the “I.” This totality the Bible would call the heart.

A fifth phase of psychological research [308] Müller-Freienfels designates as “the psychology of the unconscious.” The task of this school he describes as follows:

The study of hypnosis, hysteria, and other mental abnormalities demonstrated that neither consciousness alone nor consciousness in combination with physical phenomena exhausted the essence of the soul. It had been found that alongside of the primary consciousness there were subconscious or, more correctly, para-conscious phenomena that influenced the primary consciousness and frequently disturbed it considerably. It became obvious that the primary consciousness was not the sole master of human life. Powerful co-rulers and opposing currents were discovered in the soul, and these para-conscious forces were just as much part of the soul as the conscious forces. Psychoanalysis took upon itself the task of investigating these dark recesses of the soul.²⁵

So now psychology set itself the task of exploring the subconscious aspects of the soul. In order to understand the totality which is behind all of man’s thoughts and actions, it found itself confronted with the necessity of going down beneath the conscious phenomena into the realm of the subconscious. There it discovered the existence of systematized “complexes,” which revealed the presence of organizations in the subconscious realm, and thus further substantiated the assumption of

²⁴ Observe how, in the light of the researches of this school of psychology, the “primacy of the intellect” is seen to be nothing else than a psychological fiction. For “the intellect” does not occur in isolation, but only as a function of the totality which psychologists may call the soul, but which the Scriptures call the heart.

²⁵ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 30.

an underlying totality behind all mental phenomena.²⁶ Müller-Freienfels goes on to point out that psychopathology, too, began with the study of abnormal single states of consciousness, like abnormal sensations, illusions, compulsions, delusions, and so on. But this phase of psychological research, like the other phases, was also compelled to go beyond this atomistic interpretation:

Most of these isolated anomalies cannot be understood in any such atomizing terms. They all imply totalitarian constellations that are necessary for the understanding [309] of the component manifestations. . . . Thus, most deviations of sensation, perception, and ideation occur simultaneously with profound alterations in mental life which always show a higher degree of unitary organization than any of the disparate acts of objective consciousness.²⁷

So this development likewise substantiated the hypothesis of a totalitarian structure, or soul, behind all the phenomena of behavior. In studying these abnormalities, it was found necessary to go back to “totalitarian constellations”—in other words, to fundamental dispositions of the soul which predetermine the abnormal behavior. Thus, we have again a primary totality, this time extending down beneath consciousness. All of this ties in most amazingly with what the Bible says about the heart as the hidden core of man, and with what Bavinck says about the heart as the domain of the unconscious.

The sixth, and final, trend of psychological investigation which Müller-Freienfels touches on is what he calls “the psychology of superindividual psychic life.” He describes it as follows:

For this school of psychologists the soul is not purely an individual phenomenon, operative only within the individual organism. These psychologists maintain that there are superindividual phenomena that dominate the phenomena of the individual soul. In this category they place social institutions, speech, morals, political life, and in short those superindividual totalities—civilization and culture—which give individual humans their characteristic and significant hallmarks, their common “style of life”. . . . For this school the soul becomes a superindividual nexus, so that we have folk souls, culture souls, and the like. And lo!

²⁶ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 347.

²⁷ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 350 f.

the soul which at first was supposed to be nothing more than an entirely empirical reality has become a metaphysical concept again!²⁸

In this school we see psychology expanding its horizons. Instead of restricting itself to individuals, it now takes into [310] account such factors as the “collective consciousness,” the “group mind,” and so on. It traces the influence of the group on the individuals which compose it. Here we see the totalitarian concept applied not merely to what is within man, but to the group to which man belongs; and even the totality of the group is said to put its stamp on its members. This would tie in with what the Scriptures teach concerning the organic solidarity of the race and the social transmission of evil. Further, the very circumstance that the group conditions its members points to the fact that man as a totality is receptive to influences that come to him from others, and that he, again as a totality, similarly influences others. All of which again reveals that what is basic in man is not just some one fragmentary aspect of his nature, but his total personality, his soul, or his heart. It is with his heart, with the totality of his being, that man makes an impact on his fellows.

So even the history of modern psychology, in a most amazing way, confirms the truth of the Biblical view of man, as a unitary totality who expresses that totality in all of his acts, words, and thoughts. In the study we have just summarized, probably the most thorough and most profound history of modern psychology ever attempted, it was clearly shown that every single phase of the psychological advancement of the last seventy years has had to come to the admission of some kind of totalitarian soul-structure as determining all of man’s behavior. And this is precisely what the Bible means when it says that out of the heart, the center and core of all of man’s functions, are the issues of life! [311]

Continuing, now, with my own formulation of the answer to our problem, let us next consider the relation of the heart to the varied activities of man. In agreement with Hoekstra, J. H. Bavinck, and Dooyeweerd, and for the reasons which they advance,²⁹ I prefer to speak of *functions* of the heart or soul rather than *faculties*. In fact, our entire historical study, particularly of Thomas and Bavinck,

²⁸ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 31.

²⁹ See above, p. 211.

has revealed the inadequacy of the conception of “faculties.” So we shall speak of functions, to stress the fact that the whole soul or heart is operative in each such activity, and that these activities have no independence in themselves.

Now in this thesis we are not primarily concerned with the question of the number, differentiation, and precise definition of the functions of the soul. This is a complicated question, and one worthy of a separate investigation. As a matter of fact, recent psychological trends may bring about considerable modification in our traditional conceptions of these functions. We noted, for example, Brederveld’s remark that what we ordinarily call intellect and will are not simple, elementary mental acts but extremely complex and involved.³⁰ In other words, it may be that we should not even speak of “intellect” as a separate function of the heart, but should make finer distinctions within what we ordinarily call “intellectual” activity. The same may have to be said about “feeling” and “will.” The widening of our psychological horizons and the deepening of our psychological perspectives in recent years, as indicated [312] by Müller-Freienfels, may make it necessary for us to distinguish as functions of the soul certain capacities which have never before been so distinguished. So I shall not hazard a classification of the functions here. It does not matter so greatly, it seems to me, how many functions one distinguishes; the important thing is to have a proper conception of how those functions are related to the soul or heart of man.

The Whole Self Active in All of Man’s Functions

In connection with this relation between the functions and the heart, there are two very important points to remember. The first is that the whole heart or the whole self is active in all the functions; and the second is that all the various functions are interrelated. Beginning now with the first of these points, it is easy to demonstrate that the entire heart or soul is active in all the functions of man. We may go back to our historical study to show this. Augustine, it will be remembered, made a special point of this. Mind, reason, memory, and will, he said, are simply different names for the one soul; these functions are nothing but

³⁰ See above, p. 192.

various “properties” of the one soul. If there is anything that I am certain of, says Augustine, it is that it is I who will, who remember, and who understand.³¹ The obvious implication is that it is the whole self or soul which is active in all these activities. Thomas Aquinas, it was observed, distinguished between the powers and the essence of the soul, [313] making the faculties “accidents,” and teaching that they were only partial expressions of the soul. A careful study of Thomas’s anthropology, however, revealed that his conception of the faculties failed to do justice to the unity of the soul in all of its activities, and therefore indirectly proved the correctness of the Augustinian view.³² In our study of Bavinck, we found Bavinck clearly and carefully expressing the point that the whole self is active in all its functions: “It is always the same subject, the one, undivided man, which, through soul and body with their faculties and powers, lives, knows, desires, and moves.”³³ But, unfortunately, Bavinck did not consistently carry out this conception in his psychology, but lapsed into a “faculty” view which obscured this unified functioning of the whole self.³⁴ And yet Bavinck understood matters sufficiently well to pay at least some lip-service to this conception, thus confirming its correctness.

We may also advance Scriptural considerations for this point. For what can be the import of the ascription of all of man’s functions to the single agency of the heart, if not this, that the whole heart is active in them all? It is the heart that thinks, according to Scripture; it is the heart that wills; it is the heart that feels — and the heart is understood as the very inmost core of man. Surely what the [314] Bible is trying to tell us is that it is the single, undivided totality of man which is expressing itself in all these functions!

Again, we may also adduce some psychological considerations. The heart or the soul is not divisible into “parts.” To think so or imagine so betrays a physical, materialistic conception of the soul. The soul is a unit. It is not one part of the soul that wills, another part that thinks, another part that remembers, and so on — but it is the whole soul which is active in each of these functions. It

³¹ See above, pp. 74–77, and footnote 38 there.

³² See above, pp. 100–108.

³³ See above, p. 204, and cf. the material immediately preceding.

³⁴ See above, pp. 205–11.

will be recalled that this was precisely the point established by the “psychology of consciousness,” according to Müller-Freienfels. Though beginning with the attempt to isolate separate acts or “elements” of consciousness, this school was forced by the results of its investigations to the conclusion that the totality of the soul is behind each so-called “element” of consciousness, giving to that element its peculiar color and meaning. The fourth school, too, the “psychology with a soul,” came to the conclusion that perceptions and ideas occur only as functions of the whole soul or “I,” and can be understood only when the whole soul is understood. In fact, we may say that the whole thrust of the history of modern psychology, as summarized by Müller-Freienfels, is to indicate that the totality of the soul is active in all of its functions.

We may note, in passing, a few statements by other students of psychology which confirm the point we have been making. J. Leycester King, in an essay on “The Soul and its Faculties,” says, “In the most strict sense, it is not reason that understands, nor will that desires, nor does the soul [315] understand or desire; it is the *man*, the single and complete *being* . . . who understands and desires.”³⁵ M. Scott Fletcher, whose work on *The Psychology of the New Testament* has been previously noted, expresses the same thought: “Behind the threefold activity of thinking, feeling, and willing lies the unity of the ego or self, the subject of these states of consciousness.”³⁶ Richard Müller-Freienfels, from whose history of psychology we have just quoted rather extensively, was not only a historian, but also a psychologist in his own right. In the following description of his own psychological position, it will become evident that he, too, believed that the whole soul or self is active in all the functions of man:

The entire self is involved in every mental act, a fact borne out by language which says: I sense, I think, and the like. All mental experiences are “attitudes” of the totalitarian self. These attitudes are of a fundamentally motor nature. They are rooted in instincts which are involved in all intellectual life. What atomistic psychology designates as independent “elements,” that is, feelings, sensations, ideas, and so forth, are to be conceived only as fractional phenomena of the organic attitudes of the self,

³⁵ J. Leycester King, “The Soul and its Faculties,” in *Man*, ed. G. J. MacGillivray (London: Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1938), 46.

³⁶ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 20.

in which bodily movements play a decisive role. Every perception, every act of thought or will is not merely an experience of consciousness; the total psychophysical self in such acts adopts a simultaneously active and sensitive attitude toward a real or imagined object.³⁷

Behind all apparently separate acts . . . stands the totality of the self, whose structure conditions not only separate acts but one's whole *Weltanschauung*.³⁸

[316] From all of this it should certainly be apparent that the point which has been discussed above (namely, that the whole soul or heart is active in all its functions) is both Scripturally and psychologically sound. This does not mean, of course, that we can fully and completely understand how the whole soul or heart can be active in various diverse functions. This is, in fact, the fundamental mystery of psychology: how the soul can be one and yet, while remaining one, be active in so many distinct activities. About all we can say about this mystery is to repeat what Augustine said fifteen hundred years ago: namely, that it is related to the fundamental mystery of the Trinity. God is one and yet three, wholly existent in each of the three Persons, and yet diverse in each of these three manifestations. Since man has been made in God's image, it is not surprising that something of this same mysterious unity amidst diversity is found in him.

Now I suppose that it is the attempt to make this mystery, involved in the very structure of man's soul, somewhat understandable which has caused many to attribute "parts" or separate personified "faculties" to the soul. The fact that we cannot understand a mystery, however, should not make us deny it. The mysteriousness of the inner working of the human heart is no excuse for splitting the soul of man into separate, isolable "parts," or for denying that the whole heart is active in all its functions. [317]

³⁷ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 277.

³⁸ Müller-Freienfels, *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*, 278. Notice how strikingly this sentence confirms the primacy of the heart, as developed in this thesis.

The Various Functions of the Soul Interrelated

The second point we wish to make about the relation between the functions and the heart is that all the various functions are interrelated. They never occur in isolation. A moment's consideration will make this clear. Let us take, for example, one of the simplest psychological processes: perception. The perception of a tree is not a simple, but a complex process; it involves much more than a mere functioning of "the intellect."³⁹ Not only does sensation enter into such a perception, but also memory, without which the tree could never be identified as a tree. Willing enters into it, since there must have been some kind of voluntary decision to fix one's attention to the tree. And feeling enters into it, since, as the psychologists tell us, every sensation has some kind of feeling-tone, be it ever so slight. There is always some dim consciousness of either pleasure or displeasure at the perception of a tree, depending on the particular "set" of the mind at the time the tree is perceived. If, for example, the tree is seen as an object worthy of admiration for its own sake, it will excite pleasure; if, however, that same tree be perceived as an obstacle which interferes with a clear view of a beautiful landscape beyond it, the perception of the tree will be accompanied by pronounced displeasure.

Similarly, we may observe that even an elementary "feeling" of pain or pleasure involves some kind of perception [318] of the pain or pleasure, and some measure of volition, whereby the person either attends or refuses to attend to the source of the pain or pleasure. Again, the most simple "act of will," to use a popular expression, involves some kind of plan, derived from "the intellect," and some kind of motive, derived from "the emotions."

If this interrelation of the various functions of the soul holds for elementary processes, it stands to reason that it should certainly hold for the more complex mental acts. Into an involved process of reasoning, for example, there enter not only perceptions, memories, and associations, but also choice (since some choice must be made as to which of the various interpretations considered shall be adopted) and feeling (since what always more or less determines which "reason"

³⁹ Strictly speaking, it is not even correct to speak of "the intellect," since intellect is not a separate "thing" in man, but simply the whole soul functioning in a certain way.

or course of action we adopt is the way we feel about the various so-called rational considerations advanced). Similarly, a strong emotion always involves the perception of a total situation (which gives rise to the emotion) and the “act of will” whereby we attend to that situation. Again, every major decision of “the will” involves not only perceptive and emotional elements, but the whole of a man’s past experience, and the totality of his character.

From all of this it will be evident that when we call some mental process “an intellectual act,” or “a volitional decision,” we are speaking in figurative language. As a matter of fact, everything we do involves intellectual, volitional, [319] and emotional factors.⁴⁰ Fletcher makes this clear when he says:

Most psychologists are agreed that in every conscious state three mental elements interact. They are separable in thought, but no one element can exist without the presence of the other two. . . . These three elements . . . are Thinking, or cognition (the intellectual element), Feeling (the emotional element), and Willing (the purposeful or moral element).⁴¹

It must be remembered that each mental element is not separate and distinct in itself, nor can it operate without the co-operation of the other two. The cognitive element of thought involves some feeling and some amount of willing. The feeling element interacts with thinking and the exercise of will, and the conative activity of willing is impossible without some measure of both thought and feeling.⁴²

To the same effect is a statement taken from Hamilton’s *Metaphysics*:

In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters; in Nature, they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific

⁴⁰ In fact, as was suggested above, it may be necessary to add even more “factors” than the customary three. When we speak in terms of these three, we do so merely in accord with popular language.

⁴¹ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 220.

⁴² Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 19.

abstraction that we are able to analyse the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination.⁴³

Foston himself, from whose book the above was quoted, expresses himself on this point as follows: “We may say that in every moment and in all circumstances we are knowing-*cum*-feeling-*cum*-striving in one commingled current of living, rather than [320] separately knowing, and separately feeling, and separately striving.”⁴⁴

It may be objected, however, that there is always some one aspect — intellectual, volitional, or emotional — which predominates in every conscious state and thereby determines its quality. This, of course, cannot be denied. Fletcher, for example, points out that in each moment of consciousness some one element is more prominent than the other two, and gives its distinctive name to the total state.⁴⁵ “Each conscious state, as a matter of fact, is highly complex, involving many mental processes, but the distinctive and dominant characteristic of each state gives to it the name by which it can be classified with others in which a like element prevails.”⁴⁶ Similarly, A. T. Ormond says: “There is no abstract psychosis of either thought, will, or feeling, but . . . all psychoses are complex and concrete, and . . . the form is determined simply by the element that dominates.”⁴⁷

If, now, all of this be kept clearly in mind, there can be no objection to speaking of “an intellectual act,” “a volitional decision,” or “an emotional state.” But then we must understand that in such states or acts all the functions of the soul co-operate and interact. We must never think of [321] any action or mental state as produced by any one function acting in isolation. For there are no such functions in the soul. Abstraction may be necessary for purposes of investigation, but we must never make the mistake of isolating the abstraction from the whole of which it is a living part.

⁴³ William Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, 1:188 f.; quoted in Hubert M. Foston, *Man and the Image of God* (London: Macmillan, 1930), 75 f., footnote 1.

⁴⁴ Foston, *Man and the Image of God*, 14.

⁴⁵ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 220.

⁴⁶ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 18.

⁴⁷ Alexander T. Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), 261. It is obvious that this writer uses the expression “psychosis” not in its modern sense but as equivalent to “conscious state.”

What we have been saying about the interrelatedness of all the functions follows also from what was said about the whole soul or self being active in all of man's functions. If this is true, as has been shown, and if the soul has not merely one but several functions, it must then be exercising all of these functions at all times — since it acts not in parts but as a whole. This is not to deny that one function usually predominates over the others in any particular act or state. But we must insist, in the name of sound psychology, on the interconnectedness and interdependence of all the functions of the soul.

Wrong to Make One Function Primary

Now it will be clear why it is so wrong to make one of the functions of the soul or heart primary or sovereign over the others. First of all, because these so-called “faculties” are, after all, only functions of the heart or soul, which operates through them. They are only ways in which the heart is active; they have no independence apart from the heart, but are utterly dependent on it. What is really sovereign in man, therefore, can only be the heart itself. To make one of the functions of the heart sovereign over the [322] others is to forget the functional character of these powers, and is equivalent to personifying them. It means to make what is only a function of the soul into an independent agency in the soul. But this, as we have clearly seen above, especially in connection with Thomas and Bavinck, breaks up the unity of the soul and virtually denies the Scriptural view of the centrality of the heart. And, therefore, we must reject such a view as not consistent with a Biblical anthropology.

The second reason why it is wrong to make one of the functions of the heart sovereign over the others is that such a position denies the interrelatedness of the functions. To make one power of the soul primary is to suggest that one function does occur in isolation and dominates the other functions. But, as has been shown above, this is not true. Every functioning of “the intellect” is accompanied by volitional and emotional phenomena, and cannot operate without them. The latter two types of phenomena are just as essential to the intellectual functioning of the soul as the intellectual is to the others. All the powers of man's soul

are always active. As Augustine said, “All that we do is done by these three.”⁴⁸ Now to call one of the functions of the soul sovereign over the other functions is not only to deny the functional character of these powers, but also to deny the interrelatedness of all the functions. [323]

It is therefore wrong to speak of a primacy of the will in man. We have previously noted attempts of this sort, and have called attention to the error involved in this position. The “will” is, after all, only the self in the act of choosing. W. Geesink makes this very clear when he says:

It is therefore our conscious soul which, in the core of its being, in our “ego,” does the willing. It is our “ego”; it is “we” who, having chosen a worthy goal through rational deliberation, and having attained insight into the means, direct and determine ourselves to the attainment of that goal.⁴⁹

On this basis, then, it is not “the will” which chooses or determines the direction of our life; it is the self or ego — in Biblical language, the heart — which actually does the choosing. “Will,” then, is just another name for a choice made by the person involved. To make the “will” primary, is then equivalent to making “choice” primary, and forgets that what is more important than the “choice” as such is the person who does the choosing. The activities of the person, including his volitional activities, as we have seen, are concentrated in the heart. It is there, and not in the “will,” that the primacy or sovereignty must be placed.

Hence it is also wrong to speak of a “primacy of the intellect” in human nature.⁵⁰ For “the intellect” is only the heart or soul in the act of thinking. It is not a separate [324] agency in man, or a separate compartment in his soul; it is only a function, and specifically a function of the whole soul or heart. Hence it

⁴⁸ See above, p. 80. What Augustine meant by “these three” was intellect, will, and memory. But the thrust of his remark holds with equal logic for whatever division of the chief functions of the soul one may wish to adopt.

⁴⁹ Wilhelm Geesink, *Van's Heeren ordinantiën* (Amsterdam: Kirchner, 1907), 1:427.

⁵⁰ It will be recalled that we are here, as elsewhere in this chapter, not using the term primacy in the sense of chronological priority, or qualitative pre-eminence, but in the sense of sovereignty. The primacy of the intellect which is repudiated here is the conception of the intellect as the ruling center in man.

is very clear that what must be made primary, determinative, and sovereign in man is not “the intellect” as such, but the heart.

The conception of the “primacy of the intellect,” in fact, is not a Scripturally-derived position. As was shown in chapter 4, it has actually been derived from Greek philosophy, particularly from Plato and Aristotle, and is rooted in Greek metaphysics, which claims that “the intellect” is the most real and the most godlike aspect of man. For Plato, only what partakes of reason really exists; what does not partake of reason does not exist; and whatever is in between pure reason and pure matter has being only to the extent to which it is informed by reason. Aristotle, moreover, taught that the active reason, the *nous*, is not the mere “form” of the body but comes into man from the outside, and returns to God after death, being imperishable and eternal. Man’s reason, then, according to Aristotle, is a “spark of divinity” within him; it is a part of the “Absolute Reason” of the universe, which he calls God. This, the metaphysical background of the “primacy of the intellect” idea, needless to say, is thoroughly anti-scriptural.

Furthermore, our study of Calvin has shown that it is not possible to combine the primacy of the intellect with the primacy of the heart in such a way as to obtain a consistently Scriptural anthropology. For these two do not mix. When Calvin attempts to mix them, the result is a hybrid anthropology, which posits two ruling centers in man: the heart (meaning the [325] will and the emotions) and the intellect. But if one is really the ruling center, the other cannot be. We must make a choice between the Greek view and the Scriptural view. If we wish to be consistently Scriptural, we must choose for the primacy of the heart (in its full, Scriptural sense), and must repudiate the primacy of the intellect.

Is There a Logical Priority of the Intellect?

In this connection, however, a possible objection must be met. Is it not true that there is a kind of logical priority of the intellectual function? This is T. Hoekstra’s position. After having denied that we can properly speak of a primacy of the intellect in the sense of sovereignty or dominance, he goes on to assert that there is a logical order in the normal life of the soul. With respect to that logical order, he says:

When seen from the viewpoint of logical order, there is no doubt but that the intellect has the primacy. The life of knowing logically precedes the life of striving and feeling. Only what is known is desired and evaluated. What I do not know I can neither desire nor enjoy.⁵¹

What shall we say about this observation? As far as the terminology is concerned, I would think it wiser to avoid the term *primacy* in this connection, since it connotes sovereignty (compare, for example, the expression, “the primacy of the Pope of Rome”). To avoid confusion, it is best to abandon this term altogether in speaking of the functions of man. Substituting, then, the word *priority* for *primacy*, may we say that there is a kind of logical priority of the intellectual [326] function?

Even this formulation of the problem is not without its difficulties. For, as has been pointed out above, no single function is actually prior in the life of the soul, neither in a chronological nor in any other sense. All the functions are always operative. There is no “pure intellection”; nor is there any “pure” willing or feeling. The intellectual function does not operate in isolation: how, then, can we speak of its “priority”?

We may, however, say that in certain mental processes the activity of the intellect is the predominant one, and the product of such mental processes we generally call *knowledge*. Without denying that emotional factors and volitional factors enter very significantly into the acquisition of knowledge, we may still concede that knowledge is primarily a product of intellectual functioning. Rephrasing our question once more, then, is there a sense in which we may speak of a priority of knowledge in the life of man?

I believe that we may. We cannot deny the fact that some kind of knowledge must precede conscious decisions, since man, being a “rational creature,” must always base his decisions on some modicum of knowledge. That knowledge in any particular case may be very slender, or even very erroneous, but some element of real or imagined knowledge must always be there before the actual decision is made. The extent to which knowledge “determines” decision may vary all the way from the care with which a scientist conducts an involved investigation before

⁵¹ Hoekstra, *Paedagogische psychologie*, 45.

deciding what view of certain phenomena he will hold, [327] to the momentary consideration of the drunkard who, before raising his glass, decides that this one drink will not hurt him and is therefore a desirable good. Man, as Bavinck is fond of saying, does evil *sub ratione boni* — that is, because he thinks it is good. More modern psychologists would call this process *rationalization*, and would say that in such cases man invents reasons to justify doing what he knows he should not do but nevertheless wants to do. Be that as it may, the fact remains that man always requires some kind of an intellectual construction of a situation before he acts on it, imperfect and deceptive though that construction may be. He decides on the basis of knowledge. And in this sense we not only may but must say that there is a kind of priority of knowledge in man's life.⁵²

Behind the Priority of Knowledge is the Primacy of the Heart

We must never forget, however, that behind this priority of knowledge is the primacy of the heart. This will be evident as we review briefly, first of all, some psychological considerations. As we have stated, there is no separate intellectual “compartment” in the mind. “Intellect” simply means the man or the self functioning in a certain way. So even the priority of knowledge does not take away the simple and obvious fact that the knower is prior to the knowledge. [328]

It must, further, be remembered that in the acquisition of knowledge the whole man is active. Even into the simplest act of perception, as we have seen, all of a man's past experience enters. We may even go so far as to say that what a man perceives in a given instance depends on what kind of man he is. Two men will see two entirely different things in the same microscope, depending on the difference in the totality of their minds. If this is true of even the simplest method of acquiring knowledge, how much more is this not true of the more complex “intellectual” activities? To acquire knowledge is a function predominantly intellectual, but what kind of knowledge one acquires depends primarily on the disposition of the learner's heart. In the functioning of “the intellect” the

⁵² While repudiating the metaphysical framework in which this thought occurs in Greek philosophy, we may at least admit that there is this much truth in the Greek conception of the guidance of “the reason” in man.

whole self is active; so the self is still prior to knowledge. And, since the self is concentrated in the heart, what ultimately determines what kind of knowledge a man acquires is the state of his heart.

Though it may, therefore, be admitted that there is a priority of knowledge in man's life, we must at the same time maintain that the real ruling center in man is not his "intellect" but his heart. For the knowledge by which he guides himself comes up out of his heart, and is determined by the condition of his heart. In fact, it is, strictly speaking, only the self or the heart which knows; it is not the intellect which knows, for the intellect is only a function of the self. So the priority of knowledge by no means controverts the primacy of the heart.

We may look, further, at some historical confirmations [329] of this point. It will be recalled that Bavinck frequently makes similar assertions, saying, for instance, "One's philosophy is frequently nothing else than the history of his heart."⁵³ In another connection he says, "Out of the heart are the issues of life, also of the life of the intellect."⁵⁴ In fact, it was specifically noted in connection with Bavinck's discussion of the faculties that what he says about the guiding function of the intellect does not invalidate his emphasis on the primacy and centrality of the heart.⁵⁵ Though we may find fault with Bavinck's formulation of the role of the intellect in human life, still we may wholeheartedly agree with one of his basic thrusts: that the heart is determinative for the functioning of the intellect.

We may also find historical confirmation for the point we have been making by reviewing the position of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. These men, it will be recalled, are attempting to construct a consistently Scriptural philosophy, and to reject all extraneous, unscriptural elements. Dooyeweerd specifically repudiates the concept of the "primacy of the intellect," linking this view with that which affirms the sufficiency of natural reason in philosophy.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Dooyeweerd points out that in all theoretical abstraction our selfhood is

⁵³ See above, p. 13.

⁵⁴ See above, p. 39.

⁵⁵ See above, pp. 37–39. See also pp. 31–39.

⁵⁶ See above, p. 61.

intellectually operative.⁵⁷ Hence he and Vollenhoven posit the heart of man as the starting-point or source of all philosophy.⁵⁸ [330] What is the significance of this position? This: that not the intellect as such but the heart is primary in man, since the heart determines the kind of philosophy a man shall have. Intellectual functioning, according to these men, is in the last analysis simply the systematic explication of the basic assumptions accepted and believed in the heart. It is obvious that this confirms precisely the point we have been making.⁵⁹

Scripture also confirms this point. In chapter 7 this was demonstrated at some length, by quotations from a number of scholars in the field of Biblical psychology.⁶⁰ There is no need to repeat this demonstration here; we may, however, remind the reader of the words in which this demonstration was summarized: [331]

In the light, now, of this Scriptural teaching, what becomes of the “primacy of the intellect”? Is it the intellect which rules and determines man’s life? On the basis of the Scriptural study just concluded we shall have to answer this question decidedly in the negative. It is not the intellect which ultimately determines the direction of man’s life, according to Scripture, but the heart. In fact, the functioning of the intellect, in Scripture, is

⁵⁷ See above, p. 63.

⁵⁸ See above, pp. 59–63.

⁵⁹ It was rather significant to me to find that an independent study of the meaning of the concept heart for our Calvinistic thinking by a disciple of the Vollenhoven-Dooyeweerd school came to conclusions remarkably in accord with my own. In a volume titled *De Reformatie van het Calvinistisch denken*, ed. C. P. Boodt (The Hague: Guido de Bres, 1939), Dr. Klaas J. Popma has a chapter titled “Het uitgangspunt van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en het Calvinisme.” In this chapter he develops the following points about the heart: In his philosophy the Christian must begin by recognizing that out of the heart are the issues of thinking (p. 20). The heart is the religious root of human existence, our full selfhood or “I-ness,” the point of concentration of all our temporal functions (p. 21). With respect to the relation of man to God, God’s Word teaches us that the undivided unity, the center of our existence, can only be found in the heart, as the religious root of life (p. 22). The unity of life is more important than the diversity of functions. This unity is shown in that man remains a unity in all that he does. This means that the direction of the heart fully expresses itself in life, since that direction remains the determining element in every tiniest fragment of life (p. 24). The striking agreement of all this with what has been developed in this thesis is a remarkable confirmation of the truth of this position.

⁶⁰ See above, pp. 181–86.

directed and determined by the heart; the moral and religious disposition of the heart is reflected and mirrored in the activity of the intellect.⁶¹

What is of ultimate importance, according to Scripture, is not the mere “functioning of the intellect,” but the regenerate or non-regenerate state of the heart, which will naturally be reflected in the “intellect.” In the light of all this we see, once again, that the disposition of the heart is basic to the operation of man’s intellect.

So, even though we may admit a kind of priority of knowledge in the life of man, this by no means controverts the ultimate primacy of the heart. Neither does the admission of such a priority of knowledge justify us in speaking of a “primacy of the intellect” in man. As will be evident by this time, this whole expression betrays a false and unsound faculty psychology. Both of the words which form the chief constituents of this expression are, in fact, open to objection. The word “primacy,” as indicated above, generally connotes sovereignty and mistakenly suggests that a single aspect of man’s mental nature is the ruling power in him. This, of course, further involves the error of personifying the powers of the soul. And the term “intellect” is open to objection because it reifies what is merely a function, giving the impression [332] that the intellectual function operates in isolation from the other functions. We shall therefore be much better off if we abandon this expression entirely.

In this connection we might add that neither is it correct to use such expressions as the following: “the reason rules over the passions,” or “the will follows the judgment of the reason,” since both of these expressions virtually personify the reason. What rules is not “the reason,” but man himself; hence it is only correct to say that man controls his passions with the help of his reason. Again, only man himself makes judgments; so that we should say that man wills what by the use of his reason he deems to be right. Even to speak of a “guiding function of the intellect,” though this expression may be properly understood, is not strictly correct. For it is not the intellect which guides man but man who, through the use of his intellect, guides himself. Once again, exception must also be taken to the expression, “the will chooses what is good.” For strictly speaking, it is not

⁶¹ See above, p. 185.

the will which chooses, as Geesink has pointed out, it is the “I” or the self which chooses.⁶² Recognition of the priority of knowledge in our life, therefore, need not and should not involve us in the errors of the old “faculty” psychology.

Instead of the primacy of the intellect, consequently, I prefer to speak of a primacy of the heart in man. Now it might be objected that this is another instance of personifying what is only an aspect of man. By heart, however, I mean the whole man, the totality behind all the separate phenomena, [333] the self—as seen particularly in the core of his being. When I say “primacy of the heart,” I am simply using Scriptural language to indicate the primacy of the whole self in all its actions. And this position, as has been indicated, is in complete harmony both with Scripture and with recent psychological developments. Only this view of what is primary and determinative in man guarantees both the unity of his personality and the interrelatedness of all his functions.

Man Must Be Seen in Relation to God

Before closing this chapter, it will be helpful to look at this question of what is primary in human nature from a somewhat different perspective. Luther, it will be recalled, distinguished between a “*psychologische Ich-Begriff*,” which views man as merely the subject of all his thoughts, feelings, and experience, and a “*theologische Ich-Begriff*,” which sees man not just in relation to his psychological functions, but first of all in relation to God. For, Luther would say, in order to see man in his essential wholeness and oneness, we must see him not merely in connection with the world which surrounds him and the world of his own thoughts and feelings, but primarily as standing face to face with God. This emphasis, it was pointed out, was Luther’s outstanding contribution to our problem.⁶³

Hence we, too, wish to go beyond the merely psychological interpretation of man to the theological, and to see man in relation to God. Of course, we must also see man as related to his fellow-men. The Scriptures see man not as a

⁶² See above, p. 236.

⁶³ See above, pp. 122–26.

creature in [334] isolation, but as a being who stands in relationships. Of these relationships, as the summary of the law teaches us,⁶⁴ the one to God is primary and basic, and the one to our fellow-men is secondary and dependent on the first. We must love both God and our neighbor. Any view of man which does not take into account this twofold relationship cannot justly claim to be Biblical.

Since man's fundamental relationship is to God, we shall here consider only this first relation, bearing in mind, however, that man's attitude toward God is determinative for his attitude toward his neighbor. By nature he is prone to hate the neighbor as well as God, and by grace he is enabled once again truly to love his neighbor. Man's ethical and social adjustment, therefore, depend primarily on his adjustment to God.

When we look at man, then, in the light of his relationship to God, we see that by nature his heart is turned away from God, as the Scriptures clearly teach. The sin which God's Word reveals is rooted, not in any peripheral aspect of his being, not in any single function alone, but in the very depths of his heart, whence it corrupts and pervades his entire nature. As a consequence, his thinking, his willing, his feeling, and all other functions of his soul are polluted with sin, and are directed, not to God as they should be, but toward himself and his own self-centered interests.

By grace, however, man may be turned toward God again. [335] This turning is a supernatural work of the Spirit of God, wrought in the heart, and therefore in the inmost "part" of man. The first step in this supernatural transformation is regeneration, significantly called in the Bible the bestowal of "a new heart." The meaning of this expression is that the very core and center of man's being is renewed, by an operation of the Spirit in which man himself is wholly passive. After this transformation of the heart has been effected, man turns to God in repentance and faith. Though these are conscious decisions of man, they are only possible through divine power, and after the fundamental change of heart has taken place; thus God retains the priority in the process of salvation.

When, therefore, we think of man in relation to God, we think not of any one aspect or function of man, but we think of the whole man, as concentrated in

⁶⁴ Matt. 22:37-40.

his heart. It is man as a whole who confronts God, both as Judge and as Savior. As Fletcher puts it, “The distinctive feature in the Christian idea of personality is that the whole man — emotional, thinking, and willing — stands in closest and most intimate relationship with the Divine Spirit.”⁶⁵ That being the case, we see the view of man which has been advanced in this thesis once more confirmed. For even from the theological point of view it is plain that what matters most in man is not any single function, but the center of man’s personality: namely, his heart.

In the believer, however, even though his heart has been renewed, the old nature has not been entirely eradicated. [336] We see, therefore, in the believer, an antithesis between the old and the new man, the fleshly and the spiritual nature. This very antithesis has its seat in his heart; thus even here the heart is primary. Yet this antithesis does not disrupt man’s fundamental personal unity (though, naturally, that unity is not as perfectly experienced now as it shall be when the old nature shall have been completely done away with). For, as Luther points out, it is the same ego which is both flesh and spirit. Furthermore, the new man conquers the old, increasingly gains the victory over the old, and thus replaces the old nature as the real determiner of man’s life.⁶⁶ Whereas before the old, fleshly self had been in control, now the new, spiritual self is in control. Though we may, therefore, speak of the ego of the believer as a “complex ego,” since both old and new nature are found in it, still in another sense we may speak of the new nature as the “essential ego” in the believer, since it is the new nature which rules (though, needless to say, not perfectly or completely). It is very significant in this connection that Paul in Rom. 7, which, according to the traditional Reformed interpretation, refers to the regenerate man, does not speak of two, but of only one ego in the regenerate man. In fact, in verse 20,⁶⁷ he specifically denies that the old nature in the believer can still be called an ego in the strict sense of the term, designating this old nature with the expression, οὐκέτι ἐγώ, “no more I.” The [337] implication of this passage is that it is no longer the essential “I” that sins, but something else, which Paul calls “sin which dwelleth in me.” So we may

⁶⁵ Fletcher, *The Psychology of the New Testament*, 318 f.

⁶⁶ See above, pp. 124–26.

⁶⁷ “But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me.”

conclude that the real ego, the ruling, dominant ego, in the regenerate man is not the old man but the new. Tying this in with the subject of this thesis, we may say that what is primary in the regenerate man is his new nature, his renewed heart.

All of this once again goes to show that what is primary and determinative in man, according to Scripture, is not his intellect but his heart. The disposition of the heart puts its stamp on everything that a man thinks, feels, says, and does. If the heart has not been renewed by God's Spirit, then out of that heart, as Jesus says, come forth "evil thoughts, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings, wickednesses, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness."⁶⁸ Such a heart makes true love to God and to the neighbor impossible; all of its deeds stand condemned before the judgment seat of God. But when God by His Spirit renews the heart, and man, in response to God's call, turns to God in heartfelt repentance and faith, then that man may now "out of the good treasure of his heart" bring forth good things,⁶⁹ and live in a way which is pleasing in God's sight. So — and this should always be basic in our thinking about man — everything ultimately depends on the disposition of the heart.

⁶⁸ Mark 7:21–22.

⁶⁹ Luke 6:45.

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¹This bibliography lists all the works referred to in the body of this thesis. In addition, a few works are listed which were examined but not referred to in the text. These entries are marked with an asterisk (*). Ed. note: This bibliography, including the first part of this note, was included in Anthony Hoekema's dissertation, but organized differently. In the dissertation, every individual chapter's bibliography appeared separately after the chapter. We have consolidated the entries for convenient reference.

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